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INTRODUCTION
This Survey is designed to assist lawyers and judges who
must argue and resolve search and seizure issues in Washington
State. The Survey summarizes the controlling state and federal
cases on search and seizure law and uses as an additional refer-
ence W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT (1978) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
Washington courts are likely to analyze future search and
seizure issues under both the fourth amendment and Washing-
ton Constitution article I, section 7. The difference in wording
between the two provisions is substantial, suggesting different
degrees or types of privacy protection.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV: Security from unwarrantable search
and seizure. The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.
WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7: Invasion of private affairs or home
prohibited. No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs,
or his home invaded, without authority of law.
The Washington Supreme Court has interpreted article I,
section 7 to provide greater privacy protection than the fourth
amendment in a number of circumstances. See, e.g., State v.
Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984) (test for proba-
ble cause based on an informant's tip); State v. Chrisman, 100
Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984) (lawfulness of warrantless
entry into a home); State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d
1240 (1983) (search incident to arrest and automobile exceptions
to warrant requirement); State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 640
P.2d 1061 (1982) (application of exclusionary rule); State v.
Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) (automatic
standing).
In applying the state constitution, the court has invalidated
searches and seizures that were lawful under the fourth amend-
ment. "The substantial difference in language (between the state
and federal provisions) allows us to provide heightened protec-
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tion . . . . This language has thus formed the basis for our
refusal to follow United States Supreme Court decisions defining
the extent of the freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures." State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 818, 676 P.2d
419, 422 (1984).
This Survey summarizes the predominant treatment of
search and seizure issues under the fourth amendment and
under article I, section 7 to the extent that the state provision is
interpreted differently from the federal. The Survey focuses pri-
marily on substantive search and seizure law in the criminal con-
text; it omits discussion of many procedural issues such as retro-
activity and preserving state constitutional claims for appeal,
see, e.g., In re Sauve, 103 Wash. 2d 322, 692 P.2d 818 (1985)
(retroactivity), State v. Donohoe, 39 Wash. App. 778, 695 P.2d
150 (appeal), rev. denied, 103 Wash. 2d 1032 (1985), and it does
not generally address civil actions brought under the search and
seizure provisions, see, e.g., Guffey v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 144,
690 P.2d 1163 (1984).
CHAPTER 1: TRIGGERING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE
I, SECTION 7: DEFINING SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
This section addresses three questions: (1) "What is a
search?"; (2) "What is a seizure of the person?"; and (3) "What
is a seizure of property?"
These questions represent the threshold inquiry in any
search or seizure problem because unless a true search or seizure
has occurred, within the meaning of the federal and state consti-
tutions, the constitutional protections are not triggered. This
section first will discuss when a search has occurred, be it in the
form of entry into a home or taking a blood sample. The section
then will discuss when a seizure of the person has occurred, be it
an arrest or investigatory stop. The section will conclude with a
discussion of when, for constitutional purposes, personal prop-
erty has been seized.
1.0 Defining "Search" Pre-Katz: "Constitutionally Protected
Areas"
Prior to 1967, the United States Supreme Court defined the
applicability of fourth amendment protections in terms of "con-
stitutionally protected areas." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967). The fourth amend-
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ment guarantees applied only to those searches that intrudedinto one of the "protected areas" enumerated within the fourth
amendment: "persons" (including the bodies and clothing ofindividuals); "houses" (including apartments, hotel rooms,
garages, business offices, stores, and warehouses); "papers" (such
as letters); and "effects" (such as automobiles). See generally 1
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(9a), at 223-24; Amsterdam,Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349
(1974).
In Katz, the Court rejected the rigid "constitutionally pro-
tected area" test.
The correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is notnecessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase "constitu-tionally protected area." . . . [Tihe Fourth Amendment pro-tects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes tothe public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject ofFourth Amendment protection .... But what he seeks to pre-serve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected.
389 U.S. at 350-52, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 581-82, 88 S. Ct. at 510-11
(citations omitted). Katz thus defined the scope of search pro-tections as the individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy."
The nature of this new test and the degree of continued vitality
of the old "constitutionally protected areas" test will be
examined in the following sections.
1.1 Defining "Search" after Katz: The "Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy"
In a concurring opinion in Katz, which has since come to beaccepted as the Katz test, Justice Harlan explained that the
Katz holding extends search and seizure protections to all situa-tions in which a defendant has a "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy." 389 U.S. at 360, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 587, 88 S. Ct. at 516
(Harlan, J., concurring); see generally LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 3.2(a), at 97-99. A reasonable expectation of privacy ismeasured by a "twofold requirement, first that a person haveexhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, sec-
ond, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to rec-
ognize as 'reasonable.'" 389 U.S. at 361, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 588, 88
S. Ct. at 516 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Thus, for example, although "a man's home is, for most pur-
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poses, a place where he expects privacy, . . . objects, activities,
or statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are
not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself has
been exhibited." State v. Drumhiller, 36 Wash. App. 592, 595,
675 P.2d 631, 633 (1984) (citation omitted) (legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy means more than subjective expectation of not
being discovered; defendants' claimed privacy expectation in
home not reasonable when defendants positioned themselves in
front of picture window with lights on and drapes open); see,
e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 99
S. Ct. 2577 (1979). The reasonable expectation of privacy also
has been analyzed by whether the incriminating evidence was
seen or heard from a place accessible to people who are not
unusually inquisitive. United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131
(2d Cir. 1980) (ascertainment of which objects or activities in
defendant's apartment could have been seen by naked eye from
adjacent apartment is necessary to determine reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in objects or activities).
The expectation of privacy additionally must be one "which
the law recognizes as 'legitimate.'" Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 143-44 n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 401-02 n.12, 99 S. Ct. 421,
430-31 n.12 (1978).
A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off
season may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation
of privacy, but it is not one which the law recognizes as 'legiti-
mate.'. . . Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must
have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by ref-
erence to concepts of real or personal property law or to under-
standings that are recognized and permitted by society.
Id.
Consequently, when a police investigative device is capable
of detecting only the presence of unlawful articles, the use of the
device does not constitute a search. United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 707, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 121, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644-45
(1983) (a canine sniff of luggage, when the canine is trained to
detect only contraband, is not a search within meaning of fourth
amendment); see also State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash. App. 813,
818, 598 P.2d 421, 424 (1979), rev. denied, 93 Wash. 2d 1008
(1980).
Similarly, unlawful sexual activity in a public toilet stall,
even though the stall door is closed, carries no legitimate expec-
tation of privacy. Hartman v. Virginia, 48 U.S.L.W. 3078 (Va.
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1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1979). In addition, the fourth
amendment provides no protection against a government agent
recording a person's conversation with the agent. United States
v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 59 L. Ed. 2d 733, 99 S. Ct. 1465 (1979).
In determining whether an expectation of privacy is reason-
able, the United States Supreme Court has looked to the inten-
tion of the Framers of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 546-47, 97
S. Ct. 2476, 2481-82 (1977). The Court also has considered "an
individual's possessory interest in the place searched" and "the
uses to which the individual has put a location," see, e.g., Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 265, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 704-05, 80
S. Ct. 725, 733 (1960), as well as our societal understanding that
certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from gov-
ernment invasion," see, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980) (homes especially pro-
tected). See generally Walinski & Tucker, Expectations of Pri-
vacy: Fourth Amendment Legitimacy Through State Law, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 1 (1981).
1.2 Defining Search after Katz: Continuing Vitality of "Consti-
tutionally Protected Areas"
Although the concept of "constitutionally protected areas"
does not "serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amend-
ment problem," Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 n.9, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 582
n.9, 88 S. Ct. at 511 n.9, the concept retains considerable author-
ity. A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL, & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR
THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES 1-219 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as TRIAL MANUAL].
Katz's new focus upon protection of "people, not places"
... and of justifiable expectations of privacy .. .apparently
expands but does not exhaust the Fourth Amendment's protec-
tion, for ... [the fourth amendment] protects certain kinds of
property interests-reflected in the constitutional phrases
houses, papers, and effects,-independently of any relation
that these may have to the privacy of their owner's "person"
Id.
The United States Supreme Court has referred to "constitu-
tionally protected areas" since Katz and has given special defer-
ence to the areas specifically enumerated within the fourth
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amendment. For example, the fourth amendment prohibits
police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into
a suspect's home, absent exigent circumstances, to effect a rou-
tine felony arrest. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed.
2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980).
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a
variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly
defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical
dimensions of an individual's home-a zone that finds its roots
in clear and specific constitutional terms: "The right of the
people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . shall not be vio-
lated." That language unequivocally establishes the proposi-
tion that "[a]t the very core [of the fourth amendment] stands
the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be
free from unreasonable Government intrusion." Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511. In terms that apply equally
to seizures of property and seizures of persons, the Fourth
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.
Id. Houses, then, are "constitutionally protected areas" because,
as under the pre-Katz analysis, "houses" are specifically enu-
merated within the fourth amendment. The Rakas/Katz analy-
sis of "legitimate expectation of privacy" supplements but does
not weaken the enhanced protection given the home as a "con-
stitutionally protected area." Note that Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734, 81 S. Ct. 679 (1961), cited
in Payton, was decided in the heart of the pre-Katz era of "con-
stitutionally protected areas" analysis. See also State v.
Holeman, 103 Wash. 2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89, 91 (1985); State
v. Jordan, 29 Wash. App. 924, 928-29, 631 P.2d 989, 991-92
(1981) (police observation of drugs through section of window
that inadvertently was left uncovered constituted search requir-
ing warrant; although similar "search" of hotel room had been
upheld in State v. Brown, 9 Wash. App. 937, 942, 515 P.2d 1008,
1012 (1973), instant case distinguished by greater expectation of
privacy in home as compared with motel or place of business).
1.3 Specific Applications of the Post-Katz Analysis
1.3(a) Residential Premises
As described above, an individual has a privacy interest in
the interior of his or her home. See Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 589-90, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 652-53, 100A S. Ct. 1371,
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1381-82 (1980); 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.3(b), at 298.
A search of a home can occur even when government officers do
not themselves enter the home, if they are able to monitor per-
sons, objects, or activities within the home that would not be
observable in ordinary circumstances. See United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. __ , 82 L. Ed. 2d 530, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984)
(search occurs, triggering the fourth amendment, when the gov-
ernment monitors an electronic device to determine whether a
particular article or person is in an individual's home at a partic-
ular time); Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158, 12 L. Ed. 2d 213,
84 S. Ct. 1186, (1964) (fourth amendment implicated when
microphone simply "stuck in" partition wall of apartment
adjoining defendant's apartment even when microphone does
not physically intrude into defendant's apartment).
The privacy interest in a home is not confined to houses but
extends to other types of residences. See Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483, 490, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856, 861, 84 S. Ct. 889, 893 (1964)
(hotel rooms); State v. Murray, 84 Wash. 2d 527, 535 P.2d 1303,
1308 (1974) (apartments); but see California v. Carney, 471 U.S.
-, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985) (mobile home).
A person may relinquish the privacy interest in an activity
or object in the home by making the activity or object observa-
ble to persons outside. State v. Drumhiller, 36 Wash. App. 592,
675 P.2d 631 (1984) (defendants had no reasonable privacy
interest in their activity in home when they positioned them-
selves in front of picture window with lights on and drapes
open). But a person does not relinquish his or her privacy inter-
ests in the home by opening the door in response to a police
officer's knock. State v. Holeman, 103 Wash. 2d 426, 429, 693
P.2d 89, 91 (1985). And the expectation of privacy in residential
premises may persist even when a home is fire-damaged and
arson is suspected. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 292, 78 L.
Ed. 2d 477, 486, 104 S. Ct. 641, 648 (1984).
A person using the home telephone has no privacy interest
in the phone numbers dialed, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
745-46, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 230, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 2582 (1979), nor
does he or she have a privacy interest in the contents of a phone
call when a recording machine's speaker makes incoming calls
audible to anyone present in the room, United States v. Whit-
ten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir. 1983).
Lower courts in some jurisdictions have held that common
hallways of multiple-dwelling buildings accessible to the public
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are not protected areas. 1LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.3(b),
at 299.
Finally, the privacy interest in one's home extends to situa-
tions in which the occupant is not a criminal suspect. The fourth
amendment is triggered when an officer enters a person's home
to search for someone who does not live there. See Steagald v.
United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213-14, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38, 46, 101 S.
Ct. 1642, 1648 (1981). And the fourth amendment is triggered
when a housing inspector enters to conduct an administrative
search. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 18 L. Ed.
2d 930, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967).
1.3(b) Related Structures: The Curtilage
The "curtilage" of residential premises consists of "all
buildings in close proximity to a dwelling which are continually
used for carrying on domestic employment; or such place as is
necessary and convenient to a dwelling, and is habitually used
for family purposes." United States v. Potts, 297 F.2d 68, 69
(6th Cir. 1961). Prior to Katz, the curtilage served as a control-
ling standard of an individual's privacy interest: structures
within the curtilage were protected and structures outside the
curtilage were not. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.3(d),
at 313-14.
In the aftermath of Katz, lower courts and commentators
have favored constitutional protection for structures located
within the curtilage on the grounds that residents have an
expectation of privacy in such areas. See Id. at 315 n.112.
When a case involves a structure outside the curtilage, the
reviewing court must examine whether the defendant did in fact
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area. People v.
Weisenberger, 183 Colo. 353, 355, 516 P.2d 1128, 1129 (1973)
(whether or not defendant's chicken house considered "outside
the curtilage," defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy
as to its contents); see also 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §
2.3(d), at 315-16.
Washington courts have recognized no privacy interest in
those areas of the curtilage that are impliedly open to the pub-
lic, such as usual access routes to a house. See State v. Seagull,
95 Wash. 2d 898, 902, 632 P.2d 44, 47 (1981); see also State v.
Daugherty, 94 Wash. 2d 263, 268, 616 P.2d 649, 651 (1980) (no
reasonable expectation of privacy in driveway that is exposed to
view from street and is conventional means of access to house);
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supra § 1.3(a).
1.3(c) Adjoining Lands and "Open Fields"
Certain lands adjacent to a dwelling fall within the privacy
protection surrounding the residence. "The protection afforded
by the fourth amendment, insofar as houses are concerned, has
never been restricted to the interior of the house, but has
extended to open areas immediately adjacent thereto." Wat-
tenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1968) (reasona-
ble expectation of privacy extends to backyard of lodge); see
also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214, 222,
104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741 (1984) (individual may have legitimate
expectation of privacy in "area immediately surrounding the
home"). The applicability of federal search and seizure protec-
tions to areas immediately surrounding the home is determined
by the Katz test of reasonable expectation of privacy. 1 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.3(f), at 321-22.
Adjoining lands that are used as normal access routes by the
general public are only "semi-private" and therefore do not
always enjoy the protection of the fourth amendment. Air Pollu-
tion Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861,
865, 40 L. Ed. 2d 607, 611, 94 S. Ct. 2114, 2115-16 (1974);
United States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1975);
State v. Corbett, 15 Or. App. 470, 475, 516 P.2d 487, 490 (1973).
Thus, fourth amendment protections will not apply to a police
investigation that is restricted to places where visitors could be
expected to go. E.g., State v. Daugherty, 94 Wash. 2d 263, 268,
616 P.2d 649, 651 (1980) (public portions of driveway); State v.
Coburne, 10 Wash. App. 298, 314, 518 P.2d 747, 757 (1973)
(apartment building common parking lot); see also United
States v. Magana, 512 F.2d at 1171 (public portions of drive-
way); Bicar v. Gray, 380 F. Supp. 804, 806 (N.D. Ohio 1974)
(porches); People v. Bradley, 1 Cal. 2d 80, 84-85, 460 P.2d 129,
131, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457, 459 (1969) (walkways).
On the other hand, when the police enter onto adjoining
lands that are not used as an access area by the general public,
the fourth amendment guarantees do apply. See, e.g., Fixel v.
Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 484 (5th Cir. 1974) (backyard behind
four-unit apartment building, not used as common passageway
by tenants, is protected); Norman v. State, 134 Ga. App. 767,
768, 216 S.E.2d 644, 645 (1975) (truck located under trees in
small meadow behind house and not on farm access route con-
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sidered within curtilage).
Under the old "constitutionally protected areas" analysis,
the privacy protections of the fourth amendment did not apply
at all to "open fields." Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59,
68 L. Ed. 898, 900, 44 S. Ct. 445, 446 (1924). Consequently, a
defendant could not invoke constitutional privacy protections
with respect to police intrusions onto open fields, wooded areas,
vacant lots in urban areas, open beaches, reservoirs, and open
waters. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.4(a), at 332.
The open fields doctrine has been reaffirmed under the
Katz analysis on the grounds that an expectation of privacy in
open fields is not reasonable. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214, 224, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741 (1984) ("open
fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that
the Amendment is intended to shelter from government inter-
ference or surveillance"). Moreover, a person in possession of
land cannot create a legitimate expectation of privacy by taking
steps to conceal activities such as posting no trespassing signs
and erecting fences around secluded areas. Id. at -, 80 L. Ed
2d at 227, 104 S. Ct. at 1743 (issue is whether "government's
intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment"). See generally Doe v. Dring,
2 M. & S. 448 (1814) (discussing prior cases); 2 Blackstone,
Commentaries 16, 384-85. But compare California v. Ciraolo,
161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1984) (reasonable
expectation of privacy exists when a residential backyard is sur-
rounded by a high fence; thus, aerial surveillance and
photographing of backyard constitutes search), cert. granted,
_ U.S. -, 86 L. Ed. 2d 691, 105 S. Ct. 3496 (1985), with
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 313 (6th Cir.
1984) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in "outdoor spaces"
of factory; plant "is much more like 'open fields' than it is a
home or office."), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 86 L. Ed. 2d
716, 105 S. Ct. 2700 (1985).
In addition, the fact that police commit a common-law tres-
pass while observing an object or activity in open fields does not
render the intrusion a search under the federal constitution. Oli-
ver at -, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 227-28, 104 S. Ct. at 1743-44. Thus,
an intrusion may be onto the land itself as well as by aerial sur-
veillance and still not be considered a search. See id. at -, 80
L. Ed. 2d at 224-25, 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
Under the Washington Constitution, aerial surveillance at
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certain altitudes without the aid of enhancement devices does
not constitute a search. State v. Cord, 103 Wash. 2d 361, 693
P.2d 81 (1985) (aerial surveillance of defendant's property, at
altitude of 3400 feet and without aid of visual enhancement
devices, does not constitute search, even though surveillance was
conducted with aim of discovering marijuana plants); State v.
Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 514, 688 P.2d 151, 155 (1984) (obser-
vation of defendant's marijuana plants at altitude of 1500 feet
with unaided eye not search).
The relevant inquiry under article I, section 7, however, is
not whether the observed object was in a "protected place" or
whether the defendant had a legitimate and subjective expecta-
tion of privacy in the observed location, but whether "the State
unreasonably intruded into the defendant's 'private affairs'."
Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 510, 688 P.2d at 154. See also State v.
Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 178, 622 P.2d 1199, 1205 (1980);
Nock, Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory: Article I,
Section 7, 8 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 331, 334 (1985). The nature
of the property may be a factor in determining what constitutes"private affairs," but the fact that the location of the search is
an open field is not conclusive. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 513, 688
P.2d at 155.
Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court has suggested
that even when an individual has no subjective expectation of
privacy, an intrusion nevertheless may constitute a search.
"[M]erely because it is generally known that the technology
exists to enable police to view private activities from an other-
wise nonintrusive vantage point, it does not follow that these
activities are without protection." Id. (dictum). The focus is on
"those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held,
and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass
absent a warrant." Id. at 511, 688 P.2d at 154. See State v. Cord,
103 Wash. 2d 361, 365, 693 P.2d 81, 84 (1985). See also State v.
Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 903, 632 P.2d 44, 47 (1981). Note that
in both Cord and Myrick the police used no visual enhancement
devices; in addition, their vantage points for observing the con-
traband were lawful. Cord, at 365, 693 P.2d at 84; Myrick, 102
Wash. 2d at 514, 688 P.2d at 155. Cf. Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. at -, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 227, 104 S. Ct. at 1743-44
(police committed common-law trespass to view defendant's
property). For citations to aerial surveillance cases in other juris-
dictions, see Myrick 102 Wash. 2d at 511, 688 P.2d at 154. See
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generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 Minn. L. Rev. 349 (1979); Comment, Aerial Surveillance: A
Plane View of the Fourth Amendment, 18 Gonz. L. Rev. 307
(1982-83).
1.3(d) Business and Commercial Premises
The fourth amendment privacy protections extend to most
business and commercial premises. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305, 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978) (OSHA
inspector's entry into nonpublic working areas of electrical and
plumbing business constitutes search); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392
U.S. 364, 367-70, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1154, 1158-60, 88 S. Ct. 2120, 2124
(1976) (union official has reasonable expectation of privacy in
office, even when office shared with other union officials); see
also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-546 18 L. Ed. 2d
943, 947-48, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 1740-41 (1967) (for safety violations);
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir.
1984), cert. granted, - U.S. __, 86 L. Ed. 2d 716, 105 S. Ct.
2700 (1985). A few businesses, such as those dealing with liquor
and firearms, historically have been so extensively regulated,
however, as to afford their owners no reasonable expectation of
privacy. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 313, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 312, 98 S. Ct.
at 1821.
The parts of business and commercial premises that are
open to the public for inspection of wares, however, are not as
private as nonpublic premises. "[A]s an ordinary matter law
enforcement officials may accept a general public invitation to
enter commercial premises for purposes not related to the trade
conducted thereupon . . . ." United States v. Berrett, 513 F.2d
154, 156 (1st Cir. 1975). Thus, the warrantless entry into the
public lobby of a motel and restaurant for the purpose of serving
an administrative subpoena is permitted although the "adminis-
trative subpoena itself [does] not authorize either entry or
inspection of [the] premises . . . ." Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc.,
__ U.S. -, 78 L. Ed. 2d 567, 572, 104 S. Ct. 769, 772-73
(1984) (employer may not insist upon judicial warrant as condi-
tion precedent to valid administrative subpoena unless govern-
ment inspectors seek non consensual entry "into areas not open
to the public.").
Courts generally have upheld police investigative entries
into bus terminals, pool halls, bars, restaurants, and general
stores such as furniture stores and variety stores. 1 LAFAVE,
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.4(b), at 338-39. But "[t]he 'implied invi-
tation for customers to come in'. . . extends only to those times
when the premises are in fact 'open to the public;' the mere fact
that certain premises are open to the public at certain times
does not justify entry by the police on other occasions." Id. at
339.
Although a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in com-
mercial premises, the warrant requirements for administrative
searches of commercial premises may differ from those for
searches in general. See § 6.4(b), infra.
1.3(e) Automobiles and Other Motor Vehicles
Constitutional protections against unreasonable searches
apply to automobiles and other motor vehicles. California v.
Carney, 471 U.S. -, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
"[A]utomobiles are 'effects' under the Fourth Amendment, and
searches and seizures of automobiles are therefore subject to the
constitutional standard of reasonableness." United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 548-49, 97 S. Ct.
2476, 2484 (1977).
At the same time, "the configuration, use, and regulation of
automobiles often may dilute the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy that exists with respect to differently situated property."
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235, 243, 99
S. Ct. 2586, 2591 (1979) (citations omitted). Thus, a person does
not have as great an expectation of privacy in a vehicle as in a
home. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. -,85 L. Ed. 2d 406, 105
S. Ct. 2066 (1985). Even when a vehicle is used as a home, its
owner has a lesser expectation of privacy in the vehicle if the
vehicle is readily mobile and licensed to operate on public
streets. Id. at -, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 413-14, 105 S. Ct. at 2069-70
(mobile home in public lot treated as vehicle).
The lesser expectation of privacy in a vehicle does not auto-
matically extend to closed containers within the vehicle. Chad-
wick, 433 U.S. at 12-13, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 549, 97 S. Ct. at 2484.
On the other hand, when an electronic beeper is placed within a
container and officers use a radio transmitter to monitor the
container's movement, no reasonable expectation of privacy is
invaded to the extent that the container is transported in a vehi-
cle on public roads. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 75 L.
Ed. 2d 55, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983). Cf. United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. -, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984) (monitoring
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electronic beeper while object containing beeper is inside home
violates privacy interests in home).
1.3(f) Personal Characteristics
The fourth amendment protects the right of the people to
be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and
seizures. This section examines the question of how that right
protects the search or seizure of personal characteristics, such as
fingerprints and blood samples.
Personal characteristics such as facial features and voice
tone, which are continually exposed to the public, generally are
not protected by the fourth amendment because an individual
has no reasonable expectation that these characteristics will
remain private.
In Katz v. United States, . . . we said that the Fourth
Amendment provides no protection for what "a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office
.... " The physical characteristics of a person's voice, its tone
and manner, as opposed to the content of a specific conversa-
tion, are constantly exposed to the public. Like a man's facial
characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly pro-
duced for others to hear. No person can have a reasonable
expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice,
any more than he can reasonably expect that his face will be a
mystery to the world.
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14, 35 L. Ed. 2d 67, 79, 93
S. Ct. 764, 771 (1973) (subpoena of voice exemplars infringes no
fourth amendment interest).
In contrast to the seizure of voice exemplars and facial char-
acteristics, the taking of a blood sample is a search within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 767, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 918, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1834 (1966);
State v. Wetherell, 82 Wash. 2d 865, 871, 514 P.2d 1069, 1073
(1973); State v. Osborne, 18 Wash. App. 318, 321, 569 P.2d 1176,
1180 (1977). Similarly, constitutional protections apply when
officers take scrapings from an individual's fingernails, Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295, 36 L. Ed. 2d 900, 905, 93 S. Ct. 2000,
2003 (1973), or take an individual's fingerprints, Hayes v. Flor-
ida, 470 U.S. -, 84 L. Ed. 2d 705, 709, 105 S. Ct. 1643, 1646
(1985). The line drawn between facial characteristics and voice
exemplars, on the one hand, and blood samples or fingernail
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scrapings, on the other, may be explained by the fact that the
evidentiary value of the former is immediately perceivable. 1
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 2.6(a), at 366. Cf. United States
v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 63 L. Ed. 2d 141, 100 S. Ct. 874 (1980)
(handwriting exemplars not protected).
It should be noted that although drawing blood constitutes
a seizure, the defendant unknowingly may have consented to the
procedure. For example, a person who drives a motor vehicle
may give implied consent to the administration of blood tests in
certain circumstances. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.308 (1969). See
State v. Judge, 100 Wash. 2d 706, 710, 675 P.2d 219, 224 (1984)
(driver gives implied consent to blood testing when arrested for
negligent homicide or when unconscious and while being
arrested for driving while intoxicated).
1.3(g) Personal Effects and Papers
The fourth amendment expressly protects the right of pri-
vacy in "papers . . . and effects . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Although litigation concerning the search, seizure and use of
the content of private papers frequently centers on the fifth
amendment bar against self-incrimination, see, e.g., Andresen v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627, 638, 96 S. Ct.
2737, 2745 (1976); United States v. Howell, 466 F. Supp. 835,
838 (D. Or. 1979), the fourth amendment can act as an addi-
tional bar because of the protection accorded "papers" and"effects." LaFave and other commentators have argued that
even when the seizure and use of private papers is consistent
with the fifth amendment, the fourth amendment poses an abso-
lute bar against the use of any highly private content in such
papers. E.g., 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 2.6(d), at 395-99;
Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Pro-
tected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90
HARV. L. REV. 945, 989 (1977); see Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 350, 34 L. Ed. 2d 548, 566, 93 S. Ct. 611, 626 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Diaries and personal letters that rec-
ord only their author's personal thoughts lie at the heart of our
sense of privacy."); see also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S.
649, 65 L. Ed. 2d 410, 100 S. Ct. 2395 (1980).
Papers and effects are protected even when they are not in
the home. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8, 53 L. Ed.
2d 538, 546, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2482 (1977). For example, the con-
tents of a film not released to the public continue to be pro-
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tected even after the government is in lawful possession of the
film. Walter at 654, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 416, 100 St. Ct. at 2400. On
the other hand, the legitimate expectation of privacy disappears
when papers and effects are made available to the public. Mary-
land v. Macon, - U.S. -, 86 L. Ed. 2d 370, 377, 105 S. Ct.
2778, 2782 (1985) ("[T]he officer's action in entering the book-
store and examining the wares that were intentionally exposed
to all. . . did not infringe a legitimate expectation of privacy.").
Thus, the contents of a film are protected even when the govern-
ment is in lawful possession of the film, but only provided the
film has not been made available to the public. Walter at 654, 65
L. Ed. 2d at 416, 100 S. Ct. at 2400.
A reasonable expectation of privacy does not continue in
personal effects if the individual's relinquishment of the effects
occurred under circumstances indicating that the individual
retained no reasonable expectation that the effects would remain
unobserved. 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.6(b), at 369-70.
For example, the fourth amendment guarantees do not apply to
an object thrown from a moving car, United States v. McLaugh-
lin, 525 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904
(1976), or to any object left behind in a place accessible to the
general public. United States v. Smith, 293 A.2d 856 (D.C.
1972). But the guarantees do apply when a taxicab passenger
drops an object to the floor of the cab, Rios v. United States,
364 U.S. 253, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1688, 80 S. Ct. 1431 (1960), or when an
individual carries an object covered with a blanket into the hall-
way of a building and sets the object down while he makes a
telephone call at a phone located twenty to thirty feet away.
United States v. Boswell, 347 A.2d 270 (D.C. 1975). For a
detailed discussion of the caselaw on the expectation of privacy
in abandoned personal effects, see 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 2.6(b), at 366-75. For a discussion of the specific issue
of privacy expectation in garbage, see 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 2.6(c), at 375-86.
A reasonable expectation of privacy exists in the contents of
first-class mail and of sealed packages. United States v. Jacob-
sen, 466 U.S. 109, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984);
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 25 L. Ed. 2d 282,
90 S. Ct. 1029 (1970); State v. Morgan, 32 Wash. App. 764, 650
P.2d 228 (1982).
Placing a beeper inside an object does not in and of itself
constitute a search. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. -, 82 L.
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Ed. 2d 530, 539-40, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3301-02 (1984). Monitoring
the beeper and thereby tracking the object may constitute a
search of the location but not of the object. Id. at -, 82 L.
Ed. 2d at 549, 104 S. Ct. at 3307 (tracking of ether container
into home infringes privacy interest in home); cf. United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 75 L. Ed. 2d 55, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983)
(monitoring beeper in chloroform container invaded no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy because monitoring occurred only
while container was taken from store and transported in auto-
mobile on public highways and did not occur when container
was moved into residence).
1.3(h) Special Environments: Prisons, Schools, and Borders
Prisoners are not accorded the-same expectations of privacy
in their cells and effects as citizens generally enjoy in their
homes and effects. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. -, 82 L. Ed.
2d 393, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984) (5-4 decision). Students in public
schools and persons at or near borders also may have reduced
expectations of privacy. See generally infra § 6.1 (schools),
6.2(a) (prisons), and 6.3 (borders).
1.4 Defining Seizures of the Person
A person may be "seized" for purposes of the fourth amend-
ment even when he or she is not arrested. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). A seizure occurs"whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away. . .. " Id. at 16, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 903, 88 S.
Ct. at 1877; see Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50, 61 L. Ed. 2d
357, 361, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2640 (1978).
The test for a seizure is an objective one: a seizure occurs
when law enforcement officers give "a show of official authority
such that 'a reasonable person would have believed he was not
free to leave.'" Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502, 75 L. Ed. 2d
229, 239, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326 (1983) (plurality opinion) (cita-
tion omitted). The fact that a person is unconscious, however,
does not mean that he or she is not seized. See Seattle v. Sage,
11 Wash. App. 481, 484-85, 523 P.2d 942, 945 (1974). See gener-
ally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.1(a), at 215-22.
For a discussion of the level of proof needed to make
seizures of the person, see infra § § 2.1 (arrest) and 2.9(b) (Terry
stop).
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1.4(a) Consensual Encounters
A consensual encounter with an officer does not trigger the
fourth amendment, even when the individual has been
approached by, and is aware of the officer's identity as, an
officer. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 497, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 236,
103 S. Ct. at 1324; see State v. Bockman, 37 Wash. App. 474,
682 P.2d 925 (1984); State v. Belanger, 36 Wash. App. 818, 677
P.2d 781 (1984). The amendment is triggered, however, when an
individual is not free to leave an officer's presence and is aware
that his or her liberty is restrained, even when the officer
couches the forcible stop in terms of a "request." State v. Byers,
88 Wash. 2d 1, 6, 559 P.2d 1334, 1336 (1977). Thus, questioning
by law enforcement officers remains consensual until a reasona-
ble person would believe that he or she could not leave the pres-
ence of the officers or until he or she refuses to respond to their
inquiries and the police take further action. INS v. Delgado,
__ U.S. -, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247, 255, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1763
(1984) (INS agents moving systematically through factory
inquiring about workers' citizenship while other INS agents sta-
tioned at exits did not constitute seizure either of workforce or
of individual workers). See also Florida v. Rodriguez, - U.S.
__, 83 L. Ed. 2d 165, 105 S. Ct. 308 (1984). See generally infra
§ 5.10 (discussing what constitutes consent).
1.4(b) Seizures in Vehicles
A seizure of a person in an automobile occurs as soon as an
officer in a police car switches on the flashing light. State v.
Stroud, 30 Wash. App. 392, 394-96, 634 P.2d 316, 318 (1981),
rev. denied, 96 Wash. 2d 1025 (1982); State v. Owens, 39 Wash.
App. 130, 692 P.2d 850 (1984); see United States v. Hensley,
469 U.S. -, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985); Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).
A seizure also occurs when an officer stops automobiles pursuant
to a systematic "spot check" for drivers' licenses or vehicle regis-
tration. State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 706 P.2d 225
(1985).
1.4(c) Seizures in Homes
The fourth amendment is triggered even though a person is
detained in his or her own home. Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692, 696, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 345, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2590-91
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(1981); see State v. Holeman, 103 Wash. 2d 426, 693 P.2d 89
(1985).
1.4(d) Civil Offenses
The fourth amendment is triggered by a seizure of the per-
son even though seizure pertains to civil, and not criminal,
offenses. See State v. Klinker, 85 Wash. 2d 509, 514-15, 537 P.2d
268, 274 (1975).
1.5 Defining Seizures of Property
The fourth amendment protects a person's possessory inter-
est in effects as well as his or her privacy interest. See United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 120, 103 S. Ct.
2637, 2644 (1983). A seizure of property "occurs when there is
some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interests in that property." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 94, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1984). Put differ-
ently, an object is seized for purposes of the fourth amendment
when government agents exercise "dominion and control" over
the object. Id. at __ , 80 L. Ed. 2d at 99, 104 S. Ct. at 1660.
Interference with an individual's possessory interests in
some circumstances may implicate an individual's liberty inter-
ests. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at -, 77 L. Ed. 2d at
122, 103 S. Ct. at 2645 (seizure of luggage at airport "can effec-
tively restrain the person since he is subjected to the possible
disruption of his travel plans in order to remain with his luggage
or to arrange for its return"); see also 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 9.6, at 61.
1.6 Standing to Raise Search and Seizure Claims
Traditionally, a criminal defendant alleging an infringement
of fourth amendment rights first had to show "standing" to raise
the claim. The defendant's burden was to demonstrate that the
interest in the outcome of the controversy stemmed from a vio-
lation of his or her rights rather than from the violation of the
rights of some third party. 3 LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.3,
at 543-44.
The Court created an exception to this rule for a defendant
charged with an offense having possession of property as an ele-
ment when the defendant challenged the search or seizure of the
property. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697,
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80 S. Ct. 725 (1960). The defendant in such a case has "auto-
matic standing." Id.
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court merged the con-
cept of standing into fourth amendment privacy analysis. Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-40, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 397-99, 99 S.
Ct. 421, 427-29 (1978). Under the new analysis, a defendant may
challenge a search or seizure only when he or she possesses a
personal privacy interest in the area searched or the property
seized. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85, 65 L. Ed. 2d
619, 623-24, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 2549 (1980); see State v. Hayden,
28 Wash. App. 935, 938-41, 627 P.2d 973, 975-77 (1981) (search
and seizure of stolen purse upheld after defendant permitted
officers to view purse in glove compartment of automobile
because defendant had no personal privacy interest in stolen
purse). For example, when an individual has no expectation of
privacy in "checks and deposit slips retained by [the] bank," he
or she may not object to their seizure. United States v. Payner,
447 U.S. 727, 732, 65 L. Ed. 2d 468, 474, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2444
(1980). A defendant may not object to the admission of evi-
dence, as a violation of the fourth amendment, when the evi-
dence "was seized unlawfully from a third party not before the
court." Payner, 447 U.S. at 735, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 476, 100 S. Ct.
at 2446.
Although the Rakas concept of "personal" privacy interest
is relatively new, the Court has given some indication of the sit-
uations in which a defendant does or does not have such an
interest. Generally, an individual "who owns or lawfully pos-
sesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate
expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude." Rakas,
439 U.S. at 144 n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 401 n.12, 99 S. Ct. at 431
n.12; see also State v. Mathe, 102 Wash. 2d 537, 688 P.2d 859
(1984). But, although
property ownership is clearly a factor to be considered in
determining whether an individual's Fourth Amendment rights
have been violated, . . . property rights are neither the begin-
ning nor the end of [the] inquiry .... [A]n illegal search only
violates the rights of those who have "a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the invaded place."
Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 91-92, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 628, 100 S. Ct. at
2553 (unlawful possession of stolen goods stored in apartment of
another does not confer on thieves a reasonable expectation of
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privacy as to interior of apartment).
A person who resides in an apartment with the permission
of the lessee and who has a key to the apartment may assert a
privacy interest in the interior of the apartment. See Rakas, 439
U.S. at 141-42, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 399-400, 99 S. Ct. at 429-30 (cit-
ing Jones v. United States 362 U.S. 257, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 80 S.
Ct. 725 (1960)).
A mere passenger in a motor vehicle may not assert a per-
sonal privacy interest in the interior of the vehicle, Rakas, 439
U.S. at 148-50, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 404-05, 99 S. Ct. at 433-34,
whereas a person who is driving the vehicle with the owner's
permission may. United States v. Lopez, 474 F. Supp. 943, 946
(C.D. Cal. 1979). See generally Comment, Possession and Pre-
sumptions: The Plight of the Passenger Under the Fourth
Amendment, 48 FORD. L. REV. 1027 (1980).
In merging standing into privacy analysis, the Court aban-
doned the concept of automatic standing. United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980).
Hence, although the fourth amendment no longer governs
searches of stolen goods, it does apply to searches of legally pos-
sessed items discovered in the search of stolen goods: for exam-
ple, there is a protected privacy interest in closed boxes con-
tained in a stolen car. See People v. Dalton, 24 Cal. 3d 850, 855,
598 P.2d 467, 470, 157 Cal. Rptr. 497, 500 (1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 946 (1980). Defendants who claimed a stolen footlocker
belonged to their brother established a possessory interest as
bailees sufficient to have standing under Rakas. State v.
Grundy, 25 Wash. App. 411, 416, 607 P.2d 1235, 1237 (1980).
But a defendant may not claim an expectation of privacy in the
interior of an acquaintance's purse into which he has placed his
belongings. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106, 65 L. Ed. 2d
633, 642, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2562 (1980). For an examination of the
impact Salvucci may have on an accused's rights, see Note,
United States v. Salvucci, The Problematic Absence of Auto-
matic Standing, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1045 (1981).
Unlike the fourth amendment, article I, section 7 of the
Washington Constitution invests a defendant with automatic
standing to seek the suppression of contraband when the posses-
sion of the contraband is an element of the offense charged. See
State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 179, 622 P.2d 1199, 1206
(1980) (four justices upholding the rule on basis of state consti-
tution). See also State v. Johnson, 38 Wash. App. 793, 690 P.2d
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591 (1984); State v. Keller, 35 Wash. App. 455, 458 n.5, 667 P.2d
139, 141 n.5 (1983). The Washington Supreme Court has gone
beyond Rakas on the basis of state statute. A defendant was
accorded standing to challenge the use of a co-defendant's con-
versation that had been recorded in violation of the Washington
Privacy Act. State v. Williams, 94 Wash. 2d 531, 544, 617 P.2d
1012, 1020 (1980); see WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030. Cf. Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 22 L. Ed. 2d 176, 187-88, 89 S.
Ct. 891, 966-68 (1969).
The state may not raise the issue of lack of standing for the
first time on its appeal of a suppression order. State v. Grundy,
25 Wash. App. at 415, 607 P.2d at 1237 (1980) (distinguishing
Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 22, 33 L. Ed. 2d 308, 92 S. Ct.
2284 (1972), when standing was raised on appeal by the govern-
ment as respondent).
CHAPTER 2: STANDARDS OF PROOF
2.0 Nature of Probable Cause: Introduction
This chapter examines the concept of probable cause as it
relates to searches and seizures conducted with or without a
warrant. The first part of the chapter discusses the nature of the
standard; subsequent sections discuss specific types of informa-
tion considered in determining whether probable cause has been
shown; and the chapter concludes with a discussion of the spe-
cial searches and seizures for which probable cause is not the
standard employed.
The fourth amendment provides that "no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause .. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The probable cause requirement is a compromise between the
competing interests of enforcing the law and protecting the indi-
vidual's right to privacy. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 176, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1890-91, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311 (1949).
Police officers must have probable cause even for searches and
seizures in which no warrant is required. In the case of a valid
warrantless search or seizure, police may make the initial deter-
mination of whether probable cause exists. The grounds for the
search or seizure, however, must be strong enough to obtain a
warrant. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-81, 9 L.
Ed. 2d 441, 450-51, 83 S. Ct. 407, 413-14 (1963). For a warrant to
be issued, a magistrate must make the probable cause determi-
nation. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.1, at 438-39.
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Both an officer's decision and a magistrate's warrant author-
ization are subject to judicial review. In addition, when a suspect
is arrested without a warrant, he or she may not be detained for
an extended period of time without a judicial determination of
probable cause. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124-25, 43 L. Ed.
2d 54, 71, 95 S. Ct. 854, 868-69 (1975).
The probable cause requirement may be satisfied even when
police make a reasonable mistake of fact. State v. Seagull, 95
Wash. 2d 898, 908, 632 P.2d 44, 50 (1981) (warrant valid even
though officer misidentified tomato plant as marijuana). But
when police make a mistake of law and incorrectly believe that
certain conduct is unlawful, a search or seizure based upon that
belief is invalid. State v. Melrose, 2 Wash. App. 824, 828, 470
P.2d 552, 555 (1970).
For an extensive analysis of the nature of probable cause,
see 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 3.1-3.2, at 437-99.
2.1 Probable Cause Standard: Arrest Versus Search
In terms of quantum of evidence, the probable cause test is
the same for arrests and searches. Probable cause for a search,
however, does not necessarily justify an arrest; probable cause
for an arrest does not necessarily justify a search. For a search,
the officer must have probable cause to believe that the items
sought are connected with criminal activity and will be found in
the place to be searched. For an arrest, the officer must have
probable cause to believe that an offense has been or is being
committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. See,
e.g., State v. Gluck, 83 Wash. 2d 424, 426-27, 518 P.2d 703, 706
(1974) (police officers' knowledge that burglary had been com-
mitted and that suspects' automobile had been seen leaving
scene of burglary sufficient probable cause for arrest).
2.2 Probable Cause Standard: Characteristics
2.2(a) Objective Test
The probable cause standard is an objective one. Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 147, 85 S. Ct. 223, 228
(1964). An officer's good faith is not enough, and an officer's
belief that probable cause was not present is also not determina-
tive. See State v. Vanzant, 14 Wash. App. 679, 681, 544 P.2d
786, 788 (1975); cf. State v. Cottrell, 86 Wash. 2d 130, 542 P.2d
771 (1975); State v. Todd, 78 Wash. 2d 362, 474 P.2d 542 (1970)
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(officer must have real belief).
The probable cause standard is based on the reasonable
person with the expertise and experience of the officer in ques-
tion. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897-98, 45 L. Ed.
2d 623, 629, 95 S. Ct. 2585, 2589 (1975) (border patrol officers
are entitled to draw inferences in light of their prior experience
with aliens and smugglers). Thus, an officer's particular exper-
tise is critical. See State v. Smith, 93 Wash. 2d 329, 352, 610
P.2d 869, 883 (1980) (ability to identify marijuana); State v.
Compton, 13 Wash. App. 863, 866, 538 P.2d 861, 862 (1975)
(ability to smell and recognize marijuana). The basis of the
officer's knowledge and the relevance of the knowledge to the
particular case must be articulated so that the magistrate may
make an independent determination of probable cause. See 1
LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.2(d), at 461-65; see generally
infra §§ 2.4, 2.5, and 2.7.
2.2(b) Probability
Probable cause is a quantum of evidence "less than
would justify . . . conviction," yet "more than bare suspicion."
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 93 L. Ed. 1879,
1890, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310-11 (1949). To make an arrest, the
officer need not have facts sufficient to establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt but only reasonable grounds for suspicion, cou-
pled with evidence of circumstances sufficiently strong in them-
selves to warrant a cautious and distinterested person believing
that the suspect is guilty. State v. Scott, 93 Wash. 2d 7, 11-12,
604 P.2d 943, 944 (1980) (officers possessing description of car
used in robbery and license number of similar car used in rob-
bery involving similar modus operandi had probable cause to
arrest persons at address where car parked); see State v. Baxter,
68 Wash. 2d 416, 420-21, 413 P.2d 638, 641 (1966) (officers who
observed appellant at 4:00 a.m. walking near store had probable
cause to arrest when they observed him notice the officers, drop
things he was carrying, and quickly run away).
One commentator has suggested that a "more probable than
not" standard is unnecessary when the police know that a crime
has been committed but have more than one suspect, yet neces-
sary when the police have a suspect but are unsure whether a
crime has been committed. 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §
3.2(e), at 479-81; see State v. Hammond, 24 Wash. App. 596,
600, 603 P.2d 377, 379 (1979) (officer smelling marijuana on bus
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containing more than one person does not have probable cause
to arrest any individual). For a suggestion of when less than fifty
percent probability should suffice to justify the search of a par-
ticular place or the seizure of a particular object, see LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.2(e), at 476-93.
2.2(c) Individualized Suspicion
Police have probable cause to arrest an individual only if
they possess reasonable grounds to believe that that particular
individual has committed the crime. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S.
85, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979); State v. Smith, 102
Wash. 2d 449, 454, 688 P.2d 146, 149 (1984) ("The mere fact
that petitioner fit the description of a brown-haired, white male,
5 feet 10 inches tall, weighing 145 pounds, is insufficient to meet
the Sanders test of reasonable, articulable grounds to believe
that the suspect is the intended arrestee.") (citing Sanders v.
United States, 339 A.2d 373, 379 (D.C. App. 1975)); State v.
Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d 289, 293-94, 654 P.2d 96, 100-01 (1982);
see State v. Larson, 93 Wash. 2d 638, 645, 611 P.2d 771, 774
(1980). If the police are unable to single out the suspect, proba-
ble cause may not be present. See Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 480, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 451, 83 S. Ct. 407, 414 (1963).
Several exceptions, however, exist. For example, a roadblock
in which police stopped all cars exiting a ferry was upheld when
the police had probable cause to believe that persons suspected
of committing a violent felony were on board. State v. Sil-
vernail, 25 Wash. App. 185, 190-91, 605 P.2d 1279, 1283, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 843, 66 L. Ed. 2d 51, 101 S. Ct. 124 (1980).
Individualized suspicion is not required for some administrative
searches as well. See generally infra § 6.4(b),(c).
2.3 Information Considered: In General
A court reviewing a probable cause determination considers
only the information that was available to the magistrate at the
time that the warrant was issued or to the officer at the time of
arrest or search. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
481-82, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 451, 83 S. Ct. 407, 414 (1963). Probable
cause must be based on facts and not on mere conclusions. Agui-
lar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112-13, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 727, 84 S.
Ct. 1509, 1512-13 (1964). In addition, probable cause must exist
at the actual time of arrest or search; it may not be stale. See
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United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. -, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 686, 104
S. Ct. 3405, 3411 (1984); State v. Higby, 26 Wash. App. 457, 461,
613 P.2d 1192, 1195 (1980) (information about sale of marijuana
occurring two weeks earlier could not support present search);
cf. State v. Smith, 39 Wash. App. 642, 694 P.2d 660, 665-66
(1984) (evidence of 100-150 three-to-four foot marijuana plants
and extensive marijuana-growing operation on defendant's prop-
erty not stale after one month). The state has the burden of
establishing the factual basis for the search or arrest and must
present sufficient facts to enable the court to make an indepen-
dent determination of probable cause. State v. McCord, 19
Wash. App. 250, 254-55, 576 P.2d 892, 895 (1977) (no probable
cause when officers stopped vehicle without factual basis, even
though officers found illegally transported cedar wood in back of
truck when driver consented to search); see also State v. Patter-
son, 83 Wash. 2d 49, 69, 515 P.2d 496, 508 (1973) (Utter, J., dis-
senting) (affidavit supporting the search warrant was based
entirely on reports of unidentified informants and hearsay, and
therefore the magistrate issuing the warrant had no basis on
which to independently determine probable cause).
Information need not be admissible at trial in order to sup-
port probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
173, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1889, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1309 (1949) (evidence
rules often based on danger of misuse by jury rather than on
lack of probative value of information). See State v. Osborne, 18
Wash. App. 318, 322, 569 P.2d 1176, 1180 (1977) (marital privi-
lege does not apply to information supporting issuance of search
warrant). See generally infra § 7.3(c).
2.3(a) Hearsay
Hearsay may be considered when there is a substantial basis
for crediting it. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 65 L. Ed.
2d 619, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 271, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 708, 80 S. Ct. 725, 736 (1960); State v.
Luellen, 17 Wash. App. 91, 562 P.2d 253 (1977); see generally
infra § 2.5.
Although the Washington Supreme Court has not addressed
the question of multiple hearsay, a court of appeals decision
indicates that multiple hearsay may be considered if the require-
ments are met for each person in the chain of information. State
v. Laursen, 14 Wash. App. 692, 695, 544 P.2d 127, 129 (1975);
see State v. Vanzant, 14 Wash. App. 679, 683, 544 P.2d 786, 789
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(1975) (information passed to second detective by detective with
personal knowledge of informant's reliability sufficient to estab-lish probable cause for arrest); see generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 3.2(d), at 470 n.83.
2.3(b) Prior Arrests, Prior Convictions, and Reputation
A magistrate or police officer making a probable cause
determination may consider prior arrests and convictions that
have probative value to the specific probable cause inquiry.
Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 172, 93 L. Ed. at 1888-89, 69 S. Ct. at 1309;
Little v. Rhay, 68 Wash. 2d 353, 357, 413 P.2d 15, 18 (1966)
(probable cause for narcotics arrest found on basis of cumulative
facts, including defendant's previous four- to five-year narcotics
use). A prior record of the same type of criminal conduct is
insufficient to establish probable cause. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 97, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 147, 85 S. Ct. 223, 228 (1964); State v.
Hobart, 94 Wash. 2d 437, 446, 617 P.2d 429, 434 (1980) (prior
arrest for narcotics possession not sufficient basis for probable
cause to search without warrant). But prior acts may establish
probable cause when the modus operandi is similar and distinc-
tive. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.2(d), at 471.
A general assertion of criminal reputation has been consid-
ered insufficient to establish probable cause, Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637, 644, 89 S. Ct. 584,
589 (1969); but see United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583,29 L. Ed. 2d 723, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 2081-82 (1971) (plurality opin-
ion). Specific facts leading to a conclusion that a suspect has a
bad reputation may be considered. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 3.2(d), at 470-76.
2.4 First-hand Observation
Because the existence of probable cause depends on particu-
lar facts, it is impossible to define broadly when an officer's
observations amount to probable cause. Nevertheless, several
common fact patterns enable some generalization.
2.4(a) Particular Crimes: Stolen Property
Suspicious conduct suggesting that property is stolen does
not always establish probable cause. For example, when officers
saw two men park a car in an alley, load it with cartons, and
drive away, and later return and repeat their conduct, the
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officers did not have probable cause to believe that the cartons
contained stolen property. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98,
103, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134, 139, 80 S. Ct. 168, 171-72 (1959).
In a Washington case, officers stopped a vehicle after learn-
ing that its owner had an outstanding warrant for a traffic viola-
tion. The police then saw an unpadded, unsecured television in
the open trunk. A passenger in the car claimed ownership of the
set, but was unable to identify the brand. The court held that
the police had reasonable cause to believe the television was sto-
len. State v. Glasper, 84 Wash. 2d 17, 21, 523 P.2d 937, 940
(1974); See also State v. Sinclair, 11 Wash. App. 523, 532, 523
P.2d 1209, 1215 (1974). See generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 3.6(a), at 643-47.
2.4(b) Particular Crimes: Illegal Substances
Odor may establish probable cause. E.g., United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. -, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530, 104 S. Ct. 3296, reh'g
denied, 105 S. Ct. 51 (1984); State v. Huckaby, 15 Wash. App.
280, 549 P.2d 35 (1976); State v. Compton, 13 Wash. App. 863,
864-65, 538 P.2d 861, 861-62 (1975) (officer who recognized smell
of marijuana emanating from properly stopped car had probable
cause to search suspect for controlled substances). A view of
what is suspected to be contraband but also may be an innocent
substance will not amount to probable cause absent additional
suspicious circumstances. E.g., State v. Hunt, 15 Or. App. 76, 79,
514 P.2d 1363, 1365 (1973).
An officer who relies on sight or odor must have a sufficient
basis, grounded in expertise and experience, for believing that
the substance was contraband. See State v. Cord, 103 Wash. 2d
361, 693 P.2d 81 (1985); State v. Pristell, 3 Wash. App. 962, 965,
478 P.2d 743, 745 (1970) (narcotics officer observing vial contain-
ing beige-white powder had probable cause to arrest suspect for
possession of heroin). The officer's expertise and experience
must appear in the record. State v. Matlock, 27 Wash. App. 152,
156, 616 P.2d 684, 687 (1980) (affidavit that stated marijuana
plants were observed will establish probable cause if affidavit
also avers that affiant had skill to identify such plants on sight).
Police also may use specially trained narcotics dogs to
establish probable cause. See, e.g., State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash.
App. 813, 598 P.2d 421 (1979), rev. denied, 93 Wash. 2d 1008
(1980).
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2.4(c) Association: Persons and Places
Mere association with a person whom the police have
grounds to arrest does not constitute probable cause for arrest of
the companion. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587, 92 L.
Ed. 210, 216, 68 S. Ct. 222, 225 (1948) (search of car passenger
unjustified when driver arrested for possession of counterfeit
gasoline ration coupons). Companionship with an offender at the
time of the latter's criminal conduct does not establish probable
cause for arrest of the companion when no facts suggest that the
companion participated in the conduct. See State v. Thompson,
93 Wash. 2d 838, 841, 613 P.2d 525, 527 (1980). Similarly, mere
proximity to others suspected of criminal activity does not in
itself establish probable cause to search the associate. Ybarra v.
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 245, 100 S. Ct. 338,
342 (1979).
When, however, a person is continually present at a place
where criminal activity is openly and repeatedly conducted,
there may be probable cause to arrest. Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 37, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 740, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1631-32 (1963)
(probable cause existed to arrest wife of narcotics dealer when
couple's apartment had been used as base for drug operations);
cf. State v. Cabigas, 3 Wash. App. 740, 744, 477 P.2d 648, 649
(1970) (affidavit failed to establish connection between defen-
dant and drugs). Various hypothetical situations are presented
in 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.6(c), at 657-65.
A high crime rate in a particular area may be considered in
determining the existence of probable cause. See Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 177, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1891, 69 S. Ct.
1302, 1311 (1949) (probable cause exists to stop known bootleg-
ger in area of his usual operations). But an individual's presence
in a high crime area is not sufficient by itself. See Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979);
State v. Larson, 93 Wash. 2d 638, 642, 611 P.2d 771, 774 (1980)
(police must have independent cause to question passengers of a
car stopped for a traffic violation in a high crime area). See gen-
erally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.6(g), at 676-80.
2.4(d) Furtive Gestures and Flight
A suspect's furtive gestures or flight, taken alone, cannot
establish probable cause; they may, however, be considered. See
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 41, 66, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 937, 88 S.
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Ct. 1889, 1904 (1968) (probable cause existed when strangers
tiptoed from apartment and fled from police officer); State v.
Baxter, 68 Wash. 2d 416, 421, 413 P.2d 638, 642 (1966) (proba-
ble cause existed when defendant dropped his possessions and
ran from police after emerging from a business at 4:00 a.m.); cf.
State v. Bockman, 37 Wash. App. 474, 682 P.2d 925 (1984). The
action must be reasonably interpreted as furtive or in flight. See
People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 729 (1970). For an extensive analysis of furtive gestures by
occupants of stopped vehicles, see 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 3.6(d) and (e), at 665-71.
2.4(e) Response to Questioning
When combined with other circumstances, a suspect's
response to police questioning can give rise to probable cause.
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897, 45 L. Ed. 2d 623, 629,
95 S. Ct. 2585, 2589 (1975) (dicta) (border patrol may consider
defendant's responses to questioning as part of facts and circum-
stances in their determination of probable cause); State v.
Fricks, 91 Wash. 2d 391, 399, 588 P.2d 1328, 1333 (1979) (defen-
dant's co-conspirators' dubious alibis properly considered when
officer had independent cause to suspect co-conspirators); State
v. Byrd, 25 Wash. App. 282, 286, 607 P.2d 321, 324 (1980)
(officer entitled to consider defendant's nervous admissions,
defendant's resemblance to witness' description of suspect, and
defendant's close proximity in time and place to crime to form
probable cause for arrest).
Failure or refusal to answer an officer's questions, however,
may not be taken into account. State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92,
106, 640 P.2d 1061, 1069 (1982). See generally 1 LAFAvE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 3.6(f), at 674; Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 n.3,
61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 363 n.3, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641 n.3 (1979).
Silence after Miranda warnings have been given may not be
considered in determining probable cause, Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610, 618, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 98, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245 (1976),
nor may the suspect's failure to challenge the officer's actions.
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 594, 92 L. Ed. 210, 219, 68
S. Ct. 222, 228 (1948) (officers could not infer probable cause
from suspect's failure to protest arrest or to proclaim
innocence).
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2.5 Information from an Informant: In General
An enormous quantity of caselaw exists on the question of
when information from a police informant-often a crimi-
nal-may be used as a basis for probable cause. In the past,
information from an informant could establish probable cause
only when the facts available to the police satisfied a two-prong
test. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 729,
84 S. Ct. 1509, 1514 (1964).
Under the "basis of knowledge" prong of the test, facts
must be revealed that enable the person making the probable
cause determination to decide whether the informant had a
basis for the allegation of criminal conduct. Under the "verac-
ity" prong, facts must be presented so that the magistrate can
determine either the inherent credibility of the informant or the
reliability of the informant on this particular occasion. Id.; see
also Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S. 410, 415-16, 21 L. Ed.
2d 637, 643, 89 S. Ct. 584, 589 (1969); State v. Jackson, 102
Wash. 2d 432, 435, 688 P.2d 136, 138-39 (1984). So long as each
link in the chain of information satisfies the two-prong test,
multiple hearsay may be considered. United States v. Carmi-
chael, 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973); cf. State v. Luellen, 17
Wash. App. 91, 92, 562 P.2d 253, 256 (1977).
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court replaced the
Aguilar-Spinelli test with a totality of the circumstances
approach for determining when an informant's tip may establish
probable cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 76 L. Ed. 2d
527, 543, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328 (1983); see Massachusetts v.
Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 80 L. Ed. 2d 721, 727, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2087
(1984). The Washington Supreme Court, however, has held that
article I, section 7 of the state constitution requires adherence to
the two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test despite the United States
Supreme Court's abandonment of the test in Gates. State v.
Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); State v.
Adame, 39 Wash. App. 574, 694 P.2d 676 (1985); see also State
v. Smith, 102 Wash. 2d 449, 688 P.2d 146 (1984). For a discus-
sion of Gates and its impact on search and seizure law, see 1
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.3, at 189-223 (1985 Cum.
Supp.); Moylan, Illinois v. Gates: What It Did and Did Not Do,
20 CRIM. L. BULL. 93 (Mar./Apr. 1984).
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2.5(a) Satisfying "Basis of Knowledge" Prong by Personal
Knowledge
The best way to satisfy the "basis of knowledge" prong is to
show that the informant based his or her information on per-
sonal knowledge. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 12 L. Ed.
2d 723, 729, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 1514 (1964); State v. Jackson, 102
Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984). For example, an informant's
statement that he had observed the defendant selling narcotics
will satisfy the prong. McCray v. Illinois, 396 U.S. 300, 304, 18
L. Ed. 2d 62, 66, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 1059 (1967). But cf. 1 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.3, at 539-40 & n.164 (criticizing McCray
for failing to require a showing that the informant knew the sub-
stance was a narcotic). Hearsay, however, also may establish the
basis of an informant's knowledge. See State v. Jackson, 102
Wash. 2d 432, 437-38, 688 P.2d 136, 140 (1984) (dictum).
Under article I, section 7, a deficiency in the basis of knowl-
edge prong may be remedied by "independent police investiga-
tory work that corroborates the tip to such an extent that it sup-
ports the missing [element] . . . ." Id. at 438, 688 P.2d at 140;
see also State v. Adame, 39 Wash. App. 577, 694 P.2d 678
(1985). The corroborated information, however, must itself sug-
gest criminal activity. "Merely verifying 'innocuous details',
commonly known facts or easily predictable events should not
suffice to remedy [the] deficiency . . . ." Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d
at 438, 688 P.2d at 140. (citations omitted). See also State v.
Chatmon, 9 Wash. App. 741, 745-46, 515 P.2d 530, 534 (1973)
(dicta). See generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.3(f), at
564.
2.5(b) Satisfying "Veracity" Prong by Past Performance
Police may establish the veracity prong by demonstrating
the informant's general credibility. A mere conclusion that the
informant is a "credible person" is insufficient; reasons for
believing the informant to be credible are required. Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 727, 84 S. Ct. 1509,
1512 (1964); State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136
(1984).
The fact that an informant's past information has led to
convictions is a sufficient showing of reliability. E.g., United
States ex rel. Hurley v. Delaware, 365 F. Supp. 282, 286 (D. Del.
1973); State v. Adame, 37 Wash. App. 94, 678 P.2d 1299 (1984).
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An informant's reliability may also be established when theinformant was used successfully on a prior occasion to make a
controlled purchase of narcotics. State v. Fisher, 96 Wash. 2d
962, 965, 639 P.2d 743, 746 (1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137,73 L. Ed. 2d 1355, 102 S. Ct. 2967 (1982). But see id. at 968, 639
P.2d at 747 (Utter, J., dissenting). See generally 1 LAFAvE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.3(b), at 511-15.
The Washington Court of Appeals upheld a warrant based
on an affidavit which merely stated that the informants previ-
ously had supplied information leading to arrests and recovery
of contraband. State v. Frye, 26 Wash. App. 276, 279, 613 P.2d152, 155 (1980). Courts have held that an informant who assists
in an arrest is credible. The arrest does not need to be lawful,
and the facts learned following the arrest do not have to verifythe informant's tip. E.g., State v. Hutton, 19 Ariz. App. 95, 99,
505 P.2d 263, 267 (1973). Some courts have read Aguilar to hold
that general statements alleging past reliability of the defendant
are sufficient. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.3(b), at
508-22 (criticizing such decisions for relying on allegations too
general to show credibility).
In the absence of circumstances showing unreliability, an
officer need not have personal knowledge of the informant'strack record but may rely on information from fellow officers.
State v. Vanzant, 14 Wash. App. 679, 681-82, 544 P.2d 786, 788
(1975). See infra § 2.7.
2.5(c) Satisfying "Veracity" Prong by Admissions Against
Interest and by Motive
When an informant cannot be shown to be generally credi-
ble, police may establish the informant's reliability on the par-
ticular occasion. For example, an admission against penal inter-
est may indicate truthfulness. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S.
573, 583-84, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723, 733-34, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 2081-82,
(1975); State v. Lair, 95 Wash. 2d 706, 711, 630 P.2d 427, 430-31(1981). See generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.3(c), at
523 n.100. A statement against penal interest made to a citizen
is considered just as reliable, if not more so, than one made to
the police. Lair, 95 Wash. 2d at 711, 630 P.2d at 430.
Reliability also may be established by showing that theinformant had a strong motive to assist the police. See State v.
Bean, 89 Wash. 2d 467, 572 P.2d 1102 (1978). In Bean, the
informant had been arrested on a drug offense and cooperated
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with police in return for a favorable recommendation at sentenc-
ing. The informant set up an illegal drug purchase; the police
accompanied the informant to the arranged purchase, but
arrested the defendant before the purchase occurred. The
informant's tip was held to be reliable in part because of his
strong motive to help the police. Id. at 471, 572 P.2d at 1104; see
State v. Smith, 39 Wash. App. 642, 694 P.2d 660 (1984) (verac-
ity prong satisfied by informant's strong motive to provide accu-
rate information: officials offered informant reduction in charge
from felony to misdemeanor in unrelated matter); see also
United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 600, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723,
743, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 2090 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 1
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.3(c), at 522-35 (1978); id., at
200-206 (Supp. 1985) (person in position of an informant would"not lightly undertake to divert the police down blind alleys").
2.6 Citizen Informants- Victim/Witness Informants: In
General
The Aguilar "basis of knowledge" and "veracity" tests
apply to the use of information from a citizen informant, such as
a victim or witness. Again, multiple hearsay is acceptable so long
as each instance meets the two-prong test. See, e.g., United
States v. Wilson, 479 F.2d 936, 940-41 (7th Cir. 1973) (service
station employee notified police after learning through telephone
call to American Express office that defendant was attempting
to use a stolen credit card; the hearsay report from the citizen-
informant was considered reliable because it was not likely to be
colored by self-interest and was volunteered by an identified
party, and the American Express report was reliable for reasons
analogous to the business records exception to the hearsay rule).
2.6(a) Satisfying the "Basis of Knowledge" Prong
The basis of the "citizen-informant's" knowledge must be
established. See State v. Sieler, 95 Wash. 2d 43, 47-48, 621 P.2d
1272, 1275 (1980). In most cases no issue is presented because
the citizen is an eyewitness. When, however, the facts have come
from someone who is not an eyewitness or when the information
given required some expertise, such as the ability to identify the
odor of marijuana, the basis of the informant's knowledge
requires demonstration. See generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 3.4(b), at 602-06.
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2.6(b) Satisfying "Veracity" Prong by Partial Corroboration of
Informant's Tip and by Self-Verifying Detail
In other jurisdictions, the veracity of citizen informants hasbeen presumed, and corroboration of their information held
unnecessary. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.4(b); see,e.g., Allison v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 14, 21, 214 N.W.2d 437, 441-442
(1974). Commentators favor this view if the witnesses had nomotive to falsify. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.4(b), at
587-602.
The presumption of reliability attaches only to the citizen-informant, and some courts have indicated that the state has the
burden of showing that an informant deserves citizen status.
See, e.g., People v. Herdan, 42 Cal. App. 3d 300, 305-06, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 641, 644 (1978) (informant provided police officers withprearranged signal that narcotics were present within the defen-
dant's vehicle, but because the state failed to distinguish theinformant as a citizen-informant rather than as paid informant,
reliability could not be inferred, and information given to police
officers did not constitute probable cause.) If the burden is not
met, the requirements for criminal informants must be shown.
See generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.4(a), at 587-
602.
Washington courts, however, require a showing of reliability
for citizen-informants. See State v. Woodall, 100 Wash. 2d 74,77, 666 P.2d 364, 366 (1983); State v. Fisher, 96 Wash. 2d 962,
965, 639 P.2d 743, 745, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137, 73 L. Ed. 2d1355, 102 S. Ct. 2967 (1982). Although details provided by aninformant may establish the requisite basis of the informant's
knowledge, Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L. Ed. 2d
637, 89 S. Ct. 584 (1969), they will not establish the informant's
veracity when the details are consistent with innocent or lawful
behavior. State v. Chatmon, 9 Wash. App. 741, 746-47, 515 P.2d530, 535 (1973). Thus, when an anonymous informant told policethat a person of the defendant's description, riding in a car of a
particular description and license number, was carrying mari-juana, police corroboration that such a person was in such a car
did not establish the informant's reliability. Id. at 746-47, 515P.2d at 535. The corroborated details must themselves create areasonable inference that the law is being violated. Id. (citation
omitted). Cf. State v. Luellen, 17 Wash. App. 91, 562 P.2d 253
(1977).
When a citizen-informant is fully identified to the magis-
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trate, however, "intrinsic indicia of the informant's reliability
may be found in his detailed description of the underlying cir-
cumstances of the crime observed or about which he had knowl-
edge." State v. Northness, 20 Wash. App. 551, 557, 582 P.2d 546
(1978) (informant gave details of location of marijuana in her
own apartment but belonging to a roommate; details sufficient to
establish reliability). Consequently, when an affidavit contains
the name and address of a citizen-informant, states that the
informant had personally witnessed a crime, and describes the
underlying circumstances with specificity, "no independent cor-
roboration is required." Id. at 557-58, 582 P.2d at 550 (citations
omitted).
Finally, the veracity prong may require less of a showing in
exigent situations. "Where eyewitnesses to crime summon the
police, and the exigencies are such (as in the case of violent
crime and the imminent possibility of escape) that ascertain-
ment of the identity and background of the informants would be
unreasonable, the 'reliability' requirement might be further
relaxed." Northness, 20 Wash. App. at 555, 582 P.2d at 548
(citations omitted). See generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 3.3(e), at 548.
2.6(c) Sufficiency of Information Supplied
Factors that have been considered in determining whether
sufficient information has been provided include: (1) the particu-
larity of the description of the offender or the vehicle; (2) the
size of the area in which the perpetrator might be found; (3) the
number of persons in the area; (4) the direction of flight; (5) the
activity or condition of the person arrested; and (6) the knowl-
edge that the person or his vehicle has been involved in other
similar criminal activity. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §
3.4(c), at 611-18.
When a citizen can identify a suspect by name or by photo-
graph, the information is sufficient to establish probable cause.
The use of photo identification, however, is subject to challenge
on the deficiencies noted in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377, 384-86, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247, 1253-54, 88 S. Ct. 967, 971-72
(1968) (for example, initial misidentification of suspect could be
retained in witness' memory).
Washington cases discussing particular fact patterns
include: State v. Palmer, 73 Wash. 2d 462, 464, 438 P.2d 876,
878 (1968) (finding probable cause for arrest forty-five minutes
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after robbery victim identified automobile by make, year, color,
dirty white top, and clothes hanging in rear, and described sus-
pect by hair color and attire); State v. Kohler, 70 Wash. 2d 599,
605, 424 P.2d 656, 660 (1967) (finding probable cause when two
witnesses provided police with descriptions of vehicle, clothing,
and build of suspects, and when probability of two like cars
traveling within limited area of Seattle at 12:30 a.m. was slight);
State v. Baker, 68 Wash. 2d 517, 520, 413 P.2d 965, 967-68
(1966) (finding probable cause when robbery victims identified
make, color, and license number of suspect vehicle); State v.
McClung, 66 Wash. 2d 654, 656-57, 660, 404 P.2d 460, 461-62
(1965) (finding probable cause when robbery victims described
suspects, patterns of two crimes similar, and anonymous caller
identified vehicle used in narcotic sales by year, color, make and
license number and gave description of suspects); State v. John-
son, 64 Wash. 2d 613, 615, 393 P.2d 284, 285-86 (1964) (findingprobable cause when citizen gave detailed description of defen-
dants and direction of flight); State v. Thompson, 58 Wash. 2d
598, 601-03, 364 P.2d 527, 528-30 (1961) (finding probable cause
when citizen gave description of defendant's appearance and
physical condition and when defendant was found in close prox-
imity to situs of crime); State v. Hutton, 7 Wash. App. 726, 734-
35, 502 P.2d 1037, 1042-43 (1972) (officer's mere knowledge of
defendant's prior charge for possession of marijuana insufficient
to establish probable cause).
2.7 Police as Informants
2.7(a) Satisfying "Veracity" and "Basis of Knowledge" Prongs
As with citizen-informants, the veracity of police informants
may be presumed. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,
110, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684, 691, 85 S. Ct. 741, 747 (1965); see also,
United States v. Various Gambling Devices, 478 F.2d 1194, 1200
(5th Cir. 1973) (FBI agent's personal observations assumed to be
reliable). But see State v. Vanzant, 14 Wash. App. 679, 681, 544
P.2d 786, 788 (1975) ("[Pjrobable cause may rest upon hearsay
received from an informant if a reasonable person could con-
clude that, first, the present information is reliable; and second,
the informant himself is reliable.").
Generally, there must be a showing that the officer had abasis for his or her knowledge. In limited, complex situations,
however, when setting forth the grounds for belief would be dif-
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ficult, conclusory allegations will suffice. Jaben v. United States,
381 U.S. 214, 224-25, 14 L. Ed. 2d 345, 353, 85 S. Ct. 1365, 1371
(1965) (in tax evasion case, affidavit need not independently
document or spell out every factual allegation because recon-
struction of taxpayer's income from various sources could not be
alleged concisely in complaint).
2.7(b) Multiple Hearsay
An arresting officer need not have personal knowledge of the
facts establishing probable cause but may rely on another
officer's assessment. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568, 28
L. Ed. 2d 306, 313, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 1035 (1971) ("fellow officer
rule"). The validity of an arrest, however, will depend on
whether probable cause in fact existed. Id. at 568-69, 28 L. Ed.
2d at 313, 91 S. Ct. at 1036; cf. United States v. Hensley,
U.S. , 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985) (officer making
Terry stop may rely on information provided by neighboring
police department; "effective law enforcement cannot be con-
ducted unless police officers can act on directions and informa-
tion transmitted by one officer to another[,] and . . . officers,
who must often act swiftly, cannot be expected to cross-examine
their fellow officers about the foundation for the transmitted
information.") (quoting United States v. Robinson, 536 F.2d
1298, 1299 (9th Cir. 1976)); Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 74
Mass. 1225, 315 N.E.2d 530 (1974) (police may not assume that
officer issuing radio communication had reliable information).
For a discussion of the application of Whiteley, see 1 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.5(b), at 622-31.
Although determining probable cause on the basis of collec-
tive information in an agency generally is permissible, the chain
of communication from one officer to another must be shown.
See State v. Johnson, 12 Wash. App. 309, 310, 529 P.2d 873, 874
(1974); see generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.5(c), at
631-34.
2.8 Information from Anonymous or Unknown Informants: Sat-
isfying "Veracity" Prong
Information from an anonymous informant may not, by
itself, support probable cause. Bantam v. Washington, 163
Wash. 598, 601, 1 P.2d 861, 862 (1931). A named but unknown
informant is not presumed reliable. See State v. Sieler, 95
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Wash. 2d 43, 48, 621 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1980) (reliability of named
but unknown telephone informant not significantly different
from anonymous telephone informant). Some courts examine
why the police do not know the citizen's identity and look for
other circumstances that may indicate veracity. See, e.g., State
v. Chatmon, 9 Wash. App. 741, 748, 515 P.2d 530, 535 (1973)
(reliability of a citizen informant may br cstablished by an
interview with police if the informant satisfies an officer that he
or she is a "prudent" person and has no motive to falsify). Thus,
"[wihere eyewitnesses to crime summon police, and the exigen-
cies are such . . . that ascertainment of the identity and back-
ground of the informants would be unreasonable, the 'reliability'
requirement might be further relaxed." 9 Wash. App. at 748 n.4,
515 P.2d at 535 n.4. See generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 3.4(a), at 596-97.
2.9 Special Searches and Seizures Requiring Greater or Lesser
Levels of Proof
2.9(a) Administrative Searches
When a search is conducted for administrative, regulatory,
or other purposes for which criminal prosecution is not the prin-
cipal goal, a level of proof other than individualized probable
cause may be used. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967). Two levels or types
of proof will satisfy the requirements for an administrative war-
rant: (1) specific evidence providing reasonable grounds for
believing that an administrative violation exists, Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305, 316, 98 S. Ct.
1816, 1824 (1978); or (2) "reasonable legislative or administra-
tive standards for conducting an area inspection [that] are satis-
fied with respect to a particular dwelling." Camara, 387 U.S. at
538, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 941, 87 S. Ct. at 1736. Administrative stan-
dards for housing code inspections, for example, may be based
on factors such as "the passage of time, the nature of the build-
ing[,] . . . or the condition of the entire area, but . . . will not
necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of
[a] particular dwelling." Id.
The Washington Supreme Court has required administra-
tive search programs, such as spot checks of automobiles for
registration or vehicle violations, to be based on more than the
purpose of detecting offenders; the government must furnish
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evidence "that indicates that the [program] is a sufficiently pro-
ductive mechanism to justify the intrusion." State v. Marchand,
104 Wash. 2d 434, 437, 706 P.2d 225 (1985).
For a discussion of administrative searches in general, see
infra § 6.4.
2.9(b) Terry Stops and Frisks
A search or seizure that is relatively nonintrusive, such as a
brief investigatory stop or patdown for weapons, may be based
on less than probable cause. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed.
2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). The level of proof required for
such intrusion is a "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881, 45 L. Ed. 2d
607, 616-17, 95A S. Ct. 2574, 2580 (1975). The standard requires
that "the police officer . . . be able to point to specific and
articulable facts" supporting the suspicions or belief. Terry, 392
U.S. at 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.
For an officer to frisk a suspect who has been stopped as a
result of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer
must have
reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and danger-
ous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to
arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be abso-
lutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether
a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be war-
ranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in
danger.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 909, 88 S. Ct. at 1883.
For a further discussion of Terry stops and frisks, see infra
§ 4.5.
A suspect may be detained in his or her home on less than
probable cause when police are executing a search warrant at the
home for contraband. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705,
69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 351, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2595 (1981). Similarly,
police may frisk a person present at the execution of a search
warrant if they have a reasonable belief that the person is
armed. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-93, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238,
246, 100 S. Ct. 338, 343 (1979). See infra § 5.18(b).
2.9(c) Intrusions Into the Body
Probable cause alone is not sufficient to permit police to
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conduct a search involving an intrusion into a suspect's body.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908,
919, 86A S. Ct. 1826, 1835 (1966). In addition to establishing
probable cause, police must show that the desired evidence
clearly will be discovered by the intrusion and that the evidence
is important to the government's case. See Winston v. Lee,
U.S. __ , 84 L. Ed. 2d 662, 670-71, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 1618 (1985);
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 15 L. Ed. 2d at 919, 86 S. Ct. at
1835.
Even when these requirements have been satisfied, reasona-
ble medical means and equipment must be used. Schmerber, 384
U.S. at 771, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 920, 86 S. Ct. at 1836. See generally
infra § 3.13(b).
2.9(d) Special Environments: Schools, Prisons, and Borders
The levels of proof required for searches and seizures in
schools, in detention facilities, and at borders are discussed infra
§ 6.
CHAPTER 3: SEARCH WARRANTS
3.0 Introduction: Fourth Amendment Requirements for Search
Warrants
The fourth amendment provides that
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to besearched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST., amend. IV. This provision was enacted partly inresponse to the evils of the use of general warrants in England
and writs of assistance in the colonies. See Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-27, 29 L. Ed. 746, 749-50, 6 S. Ct. 524,
530 (1886); State v. Fields, 85 Wash. 2d 126, 128, 530 P.2d 284,
288 (1975). This chapter is concerned with the interpretation of
the fourth amendment's requirements for a valid search warrant
and its execution.
Searches and seizures generally must be made pursuant to awarrant. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106,
13 L. Ed. 2d 684, 687, 85 S. Ct. 741, 744 (1965). There are, how-
ever, a number of situations when searches and seizures may be
made without warrants-even when it would be feasible to
obtain them-and some circumstances when warrants alone arenot sufficient. Warrantless searches and seizures are discussed
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separately in Chapter 5, 'and circumstances in which warrants
are not sufficient are discussed in sections 3.13(a),(b). For the
most part, the standards discussed below apply to arrest as well
as search warrants. Issues pertaining specifically to arrests are
discussed in Chapter 4.
3.1 Types of Items That May Be Searched and Seized
Warrants may be issued not only for contraband or instru-
mentalities of crime, but also for "mere evidence." When it
seeks a warrant for evidence, the state must show cause to
believe that the evidence will aid in apprehending or convicting.
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 18 L.
Ed. 2d 782, 87 S. Ct. 1642 (1967). See CRR 2.3(b); JCRR 2.10(b).
Warrants may be issued for evidence containing incriminating
statements; the fifth amendment protects a person only from
producing evidence, not from its production by others. Andresen
v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627, 638, 96 S. Ct.
2737, 2745 (1976).
3.2 Who May Issue Warrants: Neutral and Detached Magis-
trate Requirements
Part of the protection that a warrant provides is the deter-
mination of probable cause by a neutral and detached magis-
trate instead of by a police officer. Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 92 L. Ed. 436, 440, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369 (1948)
("The point of the Fourth Amendment. . . is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which rea-
sonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in
requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime."). See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.2
(a)(f), at 29-41.
3.2(a) Qualifications of a "Magistrate"
Constitutional provisions, statutes, and court rules define
who qualifies as a magistrate. The fourth amendment does not
require that a magistrate be a lawyer so long as he or she is
capable of determining whether probable cause exists. Shadwick
v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 32 L. Ed. 2d 783, 92 S. Ct. 2119
(1972) (nonlawyer municipal court clerk permitted to issue
[Vol. 9:1
Search and Seizure Survey
arrest warrants); State v. Porter, 88 Wash. 2d 512, 515, 563 P.2d
829, 830-31 (1977); but c.f. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §4.2(c), at 34-37 (because search warrants are more complex than
arrest warrants, the use of nonlawyers to issue search warrants
should be constitutionally suspect).
Even when the person issuing the warrant is a magistrate intitle, he or she must make an independent probable cause deter-mination and may not simply rubber-stamp warrants. Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 728-29, 84 S. Ct.1509, 1514 (1964); State v. Klinker, 85 Wash. 2d 509, 537 P.2d
268 (1975).
States may impose more stringent requirements than thefourth amendment. Washington limits the power to issue war-rants to magistrates, including justices of the peace, see WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 2.20.010 and .020, and to court commissioners, see
State v. Porter, 88 Wash. 2d at 514, 563 P.2d at 830.
3.2(b) Neutrality
A magistrate who is capable of determining probable causenevertheless may be disqualified from issuing a warrant for fail-
ing to meet the "neutral" requirement. Thus, a state officer whoacts as prosecutor and investigator in a case is automatically dis-
qualified from acting as a magistrate in that case. Coolidge v.New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 573, 91 S.
Ct. 2022, 2029 (1971). An unsalaried magistrate who receives afee for each search warrant issued is not considered neutral.
Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250, 50 L. Ed. 2d 444, 448, 97
S. Ct. 546, 548 (1977) (pecuniary interest in issuing warrantscompared with denying them renders magistrate not neutral andnot detached). An administrative "warrant" signed by the parole
officer conducting the search is invalid. Hocker v. Woody, 95Wash. 2d 822, 825-26, 631 P.2d 372, 375 (1981). Finally, themagistrate's involvement in the execution of the warrant mayconstitute non-neutrality. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442U.S. 319, 326-27, 60 L. Ed. 2d 920, 928-29, 99 S. Ct. 2319, 2324(1979) (judge who accompanied police on raid of pornographic
bookstore was not neutral and detached when he added newmaterials observed there to previously signed search warrant).
On the other hand, the per se rule of Coolidge was held notto apply to a case in which the pro ternpore judge issuing thewarrant was also a prosecutor but was not involved in the prose-
cution of that particular case. State v. Hill, 17 Wash. App. 678,
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683, 564 P.2d 841, 843 (1977). A search warrant has been upheld,
however, although the issuing judicial officer was aware from the
affidavit that he might be a witness against the defendant. State
v. Smith, 16 Wash. App. 425, 428, 558 P.2d 265, 268 (1976). But
see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.2 (b), at 33 n.25 (ques-
tioning the reasoning in Smith).
Washington also has refused to apply the Coolidge rule of
per se disqualification to a judge who issued a search warrant in
a case that was before him on special inquiry. State v. Neslund,
103 Wash. 2d 79, 88, 690 P.2d 1153, 1158-59 (1984). The judge
had been appointed to investigate suspected criminal activity of
the defendant and one of the defendant's brothers. During the
special inquiry proceedings, the judge asked another brother
some questions; he did not, however, question other witnesses or
discuss the investigation or the brother's testimony with anyone
else involved in the investigation. The court did not per se dis-
qualify the judge from issuing warrants authorizing a search of
the defendant's premises and the seizure of particular items of
the defendant's personal property, basing its holding in part on
the fact that the warrants were not issued in subsequent court
proceedings "arising" from the inquiry. 103 Wash. 2d at 82-83,
690 P.2d at 1156. Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.27.180 (special
inquiry judges disqualified from participating in subsequent
court proceedings arising from special inquiry).
Magistrate-shopping to obtain a warrant after one has been
denied by another magistrate has been condemned. See, e.g.,
United States v. Davis, 346 F. Supp. 435 (S.D. Ill. 1972); but see
2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.2(e), at 39.
3.2(c) Burden of Proof
Unless a magistrate is disqualified under the per se rule of
Coolidge, the defendant bears the burden of proving a magis-
trate's lack of neutrality. State v. Hill, 17 Wash. App. 678, 683,
564 P.2d 841, 843 (1977).
3.3 Content of the Warrant
3.3(a) Oath or Affirmation: Multiple Affidavits
The oath or affirmation clause of the fourth amendment
requires that the person presenting the supporting affidavit
swear to the information the affidavit contains. U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. A Washington court has upheld a warrant, however,
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when the affidavit was not sworn to but was signed in the pres-
ence of the magistrate. State v. Douglas, 71 Wash. 2d 303, 309-
310, 428 P.2d 535, 539 (1967). Lower courts have split on the
question of whether a fictitious name affidavit is defective. See 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.3(f), at 53-99.
3.3(b) Information Considered
The information establishing probable cause may not be
stale at the time it is presented to the judge. "It is not enough
• . . to set forth that criminal activity occurred at some prior
time. The facts or circumstances must support the reasonable
probability that the criminal activity was occurring at or about
the time the warrant was issued." State v. Higby, 26 Wash. App.
457, 460, 613 P.2d 1192, 1194 (1980) (one sale of small amount of
marijuana did not provide probable cause to search two weeks
later); cf. supra § 2.3.
The fact that a valid warrant could have been obtained had
the affiant provided sufficient information to the magistrate will
not validate a warrant issued in the absence of that information.
Thus, an otherwise insufficient affidavit cannot be rehabilitated
by a later production of information that the affiant had pos-
sessed but did not disclose to the magistrate when seeking the
warrant. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565-66, 28 L. Ed. 2d
306, 311-12, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 1035-36 (1971); cf. Seattle v. Leach,
29 Wash. App. 81, 627 P.2d 159 (1981) (affidavit in support of
administrative warrant not sufficient when it alleges comprehen-
sive inspection program but fails to describe program). But see
State v. Smith, 16 Wash. App. 425, 428, 558 P.2d 265, 268 (1976)
(warrant valid so long as it could have been properly issued).
On the other hand, the Washington Supreme Court has
ruled that when a warrant is facially valid and an omission is
neither intentional nor made with a reckless disregard for the
truth, the warrant can be valid even though it is based upon an
affidavit containing an omission. State v. Cord, 103 Wash. 2d
361, 693 P.2d 81 (1985). Thus, although an affidavit in support
of a search warrant failed to state the altitude at which the
officer allegedly observed marijuana plants, the affidavit other-
wise provided a sufficient basis for the issuing judge to conclude
that a crime probably had been committed. But cf. Cord, 103
Wash. 2d at 369, 693 P.2d at 87 (Williams, C.J., dissenting)
(when aerial views are means utilized to show probable cause,
affidavit must reveal altitude from which identification made;
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court thus can guard against issuance of warrants following
unreasonably low, intrusive searches and make sure officers do
not engage in unreasonably high views of questionable
reliability).
An affidavit must set forth the underlying facts; a con-
clusory information, sworn to by the prosecutor, cannot estab-
lish probable cause. See Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5,
71 L. Ed. 505, 47 S. Ct. 250 (1927); cf. State v. Klinker, 85
Wash. 2d 509, 537 P.2d 268 (1975). At the same time, however,
[a]ffidavits for search warrants must be tested in a common-
sense manner rather than hypertechnically as long as the basic
Aguilar/Spinelli requirements are met. . . . "The support for
issuance of a search warrant is sufficient if, on reading the affi-
davits, an ordinary person would understand that a violation
existed and was continuing at the time of the application."
State v. Fisher, 96 Wash. 2d 962, 965, 639 P.2d 743, 745 (1982)
(citations omitted).
3.3(c) Oral Testimony and Oral Warrants
In Washington, a search warrant may be based on a single
affidavit, several affidavits, or oral testimony. CRR 2.3(c); JCRR
2.10(c). The judge must record a summary of any additional evi-
dence upon which the warrant is based. CRR 2.3(c); see 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.3 (b), at 45-46.
Some states, including Washington, permit oral search war-
rants in which an affiant makes a sworn telephonic statement to
a judge. CRR 2.3(c); JCRR 2.10(c). See State v. Ringer, 100
Wash. 2d 686, 701, 674 P.2d 1240, 1249 (1983). For a discussion
of various objections to this procedure, see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 4.3(c), at 47-49.
3.3(d) Administrative Warrants
An administrative warrant may be based either on specific
evidence of an existing violation or on a general inspection pro-
gram based on reasonable legislative or administrative standards
derived from neutral sources. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305, 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978); Seattle v.
Leach, 29 Wash. App. 81, 84, 627 P.2d 159, 161-62 (1981). See
generally infra § 6.4.
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3.4 Particular Description of Place to be Searched
3.4(a) General Considerations
By requiring a particular description of the place to be
searched, the fourth amendment furthers two purposes: (1) it
limits the risk that the wrong place will be searched; and (2) it
helps in determining whether probable cause is present. The
description must be such that the officer executing the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503, 69 L. Ed.
757, 760, 45 S. Ct. 414, 416 (1925); State v. Smith, 39 Wash.
App. 642, 648-49, 694 P.2d 660, 664 (1984).
If a warrant is invalid for failure to describe specifically the
place to be searched, the search cannot be upheld on the ground
that there was a probable cause determination by a magistrate;
the evidence seized, however, may sometimes be admissible. See
generally infra § 7.2. Furthermore, if a warrant separately and
distinctly describes two targets and it thereafter is determined
that probable cause existed for issuance of the warrant as to one
but not to the other, the warrant may be treated as severable
and upheld as to the one target only. State v. Halverson, 21
Wash. App. 35, 37, 584 P.2d 408, 409 (1978); see 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.6(f), at 111-113.
In determining initially whether a description is adequate,
reference is made to the warrant itself. The affidavit and other
incorporated documents may be considered if they are attached
to the warrant. A description may appear adequate on its face,
but upon execution be found to be ambiguous or to contain
errors. Whether such a warrant will be deemed sufficient
depends on whether other information is available that permits
the officer to identify the intended premises. See State v. Rood,
18 Wash. App. 740, 744-45, 573 P.2d 1325, 1327-28 (1977).
Three types of information may be considered in determin-
ing a warrant's adequacy: (1) other physical descriptions of the
premises contained in the warrant or the affidavit; (2) informa-
tion based on the officer's personal knowledge of the location or
its occupants; and (3) personal observations of the officers at the
time of execution. Id. at 744-45, 573 P.2d at 1328. See also State
v. Smith, 39 Wash. App. 642, 649, 694 P.2d 660, 664 (1984)
(search warrant identifying place to be searched as 2415 Carl
Road, Sumas, Washington, rather than correct address of 2415
Carl Road, Everson, Washington, was such that police officer
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could, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify place
intended); State v. Cohen, 19 Wash. App. 600, 604, 576 P.2d
933, 936 (1978) (requiring only reasonable particularity); see
generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.5, at 72-77. Earlier
Washington cases include State v. Andrich, 135 Wash. 609, 612,
238 P. 638, 639 (1925) (warrant's error in house number immate-
rial when officer knew where accused lived and searched correct
house), and State v. Davis, 165 Wash. 652, 654, 5 P.2d 1035,
1036 (1931) (warrant sufficient although incorrect street name
given; name given was popularly known, and no one could have
been misled).
3.4(b) Particular Searches: Places
In urban areas, places usually are identified by street
address, but the address is unnecessary when other facts make it
clear that a particular place is intended. State v. Trasvina, 16
Wash. App. 519, 523, 557 P.2d 368, 370 (1976) (warrant describ-
ing premises as two-story, white frame house located directly
behind particular address sufficient when no evidence presented
that more than one house met description or that premises
failed to conform to description except for incorrect address);
see State v. Chisholm, 7 Wash. App. 279, 283, 499 P.2d 81, 84
(1972) (warrant that failed to specify street location was suffi-
ciently clear when officers could identify premises with reasona-
ble certainty and when reason for failure to specify street was
included in affidavit for warrant). Rural areas may be described
by legal description of the property. See State v. Cohen, 19
Wash. App. at 603, 576 P.2d at 935.
When a warrant contains errors, the burden is upon the
party challenging the warrant to show that the errors could have
resulted in a search of the wrong premises. State v. Fisher, 96
Wash. 2d 962, 967, 639 P.2d 743, 746 (1982); see State v. Smith,
39 Wash. App. 642, 649, 694 P.2d 660, 664 (1984) (although town
wrongly identified in warrant, search upheld when defendant
made no showing that similar address existed that could have
been mistakenly searched or even that street of the same name
existed in wrongly identified town).
Generally, unless there is probable cause to search all living
units of a multiple occupancy building, the description must sin-
gle out a particular sub-unit. People v. Avery, 478 P.2d 310
(Colo. 1970). But if the building looks like a single occupancy
structure from the outside, and the officers have no reason to
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know that it is a multiple unit structure, the warrant is not
defective for failing to specify a sub-unit. State v. Chisholm, 7
Wash. App. at 282, 499 P.2d at 81. Additional exceptions to the
general rule are outlined in United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d
1000 (9th Cir. 1983). A warrant may authorize a search of an
entire street address while reciting probable cause as to only a
portion of the premises if the premises are occupied in common
rather than individually, if a multi-unit building is used as a sin-
gle entity, if the defendant was in control of the whole premises,
or if the entire premises are suspect. Id. at 1008. See generally 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.5(b), at 78-82.
Although search warrants for vehicles are uncommon
because of the many exceptions allowing warrantless searches,
see infra § 5.21, such warrants are governed by the same princi-
ples discussed above. See State v. Cohen, 19 Wash. App. at 604,
576 P.2d at 936.
3.4(c) Particular Searches: Persons
Search warrants may be issued for persons, as well as for
places, if there is probable cause to believe that a specific indi-
vidual has evidence on his or her person. When a search warrant
is issued for a person, the general rule requiring particularity
applies. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.5(e), at 88-94.
For a discussion of when a search warrant for premises
authorizes the search of persons not named in the warrant, see
infra § 3.8(a). Frequently, when a search warrant for premises is
executed, the police have probable cause to arrest persons pre-
sent, and a warrantless search is justified as incident to the
arrest. See infra § 5.1.
3.5 Particular Description of Things to be Seized
Because the facts in each case differ greatly, the issue of
whether a warrant describes the things to be seized with suffi-
cient particularity generally is determined without reference to
the fact patterns in prior cases. See State v. Helmka, 86 Wash.
2d 91, 542 P.2d 115 (1975). Instead, courts look to the purposes
of the "particular description" requirement: (1) to prevent gen-
eral exploratory searches; (2) to protect against seizure of objects
on the mistaken assumption that they fall within the warrant;
and (3) to ensure that probable cause is present. See Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192, 72 L. Ed. 213, 48 S. Ct. 74 (1927).
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Although the description need not be detailed, a search warrant
must so circumscribe an officer's actions that the reviewing court
is able to determine that the search was based on probable cause
and particular descriptions. United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723
F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1984); see State v. Weaver, 38 Wash. App. 17,
22, 683 P.2d 1136, 1139 (1984) (although cardboard box bearing
defendant's name generally would not be considered "paper,"
police could seize box because obvious purpose of warrant was
seizure not only of controlled substances but also of evidence
enabling state to demonstrate defendant's dominion and control
over premises). See also State v. Reid, 38 Wash. App. 203, 212,
687 P.2d 861, 867 (1984) (phrase "any other evidence of homi-
cide" specifically limited the warrant to the crime under investi-
gation; specific items listed, such as shotgun and shotgun shells,
provided additional guidelines for the officers conducting
search); State v. Lingo, 32 Wash. App. 638, 641, 649 P.2d 130,
132 (1982) (warrant not constitutionally defective when it limits
the officer's discretion on the items to be seized); but see
Weaver, 38 Wash. App. at 24, 683 P.2d at 1140 (1984) (Ringold,
J., dissenting) (because the box with defendant's name was not
seized to show dominion and control but solely to carry contra-
band that had been uncovered during the warrant search, major-
ity's "dominion and control" argument is merely post hoc
attempt to justify seizure, and cocaine later found in the box
should have been suppressed).
3.5(a) General Rules
Some general principles can be gleaned from the cases to
indicate when a warrant is sufficiently definite to allow the exe-
cuting officer to identify the property with reasonable certainty:
(1) More ambiguity is tolerated when the police have
acquired the most complete description that reasonably could be
expected. State v. Withers, 8 Wash. App. 123, 504 P.2d 1151
(1972).
(2) A more general description will suffice when the
nature of the items is such that they do not have more specific
characteristics.
(3) A less precise description is adequate for controlled
substances. State v. Cowles, 14 Wash. App. 14, 19, 538 P.2d 840,
844 (1975) (when affidavit states that narcotics and, specifically,
marijuana was observed, search warrant authorizing seizure of"controlled substances" is "reasonable and practical under the
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circumstances and thus satisf[ies] the constitutional require-
ment of 'particularity.' ").
(4) Failure to provide all available descriptive facts is
not fatal when the omitted facts could not have assisted the
officer in a more circumscribed search. State v. Salinas, 18
Wash. App. 455, 569 P.2d 75 (1977).
(5) An error is not fatal if the officer was able to deter-
mine what was intended from the other facts provided. State v.
Cohen, 19 Wash. App. at 604, 576 P.2d at 936.
(6) Greater care is required when the property sought
is generally in lawful use.
(7) A more specific description is required when other,
similar objects are likely to be found at the particular place.
(8) More care is required when the consequences of a
seizure of articles by mistake are substantial as, for example,
where the articles are personal papers. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 4.6(a), at 95-101.
3.5(b) Circumstances Requiring Greater Scrutiny
Search warrants for documents and for telephone conversa-
tions require greater scrutiny because of the potential for intru-
sion into personal privacy. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463,
49 L. Ed. 2d 627, 96 S. Ct. 2737 (1976). At the same time, the
Court has upheld a search warrant that listed specific docu-
ments pertaining to a particular crime but then added the catch-
all phrase, "together with other fruits, instrumentalities, and
evidence of crime." Id. at 479, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 642, 96 S. Ct. at
2748. The search was constitutional because the catch-all phrase
was to be read as authorizing a search only for evidence relating
to the defined crime. Id. at 480-82, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 642-43, 96 S.
Ct. at 2748-49. See State v. Legas, 20 Wash. App. 535, 541, 581
P.2d 172, 175 (1978) (dicta) (citing Andresen as authority for
proposition that each item seized need not have been specified
in the warrant as long as it related to the crime charged); cf.
State v. Smith, 16 Wash. App. 425, 428, 558 P.2d 265, 268 (1976)
(warrants upheld for search of defendant's home and office for
documents, cancelled checks, bank statements, and correspon-
dence relating to guardianship accounts when defendant charged
with grand larceny by misappropriation of guardianship funds).
But see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.6(d), at 104-09
(Andresen should not be read as approval for loose descriptions
because the Court was influenced by the fact that the descrip-
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tion was as specific as possible). When a search is for particular
contents of documents, the invasion of privacy can be minimized
by impounding the documents and then imposing conditions on
a further search. See 2 LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.6(d), at
108 n.68.
Evidence must be described with greater particularity when
the search is of a news-gathering organization. See Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564, 56 L. Ed. 2d 525, 541, 98 S.
Ct. 1970, 1981 (1978). Warrants for books, pictures, films, or
recordings require "scrupulous exactitude" because of the first
amendment interests involved. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476,
485, 13 L. Ed. 2d 431, 437, 86 S. Ct. 506, 511 (1965). In addition,
the officers executing the search warrant are constitutionally
prohibited from using their own discretion to determine whether
materials are unlawful. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S.
319, 325, 60 L. Ed. 2d 920, 927-28, 99 S. Ct. 2319, 2324 (1979).
These strict requirements, however, do not apply to papers that
are seized for reasons other than their unlawful content. For
example, when a warrant authorizes a search for papers that will
prove dominion or control over premises, the warrant need not
specify particular papers. State v. Legas, 20 Wash. App. 535,
540-41, 581 P.2d 172, 175 (1978).
3.6 Execution of the Warrant: Time of Execution
Washington is one of several states that requires by court
rule that warrants be executed within a certain time period. The
warrant "shall command the officer to search, within a specified
period of time not to exceed 10 days . . . ." CRR 2.3(c). Cf.
WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.509 (1983) (three day limit for execu-
tion of search warrant for controlled substances). A delay in exe-
cution may render a warrant invalid if probable cause no longer
exists at the time the warrant is executed. State v. Higby, 26
Wash. App. 457, 460, 613 P.2d 1192, 1194 (1980). See generally
2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.7(a), at 113-16.
Unlike other states, Washington does not restrict the execu-
tion of warrants to daytime hours. CRR 2.3(c) (warrant may be
served at any time of day). See State v. Smith, 15 Wash. App.
716, 719-20, 552 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1976) (nighttime search is not
unreasonable). The United States Supreme Court has not
decided whether the fourth amendment requires additional jus-
tification for nighttime search warrants. But see Gooding v.
United States, 416 U.S. 430, 460, 40 L. Ed. 2d 250, 276, 94 S. Ct.
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1780, 1795 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The purpose of the
restriction upon nighttime searches was to limit such intrusions
to those instances where there is 'some justification for it' "). See
2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.7(b), at 119 n.28 (suggesting
that the constitutionality of a nighttime search depend upon
whether it was necessary to make the search at that time).
A search warrant may be executed even when the occupants
are not present. See, e.g., United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40,
44 (3rd Cir. 1973) (presence of occupant while search warrant
being executed is neither common law nor constitutional
requirement); see also 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 4.7(c).
3.7 Entry without Notice or by Force: "Knock and Announce"
Requirements
Absent exigent circumstances, officers executing a warrant
must give notice of their authority and purpose prior to entry
onto private premises. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40, 10
L. Ed. 2d 726, 742, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1633 (1963). This "knock and
announce" or "knock and wait" requirement applies to the exe-
cution of both arrest and search warrants. See, e.g., id.; State v.
Myers, 102 Wash. 2d 548, 689 P.2d 38 (1984). The Supreme
Court has not decided whether the Constitution compels the
requirement, although the requirement is a long-established
common-law rule. See Myers, supra. See infra §§ 5.16-5.19 for a
discussion of exigent circumstances.
Many states, including Washington, have codified the knock
and announce requirement. Washington law provides: "To make
an arrest in criminal actions, the officer may break open any
outer or inner door, or windows of a dwelling house or other
building or any other inclosure, if, after notice of his office and
purpose, he be refused admittance." WASH. REV. CODE §
10.31.040 (1983). Although the statute expressly refers to arrests,
it applies to the execution of search warrants as well. State v.
Young, 76 Wash. 2d 212, 217, 455 P.2d 595, 598 (1969).
The purposes of the knock and announce rule are: (1) to
reduce the potential for violence; (2) to prevent the physical
destruction of property; and (3) to protect privacy. See United
States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 9 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 970, 40 L. Ed. 2d 559, 94 S. Ct. 1993 (1974);
State v. Dugger, 12 Wash. App. 74, 78, 528 P.2d 274, 276 (1974).
Thus, for example, the presence of an undercover officer inside
the premises does not excuse compliance with the rule because
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the purposes of the knock and announce requirement are not
served by an officer whose authority to arrest is unknown to the
occupant. Dugger, 12 Wash. App. at 77, 528 P.2d at 276. An
officer's actions are judged by a standard of reasonableness, in
light of the purposes supporting the knock and announce rule
and the particular facts and circumstances of each individual
case. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 375 U.S. 23, 33, 10 L. Ed. 2d
726, 738, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1629-30 (1963); State v. Myers, 102
Wash. 2d 548, 689 P.2d 38 (1984). See generally 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 4.8(a), at 122-25.
3.7(a) Types of Entry Requiring Notice
The phrase "break open" in the Washington knock and
announce statute refers to all nonconsensual entries and not
simply to those involving forcible breaking. See State v. Coyle,
95 Wash. 2d 1, 5-6, 621 P.2d 1256, 1258 (1980) (knock and wait
statute was violated when officers grabbed occupant who had
opened door just as police were about to knock and officers then
entered through open door without alerting other occupants);
State v. Miller, 7 Wash. App. 414, 419, 499 P.2d 241, 244 (1972)
(execution of search warrant unlawful when police entered
through partially opened door without knocking or announcing
purpose). A consensual entry, however, is not a "breaking open."
State v. Hartnell, 15 Wash. App. 410, 418, 550 P.2d 63, 69
(1976) (defendant's wife invited unidentified officer into house;
thus entry was consensual and announcement of purpose not
required).
Notice is required for entry by use of a pass key, Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 37-41, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 740-42, 83 S. Ct.
1623, 1631-34 (1963), and for entry through a closed but
unlocked door, State v. Miller, 7 Wash. App. 414, 416, 499 P.2d
241, 243 (1972). Although courts in other jurisdictions are
divided on the question of whether passage through an open
door requires notice, see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.8(b),
at 126-127, Washington courts require notice in such situations.
See Miller, 7 Wash. App. at 416, 499 P.2d at 243 (fourth amend-
ment and WASH. REV. CODE § 10.31.040 prohibit an officer exe-
cuting a search warrant from entering a house without providing
notice of office and purpose, even though door through which
the officer entered was open far enough to permit passage); see
also State v. Talley, 14 Wash. App. 484, 490-91, 543 P.2d 348,
352-53 (1975) (officer entering dwelling must give "notice of his
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office and purpose" even though door to apartment partially
open).
The Washington Supreme Court has held that consent to
enter that has been obtained by deception is effective consent.
Thus an officer who deceives a suspect into allowing him or her
to enter need not announce office and purpose. State v. Myers,
102 Wash. 2d 548, 553, 689 P.2d 38, 42 (1984). In Myers, the
police had been aware that the doors and windows to the defen-
dant's house were covered by iron bars, and they had been told
by an informant that the defendant kept a handgun within
reach whenever he opened the door. The police prepared a ficti-
tious warrant for the defendant's arrest for a traffic offense,
knowing that the defendant had no outstanding traffic viola-
tions. Upon being permitted to enter his house to execute the
arrest warrant, the police executed the search warrant. The
court held that even though the officers failed to announce their
office and purpose, the occupant of the house had granted "valid
permission" for them to enter. Id. at 552, 689 P.2d at 42; see
State v. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d, 1, 5, 621 P.2d 1256, 1259 (1980).
Because an occupant may not deny entry to police in possession
of a valid search warrant, his or her right to privacy is not
infringed by the fact that permission to enter was obtained by
ruse. Myers, 102 Wash. 2d at 555, 689 P.2d at 43. See also id. at
560, 689 P.2d at 45-46 (Dimmick, J., concurring in result) (exe-
cution of search warrants requires case-by-case evaluation of
tactics used to reduce violence and prevent destruction of prop-
erty; prohibiting use of ruse may result in police having to
approach houses massively armed and with weapons drawn, or
to destroy building entrance).
Washington Court of Appeals cases involving entry by
deception include State v. Ellis, 21 Wash. App. 123, 129, 584
P.2d 428, 432 (1978) (when officer unable to gain entry through
use of false name, subsequent forcible entry absent exigent cir-
cumstances unlawful without compliance with knock and wait
statute); State v. Huckaby, 15 Wash. App. 280, 290, 549 P.2d 35,
37-42 (1976) (when undercover officers gain entry into suspect's
home with suspect's consent and for apparent purpose of drug
transaction, knock and announce statute inapplicable); cf. Lewis
v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 17 L. Ed. 2d 312, 87 S. Ct. 424
(1966) (entry lawful when undercover officer telephoned suspect
and misrepresented his identity in order to gain invitation in to
suspect's home), reh'g denied, 386 U.S. 939, 17 L. Ed. 2d 811, 87
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S. Ct. 951 (1967). But cf. State v. Collier, 270 So. 2d 451, 453-54
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (undercover officer who leaves gather-
ing at defendants' home that appears to be "pot party" may not
return and re-enter home in order to execute search warrant
without first providing "due notice of his authority and pur-
pose" within meaning of Florida knock and announce statute,
FLA. STAT. § 933.09 (West 1971)). See generally Annot., 70
A.L.R.3d 217 (1976) (Supp. 1983).
The Washington knock and announce statute requires
notice prior to entry through inner as well as outer doors. WASH.
REV. CODE § 10.31.040 (1983); cf. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 4.8(b), at 126-27 (federal rule does not require separate notice
for different rooms in one house).
3.7(b) Compliance with Requirements
The police must identify themselves as police officers and
indicate to the person in apparent control of the premises that
they are present to execute the warrant. It is not sufficient to
make this announcement simultaneously with a forcible entry.
State v. Ellis, 21 Wash. App. 123, 129, 584 P.2d 428, 432 (1978);
State v. Lowrie, 12 Wash. App. 155, 157, 528 P.2d 1010, 1012
(1974) ("Announcing your identity as you kick in the door is not
compliance with the general [knock and wait] rule."). Police are
not required, however, to give a detailed or completely accurate
description of their purpose, as long as they comply with the
statute. Cf. State v. Myers, 102 Wash. 2d 548, 689 P.2d 38
(1984) (use by police of fictitious arrest warrant to gain entry
into defendant's house in order to execute valid search warrant
did not violate knock and announce requirements because
officers announced identity and stated that purpose was to exe-
cute warrant); State v. Reid, 38 Wash. App. 203, 687 P.2d 861
(1984).
After giving notice, officers must allow the occupants an
opportunity to "refuse admittance" before entering, but the
officers need not wait until the occupants affirmatively deny
their entry. State v. Jones, 15 Wash. App. 165, 167, 547 P.2d
906, 908 (1976) (officers' entry after ten second wait with no
affirmative refusal held reasonable). What constitutes refusal is"a factual determination to be made primarily by the trial
court." Id.; see State v. Woodall, 32 Wash. App. 407, 411, 647
P.2d 1051, 1054 (1982) ("[iun light of the information concerning
the number of people at the party, danger of violence, the con-
[Vol. 9:1
Search and Seizure Survey
cern for destruction of the evidence, and the deputy's testimony
that someone inside the clubhouse saw [the officers] long before
they reached the door," a three or four second wait after the
officers announced their identity and purpose made entry rea-
sonable), rev'd on other grounds, 100 Wash. 2d 74, 75, 666 P.2d
364, 365 (1983); State v. Haggarty, 20 Wash. App. 335, 337-38,
579 P.2d 1031, 1033 (1978) (when officers knocked on door and
announced office and purpose, and when door opened after
thirty second wait, officers were justified in believing door
opened in response to announcement and did not need to repeat
office and purpose); State v. Lowrie, 12 Wash. App. 155, 157, 528
P.2d 1010, 1012 (1974) ("failure to answer a knock at the door
within 15 seconds and then merely walking away from door is
insufficient" refusal when officers have not announced their
identity and purpose nor explicitly demanded entry, even if
occupant might have recognized one of the officers). Jones is
questioned in 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.8(c), at 130.
The announcement of office and purpose may be made to
the person answering the door even when he or she is not in
possession of the premises. See State v. Sainz, 23 Wash. App.
532, 538-39, 596 P.2d 1090, 1095 (1979).
Unnecessary roughness in executing a warrant "does not
rise to constitutional magnitude . . . or negate prior compliance
with [WASH. REV. CODE] § 10.31.040." Id.
The fact that an undercover agent who could legally seize
the evidence is present does not excuse other officers from
knocking and waiting. State v. Dugger, 12 Wash. App. 74, 77,
528 P.2d 274, 276 (1974).
An entry is in conformity with the knock and announce
statute when compliance is substantial. See State v. Reid, 38
Wash. App. 203, 687 P.2d 861 (1984).
3.7(c) Exceptions
Under the "useless gesture" exception, compliance is
excused if the authority and purpose of the police are already
known to those within the premises. Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23, 60, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 753, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1643 (1963) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting in part). Washington has required that
officers be "virtually certain" that occupants of a dwelling are
aware of the officers' presence. State v. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d 1, 11,
621 P.2d 1256, 1262 (1980). See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 4.8(f), at 137-38.
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The useless gesture exception has been applied by implica-
tion to justify a police officer's forcible entry when the officer
identified himself but was unable to state his purpose before the
suspect tried to close the door. State v. Neff, 10 Wash. App. 713,
716, 519 P.2d 1328, 1330 (1974). But closing a door upon an
officer not in uniform, under ambiguous circumstances, will not
excuse the officer from complying with the knock and announce
rule. State v. Ellis, 21 Wash. App. 123, 127, 584 P.2d 428, 431
(1978); see also Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d at 13, 621 P.2d at 1262.
Police need not comply with the knock and announce
requirement but instead may enter immediately and with force
when exigent circumstances are present. Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 37-40, 10 L. Ed.2d 726, 740-42, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1631-33
(1963); State v. Young, 76 Wash. 2d 212, 215, 455 P.2d 595, 597
(1969).
A police officer's reasonable belief that the items identified
in the search warrant will be destroyed or removed constitutes
one type of exigent circumstance. The fact that the items could
easily be destroyed is not sufficient; the police must possess spe-
cific information indicating that the items are in actual immi-
nent danger of destruction or removal. See State v. Young, 76
Wash. 2d 212, 215, 455 P.2d 595, 597 (1969) (belief of exigent
circumstances cannot be based upon vague suspicion or ambigu-
ous acts); Coleman v. Reilly, 8 Wash. App. 684, 687, 508 P.2d
1035, 1038 (1973) ("[T]here must be more than mere suspicion
on behalf of the police officers that evidence will be destroyed
before [the police] are justified in making an unannounced
entry."); see also State v. Harris, 12 Wash. App. 481, 492-94, 530
P.2d 646, 653-54 (1975) (police justified in not complying strictly
with knock and announce requirements when they had reliable
information that suspect kept heroin in condoms and would
swallow them if confronted by police).
Washington thus has rejected the blanket rule, favored by
some courts, that permits an unannounced entry when the war-
rant is for easily disposable items such as drugs. State v. Jeter,
30 Wash. App. 360, 362, 634 P.2d 312, 314 (1981); see State v.
Edwards, 20 Wash. App. 648, 652, 581 P.2d 154, 157 (1978). Spe-
cific factual situations are discussed in State v. Dugger, 12
Wash. App. 74, 81, 528 P.2d 274, 278 (1974). See generally 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.8(d), at 131-35.
A police officer's reasonable belief that announcing office
and purpose would jeopardize police or public safety is a second
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type of exigent circumstance. State v. Reid, 38 Wash. App. 203,
687 P.2d 861 (1984); State v. Carson, 21 Wash. App. 318, 322,
584 P.2d 990, 992 (1978). A mere good faith concern for safety,
however, is not sufficient; police must know from prior informa-
tion or from direct observation that the suspect keeps weapons
and has a propensity to use them. State v. Jeter, 30 Wash. App.
360, 363, 634 P.2d 312, 314 (1981) (no exigent circumstances
when officer had prior knowledge only of defendant's possession
of gun and not of any propensity to use it to resist arrest); see
State v. Dugger, 12 Wash. App. 74, 81, 528 P.2d 274, 278 (1974);
State v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 879, 512 P.2d 1208, 1214, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 304, 310 (1973) (information that defendant habitually
answered door armed with firearm constituted exigent circum-
stances); 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.8(e), at 135-37.
For a discussion of exigent circumstances justifying the
absence of a warrant, see infra §§ 5.16-19.
Finally, law enforcement officers need not comply with the
notice requirements when covert entry of the premises is the
only way effectively to execute the warrant. Dalia v. United
States, 441 U.S. 238, 247, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177, 186, 99 S. Ct. 1682,
1688 (1979) (covert entry onto premises to install listening
device authorized by warrant constitutional, even when entry
not specifically authorized by warrant); cf. State v. Myers, 102
Wash. 2d 548, 689 P.2d 38 (1984) (police justified in using ruse
to gain entry when informant had stated that defendant usually
had handgun within reach when answering door and all doors
and windows covered by bars).
3.8 Search and Detention of Persons on Premises Being
Searched
3.8(a) Search of Persons on Premises Being Searched
Generally, a search warrant for premises "justifies a search
of personal effects of the owner found therein which are plausi-
ble repositories for the objects specified in the warrant." State v.
Worth, 37 Wash. App. 889, 892, 683 P.2d 622, 624 (1984). But a
search warrant for premises or for the person and premises of
one occupant does not authorize a search of other occupants or
visitors who happen to be on the premises while the search is
taking place, nor does it automatically justify a search of per-
sonal effects belonging to such other occupants or visitors. Id.;
see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.9(b), at 142-43.
1985]
68 University of Puget Sound Law Review
There are several circumstances, however, in which persons
on the premises may be searched. First, a warrant may describe
a person to be searched. See supra § 3.4(c). Because warrants
are to be interpreted with common sense, a warrant stating that
there is probable cause to believe that there is evidence con-
cealed on a person allows a search of that person even though
the command portion of the warrant mentions only "places and
premises." State v. Williams, 90 Wash. 2d 245, 246, 580 P.2d
635 (1978); cf. State v. Cottrell, 12 Wash. App. 640, 643-44, 532
P.2d 644, 646-47 (1975) (when warrant authorized search of
premises and persons "found thereon," police may not search
person in vehicle outside premises). Second, a search also may
be made incident to an arrest. See infra § 5.1-5.1(c).
When the warrant itself gives no express or implied authori-
zation to search persons on the premises and the police do not
have probable cause to arrest them, officers may search such
persons in two situations. First, a person not named in the war-
rant but present on the premises may be searched if the police
"have reasonable cause to believe [that that person] has the arti-
cles for which the search is instituted upon his person." State v.
Halverson, 21 Wash. App. 35, 38, 584 P.2d 408, 410 (1978) (cita-
tions omitted). "Reasonable cause" requires that the person
engage in some type of suspicious activity. Id. Thus, in the exe-
cution of a search warrant for narcotics, police were justified in
searching an occupant's fists when at the time of the officers'
entry the occupant was observed kneeling in front of a weighing
scale and then rising with his fists clenched. Id. But police were
not justified in searching an occupant's purse when the occupant
gave no evidence of suspicious behavior. State v. Worth, 37
Wash. App. at 893, 683 P.2d at 624. See generally 2 LA FAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.9(c), at 143-47.
Courts are divided over whether persons who enter a place
being searched may be legally searched without a warrant if they
had no opportunity to conceal the named items. See 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.9, at 145-46. In each of these situations,
the scope of the search of a bystander is limited to that neces-
sary for detecting the items sought; thus, police may not search
a person if the search warrant is for a television set. Id.
Second, police may conduct a limited search for weapons to
protect themselves during the execution of the warrant. Ybarra
v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979);
State v. Halverson, 21 Wash. App. 35, 38, 584 P.2d 405, 410
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(1978); State v. Galloway, 14 Wash. App. 200, 202, 540 P.2d 444,
446 (1975); see also State v. Worth, 37 Wash. App. 889, 683 P.2d
622 (1984). The police, however, must have a reasonable suspi-
cion that the person searched is armed. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92-
94, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 246-47, 100 S. Ct. at 343. Moreover, the
search must be limited to ascertaining whether the individual is
armed. State v. Allen, 93 Wash. 2d 170, 172, 606 P.2d 1235, 1236
(1980) (officer conducting patdown of individual who knocked
on door of residence being searched may not examine contents
of wallet found on individual "[a]fter satisfying himself that the
'bulge' [wallet] was not a weapon"). Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 10, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 899, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1874 (1968) (police
may conduct limited weapons search to protect themselves dur-
ing lawful investigatory stop). Slightly different considerations
may control search situations compared with Terry stops
because the encounter in the search situation is more lengthy
than in a Terry stop. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.9(d) at
147-51.
3.8(b) Detention of Persons on Premises Being Searched
A "warrant to search for contraband founded on probable
cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain
the occupants of the premises while a proper search is con-
ducted." Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d
340, 351, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2595 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
A brief detention is permissible even when the police do not
have probable cause to believe that the objects of the search are
on the person detained; in addition, the police may ascertain
whether any individual arriving on the scene might interfere
with the search and determine what business, if any, the individ-
ual has at the premises. State v. Galloway, 14 Wash. App. 200,
201, 540 P.2d 444, 446 (1975). Such a limited stop, however, is
not a license to detain and frisk all persons approaching within
100 feet of the location of the search. State v. Melin, 27 Wash.
App. 589, 592, 618 P.2d 1324, 1325 (1980); see also 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.9(d), at 147.
3.9 Permissible Scope and Intensity of Search
Assuming that a search warrant describes the area and
items with the requisite particularity, the remaining question is
the permissible scope and intensity of the search. "As a general
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rule search warrants must be strictly construed and their execu-
tion must be within the specificity of the warrant." State v. Cot-
trell, 12 Wash. App. 640, 643, 532 P.2d 644, 646 (1975).
The permissible intensity of a search is governed by the
nature of the items to be seized. Once the purpose of the war-
rant has been carried out, the authority to search ends. See
State v. Legas, 20 Wash. App. 535, 541, 581 P.2d 172, 176 (1978)
(warrant permitting search of bedroom for papers linking defen-
dant to premises did not justify search of small box after such
papers discovered). Thus, a search is unlawful when a warrant
names one item and the officer begins searching for another,
even though the omission of the latter item was a mistake. State
v. Eisele, 9 Wash. App. 174, 176, 511 P.2d 1368, 1370 (1973); cf.
State v. Dearinger, 73 Wash. 2d 563, 567, 439 P.2d 971, 973
(1968) (when officers had reason to believe that during search
occupant threw sack into adjoining yard, sack and contents
found in adjoining yard within ambit of warrant).
3.9(a) Area
A search may extend to the entire area covered by the war-
rant's description. See generally State v. Cottrell, 12 Wash.
App. 640, 644, 532 P.2d 644, 647 (1975). Police may enter areas
not explicitly named in the warrant when such entry is neces-
sary to execute the warrant. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S.
238, 257, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177, 193, 99 S. Ct. 1682, 1693 (1979) (war-
rant explicitly authorizing planting hidden microphone implic-
itly authorized covert entry onto premises).
On the other hand, authority to search a vehicle does not
include authority to break into the garage where the vehicle is
parked when the officers knew at the time they applied for the
warrant that the vehicle was in the garage, and they could have
included the garage in the warrant. People v. Sciacca, 45 N.Y.2d
122, 127, 379 N.E.2d 1153, 1155, 408 N.Y.S. 2d 22, 25 (1978). It
has been suggested that police may enter adjacent areas if they
reasonably fear for their safety. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 4.10(a), at 153-54.
3.9(b) Personal Effects
Personal effects found on the premises and belonging to the
occupant may be searched if the effects reasonably can be
expected to contain the described items. State v. Worth, 37
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Wash. App. 889, 892, 683 P.2d 622, 624 (1984). Those effects
that the police know belong to other occupants, however, ordina-
rily may not be searched. See id. at 893, 683 P.2d at 624-25.
Even when a warrant authorizes a search of the entire premises,
it does not justify the search of another person residing on the
premises who was not mentioned in the affidavit, nor does it jus-
tify a search of a purse belonging to that person if she was hold-
ing it or in close proximity to it. Id.
It is worth noting that the court of appeals in Worth
rejected a distinction between personal effects worn on or held
by the person and those effects nearby at the time of the search.
Worth, 37 Wash. App. at 893, 683 P.2d at 625; cf. State v. Biggs,
16 Wash. App. 221, 556 P.2d 247 (1976). "A narrow focus on
whether a person is holding or wearing a personal item would
tend to undercut the purpose of the Fourth Amendment and
leave vulnerable readily recognizable personal effects, such as [a]
purse, which an individual has under his control and seeks to
preserve as private." Worth, 37 Wash. App. at 893, 683 P.2d at
625. Cf. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.10(b), at 154-58 (sug-
gesting that proper test in case involving visitors is whether
police have reasonable belief that items described would be con-
cealed in visitor's belongings); State v. Scott, 21 Wash. App. 113,
117, 584 P.2d 423, 425 (1978) (warrant authorizing search of bus-
iness records of "spa" to uncover evidence of prostitution did
not permit search of employees' purses for names of customers).
One court has attempted to avoid the problem by holding that
one has no privacy interest in items left at another's house.
State v. Biggs, 16 Wash. App. 221, 556 P.2d 247 (1976) (visitor
who had departed without his jacket no longer had expectation
of privacy in jacket and thus jacket could be searched).
3.9(c) Vehicles
Some courts have held that a warrant authorizing a search
of "premises" permits a search of vehicles found thereon. 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.10(c), at 158-60 (suggesting
that doctrine at least should be limited to vehicles belonging to
the occupant); cf. infra § 5.1 (search incident to arrest); People
v. Sciacca, 45 N.Y. 2d 122, 379 N.E. 2d 1153, 408 N.Y.S. 2d 22
(1978).
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3.10 Seizure of Unnamed Items: Requirements in General
Items not listed in the search warrant may be seized when
the seizure falls within one of the general exceptions to the war-
rant requirement. See, e.g., State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686,
674 P.2d 1240 (1983) (search incident to arrest); State v.
Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 632 P.2d 44 (1981) (open view); State
v. Helmka, 86 Wash. 2d 91, 542 P.2d 115 (1975) (plain view).
See generally infra Ch. 5.
3.11 Delivering Warrant and Inventory: Requirements for Exe-
cution of Warrants
Statutes or court rules may impose requirements on the
execution of warrants beyond those mandated by the federal
constitution. Washington court rules provide:
The peace officer taking property under the warrant shall give
to the person from whom or from whose premises the property
is taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property
taken. If no such person is present, the officer may post a copy
of the search warrant and receipt. The return shall be made
promptly and shall be accompanied by a written inventory of
any property taken. The inventory shall be made in the pres-
ence of the person from whose possession or premises the prop-
erty is taken, or in the presence of at least one person other
than the officer. The judge shall upon request deliver a copy of
the inventory to the person from whom or from whose prem-
ises the property was taken and to the applicant for the
warrant.
CRR 2.3(d). The requirement that an inventory be made in the
presence of another person is designed to prevent error in the
inventory, and the requirement is satisfied by the presence of
another police officer. State v. Wraspir, 20 Wash. App. 626, 628,
581 P.2d 182, 184 (1978).
Washington follows the majority rule that defects related to
the return of a search warrant are ministerial and do not compel
invalidation of the warrant, absent a showing of prejudice. State
v. Smith, 15 Wash. App. 716, 719, 552 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1976); cf.
2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.12(d), at 187-88 (contending
that the complete absence of any return should render the
search unconstitutional).
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3.12 Challenging the Content of an Affidavit
3.12(a) Informant's Identity
Although a defendant generally is entitled to examine an
affidavit to challenge whether the warrant was issued on proba-
ble cause, the court may excise portions of the affidavit identify-ing a confidential or unnamed informant to protect the state's
interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such informants.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667, 98 S. Ct.
2674 (1978); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62, 87S. Ct. 1056 (1967); State v. Mathiesen, 27 Wash. App. 257, 260,
616 P.2d 1255, 1257 (1980), rev. denied, 94 Wash. 2d 1025,
(1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 914, 68 L. Ed. 2d 305, 101 S. Ct.1990 (1981). On the other hand, "fundamental fairness" may
require the disclosure of an informant's identity when the
informant's potential testimony at trial would be relevant to the
determination of the defendant's innocence. See State v. Casal,
38 Wash. App. 310, 313, n.1 684 P.2d 1375, 1378 n.1 (1984) (cita-
tions omitted).
A defendant seeking an in camera hearing on the applica-
bility of the informant's privilege must: (1) allege deliberate
falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth; (2) furnish a
detailed offer of proof that challenges the affiant's-not theinformant's-veracity; and (3) demonstrate that the false por-
tions of the affidavit are necessary to a determination of proba-
ble cause. State v. Casal, 38 Wash. App. 310, 316, 684 P.2d 1375,
1380 (1984).
3.12(b) Misrepresentations and Omissions in the Affidavit
A defendant may challenge the validity of a warrant based
on a misrepresentation of fact in the supporting affidavit.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667, 98 S. Ct.2674 (1978). The defendant first must make a substantial show-
ing that a false statement in the affidavit (1) was made either
intentionally or in reckless disregard for the truth, and (2) wasnecessary, or material, to the finding of probable cause. Id. at155-56, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 672, 98 S. Ct. at 2676. The showing must
be based on specific facts and offers of proof and not conclusory
assertions. Once the defendant has made this preliminary show-ing, he or she is entitled to a full hearing on the issue. At the
hearing the defendant must prove the truth of his or her allega-
tions by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. If the defendant is
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successful, then the misrepresentations must be stricken from
the affidavit; if in the absence of the stricken statements proba-
ble cause does not exist, then the warrant is void. Id.; cf. United
States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754, 758-59 (5th Cir. 1976) (if misrepre-
sentation made with intent to deceive magistrate, then warrant
void, regardless of materiality). Washington has extended the
Franks rule to cover material omissions of fact. State v. Cord,
103 Wash. 2d 361, 367, 693 P.2d 81, 85 (1985); cf. United States
v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Park, 531 F.2d 754, 758-59 (5th Cir. 1976). Again, the defendant
must prove both that the omission was intentional or made with
reckless disregard and that the omitted information would have
negated probable cause. Cord, 103 Wash. 2d at 365, 693 P.2d at
85; cf. State v. Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 906-07, 632 P.2d 44, 46
(1981) (officer's innocent but inaccurate identification of tomato
plant as marijuana plant did not invalidate warrant).
3.13 Special Situations
3.13(a) First Amendment Limitations
A film may be seized pursuant to a warrant only if a prompt
judicial determination is available. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S.
483, 489, 37 L.Ed.2d 745, 752, 93 S. Ct. 2789, 2793 (1973). If the
film is a single copy, however, the court should permit copying
the film to allow showings to continue. Heller, 413 U.S. at 483,
37 L.Ed.2d at 734, 93 S. Ct. at 2795. See generally 2 LAFAvE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.1(c), at 8-10.
When seizure of a large quantity of allegedly obscene books
is contemplated, the usual warrant requirements are insufficient
to ensure constitutionality. Such planned seizures call for a prior
judicial determination of obscenity in an adversary proceeding.
A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210, 12
L. Ed. 2d 809, 812, 84 S. Ct. 1723, 1725 (1964); see also G.I.
Distrib. Inc. v. Murphy, 490 F.2d 1167, 1169 (2d Cir. 1973). Cf.
Maryland v. Macon, - U.S. -, 86 L. Ed. 2d 370, 378-82,
105 S. Ct. 2778, 2783-86 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (first
amendment implicated when officer purchased magazine in
bookstore and magazine was later introduced into evidence to
convict seller on obscenity charges). But cf. id. at -, 86 L. Ed.
2d at 377, 105 S. Ct. at 2782 (police did not commit unreasona-
ble seizure of property when, without warrant, they bought mag-
azine later used as evidence to convict seller on obscenity
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charges; sale cannot be considered seizure within fourth
amendment).
3.13(b) Intrusions into the Body
Even when a warrant has been obtained, a physical intru-sion into a person's body will violate due process if the intrusion"shocks the conscience." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172,96 L. Ed. 182, 190, 72 S. Ct. 205, 209 (1952). Thus, for example,
"[a] compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for
evidence implicates expectations of privacy and security of suchmagnitude that the intrusion may be unreasonable even if likely
to produce evidence of a crime." Winston v. Lee, - U.S. __
84 L. Ed. 2d 662, 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985); Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, 384 U.S. 757, 770-72, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 919-20, 86 S. Ct.1826, 1835-36 (1966). An intrusion that does not 'shock the con-
science' and is reasonable is one in which:
1. There is a clear indication, rather than a mere chance,
that the intrusion will produce the desired evidence;
2. The intrusive procedure is reasonably suited toobtaining the evidence, as for example, a blood test used for
determining blood alcohol levels; and
3. The intrusive procedure is performed in a reasonablemanner as, for example, a blood test performed by medical per-
sonnel as opposed to by officers at the station house. Id.Thus, for example, taking a blood sample from a defendant
charged with negligent homicide in several automobile deaths isreasonable when the police have probable cause to believe the
defendant is intoxicated. State v. Judge, 100 Wash. 2d 706, 675
P.2d 219 (1984).
Extraction of blood samples for testing is a highly effectivemeans of determining the degree to which a person is underthe influence of alcohol. Such tests are a commonplace in thesedays of periodic physical examinations and experience withthem teaches that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal,and that for most people the procedure involves virtually no
risk, trauma, or pain.
100 Wash. 2d at 712, 675 P.2d at 223 (citation omitted). Wash-
ington has upheld mandatory blood tests of putative fathers iffull adversary hearings first have been instituted. State v.Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735, 738-39, 612 P.2d 795, 798 (1980).
See generally infra §§ 4.4(a) (use of force during arrest); 5.18(a)
19851
76 University of Puget Sound Law Review
(warrantless intrusions into the body).
More intrusive procedures may be permitted in special envi-
ronments such as at prisons and jails, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979) (full body cav-
ity searches of prison inmates following contact visits not unrea-
sonable, even when searches routine and not based on probable
cause), and at borders, see United States v. Montoya de Her-
nandez, 473 U.S. -, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985)
(suspect fitting profile for alimentary canal drug smuggler may
be subjected to rectal cavity search when warrant based on pro-
file plus suspect's unwillingness to eat, drink, or defecate during
sixteen-hour confinement). See generally infra §§ 6.2 (prisons);
6.3 et.seq. (borders).
Other factors considered include the necessity of the search
for a fair determination of the charges and whether opportuni-
ties for an adversary hearing and interlocutory appellate review
are provided. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.1(d), at 12-
20; see also Winston v. Lee, - U.S. at -, 84 L. Ed. 2d at
670-71, 105 S. Ct. at 1618.
3.13(c) Warrants Directed at Nonsuspects
The Constitution does not prohibit warrants directed at
nonsuspects. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 560, 56 L.
Ed. 2d 525, 538, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1978-79 (1978). But see
O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (invali-
dating warrant authorizing search of attorney's office when
attorney not suspected of criminal activity and no threat existed
that materials would be destroyed). Critics have argued that a
search warrant of a third party is per se unreasonable and that a
subpoena duces tecum can adequately protect law enforcement
interests. See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 4.1(e),
(f), at 21-28; Note, The Reasonableness of Warranted Searches
of Nonsuspect Third Parties, 44 ALB. L. REV. 212, 232-35 (1979)
(criticizing Stanford Daily for failing to adopt less drastic alter-
native or less intrusive practice test in fourth amendment cases).
CHAPTER 4: SEIZURES OF THE PERSON: ARRESTS AND STOP-AND-
FRISKS
4.0 Arrest: Introduction
This section deals with the principles that are unique to
seizures of the person. Related issues are discussed in other sec-
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tions. See infra § 5.1 (search incident to arrest); supra §§ 2.1-2.7
(probable cause); § 3.7 (knock and announce).
An illegal arrest is not a defense to prosecution. The legality
of the arrest, however, affects the legality of searches and confes-
sions taking place subsequent to the arrest and the admissibility
of evidence derived from the arrest. See generally infra Ch. 7.
4.1 Arrests Without Warrants: Public Versus Home Arrests
Arrests are not subject to the same strict warrant require-
ments as searches, and an officer may make a warrantless felony
arrest in a public place even though he or she had time to obtain
a warrant. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423, 46 L. Ed.2d 598, 609, 96 S. Ct. 820, 828 (1976); State v. Luellen, 17 Wash.
App. 91, 93, 562 P.2d 253, 255 (1977). See generally 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.1 (b), at 225-33. When a warrantless
arrest has occurred, however, a prompt post-arrest judicialdetermination of probable cause is required. Gerstein v. Pugh,420 U.S. 103, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975); see infra §
4.4(c).
Although an arrest in public may be made without a war-rant, police may not make an arrest after a nonconsensual entry
into a suspect's home without a warrant, absent exigent circum-
stances. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90, 63 L. Ed. 2d639, 652-53, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1381 (1980). Fact patterns consti-
tuting exigent circumstances are described in some detail infra §5.16. See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances
for a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 ALB. L. REV. 90 (1980).
Under the fourth amendment, police who make a warrant-less arrest outside an arrestee's home may then accompany the
arrestee into his or her home even if the arrestee enters thehome with the officer's consent for a purpose such as obtaining
identification. See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 6-7, 70L. Ed. 2d 778, 785, 102 S. Ct. 812, 817 (1982) (risk of danger to
officer and possibility of confederates' escape justify policeofficer accompanying arrested person into his dwelling; policeneed no affirmative indication of likelihood of danger or escape);
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300, 305,
96 S. Ct. 2406, 2409 (1976).
Washington, however, has rejected the bright line rule thatan officer in all circumstances may accompany an arrestee intothe arrestee's home. State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 676P.2d 419 (1984). Under article I, section 7 of the Washington
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Constitution, when a person is arrested for a minor violation, the
arresting officer may not follow the arrestee into his or her home
unless the officer can reasonably conclude that the officer's
safety is endangered, evidence might be destroyed, or the likeli-
hood of escape is strong. 100 Wash. 2d at 821-22, 676 P.2d at 424
(officer's entry into lth floor dormitory room unlawful when
student arrested for misdemeanor offered no likelihood of
escape, destruction of evidence of crime for which arrested, or
danger to officer).
The arrest of a suspect who is standing in the doorway of
his or her home is treated the same as an arrest in the home. See
State v. Holeman, 103 Wash. 2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89, 91
(1985). For fourth amendment purposes, the location of the sus-
pect and not the location of the officer is material to the issue of
whether an arrest occurs in the home. Id. at 429, 693 P.2d at 91.
An arrest of a suspect who is located on a front porch, as
opposed to in the doorway, is considered a public arrest. State v.
Bockman, 37 Wash. App. 474, 682 P.2d 925 (1984). The Payton
prohibition on a warrantless nonconsensual entry of a suspect's
home is applied to three sets of facts in State v. Counts, 99
Wash. 2d 54, 659 P.2d 1087 (1983). See also State v. Hendricks,
25 Wash. App. 775, 779-80, 610 P.2d 940, 943 (1980).
4.2 Arrests Without Warrants: Felony Versus Misdemeanor
Arrests
4.2(a) Felony Arrest
This section discusses differences in the warrant require-
ments for felony and misdeameanor arrests. For a discussion of
custodial arrests for misdemeanor offenses, see infra § 4.4(d).
Under the common-law standard and the fourth amendment, an
officer's authority to make an arrest in public without a warrant
generally applies only to felonies. See United State v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 423, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598, 609, 96 S. Ct. 820, 828
(1976). Some states have placed restrictions on warrantless fel-
ony arrests; Washington, however, has codified the common-law
rule. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100 (Supp. 1985-86).
4.2(b) Misdemeanor Arrest
For misdemeanors, the common-law rule requires that a
warrant be procured except for a breach of peace committed in
the officer's presence. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.1(b), at
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223; contra Tacoma v. Harris, 73 Wash. 2d 123, 126, 436 P.2d
770, 772 (1968). The common-law misdemeanor rule has not
been held to be constitutionally required, and many states have
enacted statutes applying the felony rule to misdemeanors. See
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418, 46 L.Ed.2d 598,
606, 96 S. Ct. 820, 825 (1976). Some of those states that do
require misdemeanor warrants have held that a statutory-as
opposed to constitutional-violation is not grounds for the sup-
pression of evidence derived from the arrest. E.g., State v.
Eubanks, 283 N.C. 556, 560, 196 S.E.2d 706, 708 (1973).
Washington law provides that an officer may make a war-
rantless misdemeanor arrest when the offense is committed in
his or her presence or involves physical harm or the threat of
physical harm to persons or property, possession of marijuana,
or one of a number of specified traffic offenses. WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.31.100 (Supp. 1985-86). See also WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 46.64.017 (1983) (permitting warrantless arrest at scene
of accident); State v. Whatcom County, 92 Wash. 2d 35, 38, 593
P.2d 546, 547 (1979) (officer may not make arrest at location
other than accident scene); State v. Teuber, 19 Wash. App. 651,
654-55, 577 P.2d 147, 149-50 (1978) (officer may make lawful
misdemeanor arrest for offense committed four hours earlier
when offense involves physical harm to property).
The "in the presence" requirement of § 10.31.100 is satisfied
whenever the officer directly perceives facts permitting a reason-
able inference that a misdemeanor is being committed. Snohom-
ish v. Swoboda, 1 Wash. App. 292, 295, 461 P.2d 546, 548-49
(1969). Questions arise as to whether the officer must view all
the elements of a crime and as to what types of information may
be used to fill in "gaps." Id. ("in the presence" requirement was
satisfied when from 150 feet away police officers, as part of"sting" operation, observed person handing an object to another;
even though police could not positvely identify the object, the
nature of the operation permitted a reasonable inference the
object was contraband). State v. Silverman, 48 Wash. 2d 198,
202-03, 292 P.2d 868, 870 (1956) (when officer enters establish-
ment as member of public and views "peep shows," arrest of
person operating establishment is valid; elements of possession
of obscene pictures with intent to show them committed in
officer's presence). See also United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d
1117, 1128 (1st Cir. 1978); State v. Greene, 75 Wash. 2d 519,
521, 451 P.2d 926, 928 (1969). See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH
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AND SEIZURE § 5.1(c), at 233-38.
4.3 Arrests with Warrants
The principles governing the procurement and execution of
search warrants also apply to arrest warrants. See infra Ch. 3.;
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.31.010-.040 (1983). Thus, an invalid war-
rant will not support an arrest. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S.
560, 568-69, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306, 313, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (1971).
See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.1(g), at 252-56.
4.4 Arrests: Miscellaneous Requirements
4.4(a) Use of Force
Under traditional common law, an officer was permitted to
use reasonable force to make an arrest, and the officer could use
deadly force if such force reasonably appeared necessary to pre-
vent a suspect's escape from a felony arrest. The common-law
rule has been restricted, however, and an arresting officer may
use deadly force only when he or she "has probable cause to
believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or
serious physical injury to the officer or others." Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. __ , 85 L. Ed. 2d 1, 4, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1696
(1985) (police not permitted to shoot unarmed, fleeing burglary
suspect).
In Washington, the amount of force an officer may use is
governed by statute to the extent that the statute is consistent
with Tennessee v. Garner. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §
10.31.050 (1983) ("If after notice of the intention to arrest the
defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all
necessary means to effect the arrest."); WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.16.040 (1983). Deadly force is justifiable when committed by
a public officer or
person acting under his command and in his aid. . . when nec-
essary to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the
legal process . . . or in the discharge of a legal duty [or] when
necessary in retaking an escaped or rescued prisoner who has
been committed [for], arrested for, or convicted of a felony...
or in lawfully suppressing a riot or preserving the peace.
Id. In a Washington case decided before Tennessee v. Garner,
the court upheld the use of a chokehold aimed at recovering evi-
dence because the officers did not fear harm to themselves or to
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the public. State v. Taplin, 36 Wash. App. 664, 676 P.2d 504
(1984) (chokehold used to prevent defendant from swallowing
balloons suspected of containing heroin did not violate due pro-
cess rights because defendant still was able to breathe while
chokehold was applied). Cf. infra §§ 5.2(a), 5.18(a). In constru-
ing a prior but similar statute, the Washington Supreme Court
held that deadly force may be used even when a felony has not
in fact occurred as long as the officer reasonably believes that a
felony has been committed. Reese v. Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d 374,
379-80, 503 P.2d 64, 69-70 (1972). "[G]reat caution must be
exercised by an officer in the use of deadly force and it must be
resorted to by an officer only when all other reasonable efforts to
apprehend a person fleeing from a lawful arrest for a felony
have failed." Id. at 382-83, 503 P.2d at 71.
4.4(b) Significance of Booking and Crime Charged: Pretextual
Arrests
Courts differ as to the significance of a suspect being booked
for one offense yet formally charged with another. Conflicting
considerations underlie the decisions. On the one hand, if the
booking and formal charges need not be similar, police can use
an arrest as a pretext for detaining a suspect for questioning
about an unrelated crime for which the police lack probable
cause. On the other hand, at the time police first establish prob-
able cause for one crime, they may not possess sufficient infor-
mation to establish probable cause for other crimes. See gener-
ally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.1(e), at 240-44.
In Washington, the formal charge may differ from the book-
ing charge. State v. Teuber, 19 Wash. App. 651, 656, 577 P.2d
147, 150 (1978). The booking charge has no significance after a
formal charge has been lodged, and booking "for investigation"
is permissible, provided probable cause for an arrest on any
charge is present. See State v. Thompson, 58 Wash. 2d 598, 606-
07, 364 P.2d 527, 532 (1961).
When a suspect is arrested for a misdemeanor not commit-
ted in the officer's presence, the arrest is not illegal if the arrest-
ing officer has knowledge of a felony for which the suspect could
have been arrested. State v. Vangen, 72 Wash. 2d 548, 553, 433
P.2d 691, 694 (1967).
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4.4(c) Judicial Review
A person arrested without a warrant is entitled to a post-
arrest probable cause determination. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 114, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 65, 95 S. Ct. 854, 863 (1975) ("Once
the suspect is in custody, . . . the reasons that justify dispensing
with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate."). A neutral
and detached magistrate must make the probable cause determi-
nation, but the hearing may be ex parte. Id. at 119-23, 43 L. Ed.
2d at 68-71, 95 S. Ct. 865-68.
The issue of whether a violation of the Gerstein rule
requires suppression of evidence seized after the arrest has not
been resolved. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.1(f), at
244-52; see also Williams v. State, 264 Ind. 664, 668, 348 N.E.
2d 623, 627 (1976) (defendant's voluntary confession suppressed
when, following probable cause arrest, defendant was held for
eight days without judicial determination of probable cause and
confession was made during that detention).
4.4(d) Custodial Arrests for Minor Offenses
The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed
whether probable cause always justifies an arrest. Recent lower
court decisions, however, have held that for certain offenses an
arrest is unconstitutional in the absence of a special need for
custody. See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.1(h),
at 256-60.
When civil as opposed to criminal proceedings are involved,
custodial arrests may be improper. The Washington Supreme
Court has held unconstitutional a statute authorizing the custo-
dial arrest of any person against whom a paternity complaint is
filed. State v. Klinker, 85 Wash. 2d 509, 537 P.2d 268 (1975).
Thus, in the absence of a contrary showing, the usual summons
and complaint procedure for civil cases is deemed adequate for
securing the defendant's presence at trial. Id. at 522, 537 P.2d at
278. Criminal cases are treated differently because the public
interest in restraining the defendant is greater. Id. at 520, 537
P.2d at 277; see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.1(h), at 259-
60.
Although traffic infractions may fall within the criminal
code, under Washington law "as a matter of public policy . ..
custodial arrest for minor traffic violations is unjustified, unwar-
ranted, and impermissible if the defendant signs [a] promise to
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appear. . .[in court] . . . ." State v. Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d 45,
47, 578 P.2d 527, 528 (1978); see WASH. REV. CODE § 46.64.015;
cf. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.2(e), at 281-87. A custodial
arrest is not inappropriate, however, merely because the offense
is traffic-related. State v. Carner, 28 Wash. App. 439, 443, 624
P.2d 204, 207 (1981) (arrest proper when minor tried to evade
police on his motorcycle); cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.64.015
(Supp. 1985) (police may detain suspect who refuses to sign a
promise to appear in court); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,
80 L. Ed. 2d 732, 747-52, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2101-104 (1984)
(White, J., dissenting) (state acted within its proper police
power in dealing with perceived seriousness of drunk-driving
when it enacted a statute that permitted a warrantless arrest for
the misdemeanor).
4.5 Stop and Frisk: Introduction
Police investigatory stops that fall short of arrests may be
based on less proof than probable cause. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). Although these brief
detentions fall within the scope of the fourth amendment, the
public interest in crime detection and the relative nonintrusive-
ness of a stop permit a lower standard of proof. Id. at 20-27, 20
L. Ed. 2d at 905-09, 88 S. Ct. at 1879-83. Thus, the investigatory
stop is tested against the fourth amendment's general proscrip-
tion of unreasonable searches and seizures rather than by the
amendment's probable cause requirement. Id. at 20, 20 L. Ed. 2d
at 905, 88 S. Ct. at 1879.
The standard of proof that must be satisfied for a lawful
investigatory stop is a "reasonable suspicion, based on objective
facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity." Brown
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362, 99 S. Ct. 2637,
2641 (1979). The mere subjective good faith of the investigating
officer is insufficient. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906,
88 S. Ct. at 1880 (citation omitted). See generally supra §
2.8(b).
Once an officer possesses a reasonable suspicion, he or she
may forcibly stop the suspect, but the stop must be a more lim-
ited intrusion than an arrest. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 209, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 833, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2255 (1979). An
investigatory stop will be held "reasonable" when "the limited
violation of individual privacy" is outweighed by the public's
"interests in crime prevention and detection. . . ." Id. Although
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a balancing test determines the permissible scope of a stop, once
an intrusion is substantial enough to constitute an arrest, proba-
ble cause is necessary no matter how substantial the public's
interest. See id. at 212-216, 60 L.Ed.2d at 835-38, 99 S. Ct. at
2256-58 (custodial detention, even when charges not filed- and
suspect is not told that he is under arrest, requires probable
cause). But cf. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. -, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985) (special gov-
ernmental interest in detecting smugglers at border justifies
holding suspect 16 hours based on reasonable suspicion of trans-
porting contraband); infra § 6.3.
Terry stops are permitted both to prevent ongoing or future
criminal activity and to investigate completed crimes. United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. -, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 105 S. Ct.
675 (1985). For a discussion of the use of the reasonable suspi-
cion standard in special environments, see infra §§ 6.1 (schools)
and 6.3 (border). See also Preiser, Confrontations Initiated by
Police on Less Than Probable Cause, 45 ALB. L. REV. 57, 58
(1980); see generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.1, at 2-
18.
4.6 Satisfying the Reasonable Suspicion Standard
4.6(a) Factual Basis and Individualized Suspicion
The reasonable suspicion standard requires that the officer's
belief bb based on objective facts. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,
51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641 (1979); see State
v. Gluck, 83 Wash. 2d 424, 426, 518 P.2d 703, 705 (1974). The
facts must be both "specific and articulable"; an "inarticulate
hunch" is insufficient. Terry v. Ohio, 342 U.S. 1, 21-22, 20 L. Ed.
2d 889, 906, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968); State v. Thompson, 93
Wash. 2d 838, 842, 613 P.2d 525, 527 (1980). see Florida v. Rod-
riguez, 469 U.S. -, 83 L. Ed. 2d 165, 105 S. Ct. 308 (1984);
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 422, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621,
629, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1980). An officer's ability, as a result of
his or her experience, to perceive meaning in what to the ordi-
nary citizen would appear innocent conduct may make a suspi-
cion reasonable. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 884-85, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 619, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2582 (1975).
Individualized suspicion generally is required for a Terry
stop. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362, 99
S. Ct. 2637, 2640-41, (1979); State v. Kennedy, 38 Wash. App.
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41, 684 P.2d 1326 (1984), rev. granted, 102 Wash. 2d 1015
(1984). Several exceptions, however, exist. In some circum-
stances, a stop may be based on less than individualized suspi-
cion when "carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit,
neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." Brown
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362, 99 S. Ct. 2637,
2640-41 (1979). Border checkpoints may constitute such a cir-
cumstance. See infra § 6.3. But when individualized suspicion is
lacking, officer discretion must be limited; thus, for example,
police officers stopping vehicles for driver's license and vehicle
registration checks may not select the vehicles at random. Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 673-74, 99 S.
Ct. 1391, 1401 (1979); see also State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d
434, 706 P.2d 225 (1985). For a discussion of stops requiring no
individualized suspicion, see infra §§ 6.3 (stops at or near bor-
ders) and 6.4(c) (vehicle spot checks); cf. id. (individualized sus-
picion not required in administrative searches that nevertheless
are based on probable cause). See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE § 9.3(g), at 62-70 (Supp. 1985).
4.6(b) Particular Applications: Informants
When stops have been based on information provided by
informants, the information does not have to meet the same cri-
teria required for probable cause. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 147, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 617, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1924
(1972). See generally supra § 2.5. The information must, how-
ever, carry "indicia of reliability." Adams, 407 U.S. at 147, 32 L.
Ed. 2d at 617, 92 S. Ct. at 1924 (informant known personally to
officer and had provided information in past). For a summary of
cases interpreting Adams, see 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §
9.3(e), at 94-104.
Police may make a Terry stop on the basis of information
provided by other police. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S.
-, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985). If, however, the
officer who was the source of the information did not possess
facts supporting a reasonable suspicion, the stop would be
unlawful. Id. at ,83 L. Ed. 2d at 614, 105 S. Ct. at 682-83.
In Washington, police must have some reason to believe
that an informant is reliable and possess "[s]ome underlying fac-
tual justification for the informant's conclusion" that a crime is
being committed. State v. Sieler, 95 Wash. 2d 43, 48, 621 P.2d
1272 (1980). No reliability may be inferred from an anonymous
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informant or from a named but unknown telephone informant,
id., nor may the basis for the informant's knowledge be inferred
from conclusory allegations. Id. But conclusory allegations may
be sufficient when independent police observations corroborate
the presence of criminal activity or the reliability of the manner
in which the information was obtained. Id.; State v. Lesnick, 84
Wash. 2d 940, 944, 530 P.2d 243, 246 (1975). See also State v.
Kennedy, 38 Wash. App. 41, 684 P.2d 1326 (1984), rev. granted,
102 Wash. 2d 1015 (1984); State v. Sykes, 27 Wash. App. 111,
115-16, 615 P.2d 1345, 1347-48 (1980); State v. McCord, 19
Wash. App. 250, 254, 576 P.2d 892, 895 (1978).
An informant's tip may be sufficiently reliable to support a
stop even when it would not support an arrest. See State v.
Moreno, 21 Wash. App. 430, 436, 585 P.2d 481, 483 (1978)
(officer had cause to stop but not arrest when defendant arrived
on flight specified by anonymous informant); State v. Chatmon,
9 Wash. App. 741, 748, 515 P.2d 530, 535 (1973) (officer's failure
to establish reliability of anonymous informant by obtaining
description of informant and by learning both informant's pur-
pose for being at scene of crime and reason for informant's
desire to remain anonymous does not invalidate investigative
stop, but does invalidate subsequent search for lack of probable
cause).
The Washington Supreme Court has suggested that a tip
may support a stop when a serious crime is involved even if the
tip is not reliable enough to support stops in other circum-
stances. State v. Lesnick, 84 Wash. 2d 940, 944-45, 530 P.2d 243,
246 (1980); see also Sieler, 95 Wash. 2d at 50, 621 P.2d at 1276.
See 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.3(e), at 103, for a discus-
sion of State v. Lesnick and the argument that lesser indicia of
reliability should be necessary for serious crimes.
4.6(c) Particular Applications: Nature of Offense
Terry stops have been upheld for offenses ranging from
aggravated robbery, United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. -, 83
L. Ed. 2d 604, 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985), to possession of narcotics,
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 92 S. Ct.
1921 (1972). For arguments that Terry stops be limited to inves-
tigations of serious offenses, see Adams v. Williams at 151-53, 32
L. Ed. 2d at 620-21, 92 S. Ct. at 1926-27 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.2(c), at 24-28; cf. State
v. Moreno, 21 Wash. App. 430, 434, 585 P.2d 481, 483 (1978)
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(possession of narcotics characterized as "serious" offense).
4.6(d) Examples of Satisfying or Failing to Satisfy the Reason-
able Suspicion Standard
The mere fact that a suspect is in a high crime area will not
justify a stop. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357,
362-63, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641 (1979); State v. Larson, 93 Wash. 2d
638, 641, 611 P.2d 771, 774 (1980). Cf. State v. Belanger, 36
Wash. App. 818, 819-21, 677 P.2d 781, 782-83 (1984) (officer
acquired a well-founded suspicion of criminal conduct when he
observed individual walking in high crime area in early morning,
the individual gave unsatisfactory responses to the officer's ques-
tions after voluntarily engaging in conversation with the officer,
and the officer observed guns, including one with a pawnshop
tag). A person leaving a crime scene when police arrive is not a
proper subject of a stop. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d at
360, 99 S. Ct. at 2639; State v. Thompson, 93 Wash. 2d 838, 841-
42, 613 P.2d 525, 527 (1980). Similarly, officers may not stop an
individual because the individual is in proximity to others who
are suspected of criminal activity. Thompson, 93 Wash. 2d at
841, 613 P.2d at 527; Larson, 93 Wash. 2d at 642, 611 P.2d at
774; see infra § 4.7(b). But cf. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.
692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 351, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2595-96 (1981)
(valid search warrant for residence allows detention of occupants
during search). See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE §§
9.3(c), (d), (f), at 69-94, 104-07 (discussing and evaluating state
and federal case law on the common Terry stop situations).
Washington decisions upholding Terry stops include: State
v. Young, 28 Wash. App. 412, 421-23, 624 P.2d 725, 731-32
(1981) (police officer's knowledge of numerous specific, articul-
able facts reasonably warranted suspicion that suspect involved
in burglary); State v. Walker, 24 Wash. App. 823, 827-28, 604
P.2d 514, 517 (1979) (information given to police officer, when
examined in conjunction with defendant's physical appearance,
proximity to crime scene, possession of black purse, and posses-
sion of loose currency in hand, gave rise to reasonable inference
justifying investigatory stop); State v. Dunn, 22 Wash. App. 362,
365, 591 P.2d 782, 784 (1979) (defendant's lack of identification
and statement that he did not live anywhere, coupled with prox-
imity to burglary site, permitted "well-founded suspicion" war-
ranting stop and frisk); State v. Serrano, 14 Wash. App. 462,
466, 544 P.2d 101, 104 (1975) (because of the late hour, fact that
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juvenile occupants were in car with broken window, and fact
that car did not "fit" neighborhood justified temporary deten-
tion to inquire into suspicious activity); State v. Clark, 13 Wash.
App. 21, 23, 533 P.2d 387, 389 (1975) (silent alarm signalling for-
cible entry, in conjunction with defendant's appearance, con-
duct, and presence in vicinity, justified stop); State v. Sinclair,
11 Wash. App. 523, 530-31, 523 P.2d 1209, 1214 (1974) (police
officers' suspicion that defendant had outstanding traffic war-
rant, in conjunction with defendant using modus operandi com-
mon for type of crime in question, justified stop); State v.
Smith, 9 Wash. App. 279, 281, 511 P.2d 1032, 1034 (1973)
(description of two black men-one short, one tall-possibly
driving green or blue, older model automobile justified detaining
green 1966 automobile containing two black persons within
appropriate driving distance from scene of crime); State v. Fer-
guson, 3 Wash. App. 898, 902, 479 P.2d 114, 117 (1970) (while
checking records police may stop, request identification, and
briefly detain suspects stopped near scene of robbery in car fit-
ting description of getaway vehicle).
4.7 Dimensions of a Permissible Stop
4.7(a) Time, Place, and Method
An investigatory stop may be based on less than probable
cause because the intrusion on individual freedom is relatively
minor. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 905, 88 S.
Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968). When an investigatory stop becomes as
intrusive as an arrest, the stop is considered an arrest and
requires probable cause. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
214-16, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 836-38, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2257-59 (1979).
A valid stop must be limited as to length, movement of the
suspect, and investigative techniques employed. See Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238, 103 S. Ct. 1319,
1325 (1983); State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065
(1984). See generally 3 LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.2(d), at
28-33.
The Court has declined to set an absolute limit on the per-
missible duration of a Terry stop in terms of minutes or hours;
the duration of a stop is evaluated in terms of whether "the
police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely
to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time
it was necessary to detain the [suspect]." United States v.
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Sharpe, 470 U.S. -, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 616, 105 S. Ct. 1568,
1575 (1985); see Royer, 460 U.S. at 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 238; 103
S. Ct. at 1325 (stop may "last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate [its] purpose. . . ."). The means of investigation need
not be the least intrusive available, provided the police do not
act unreasonably "in failing to recognize or to pursue" a less
intrusive alternative. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at -, 84 L. Ed. 2d at
616, 105 S. Ct. at 1576.
The investigative methods employed in a Terry stop must
be less intrusive than those employed in arrests not only with
respect to duration. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 60
L. Ed. 2d 824, 99 S. Ct. 2248 (1979). Thus, for example, police
many not transport a nonconsenting suspect in a patrol car to
the police station and subject the suspect to custodial interroga-
tion based only on a reasonable suspicion. Id. at 212, 60 L. Ed.
2d at 836, 99 S. Ct. at 2256; see Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. ,
84 L. Ed. 2d 705, 105 S. Ct. 1643 (1985) (police may not trans-
port suspect to police station for fingerprinting absent probable
cause, although based on reasonable suspicion, police may take
fingerprints while stopping and questioning suspect); Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. at 496, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 235, 103 S. Ct. at 1323
(seizing suspect's luggage at airport and directing suspect to
small room for interrogation constituted arrest). But when, as a
result of a radio call summoning the investigating officers to an
apparently unrelated crime scene, the officers transported the
suspect with them, a reasonable suspicion was sufficient. State v.
Sweet, 36 Wash. App. 337, 675 P.2d 1236 (1984). Cf. State v.
Byers, 85 Wash. 2d 783, 787, 539 P.2d 833, 836 (1975).
A Washington court has held that an officer did not use the
least intrusive means reasonably available to confirm or dispel
his suspicion that a house was being burglarized when he
ordered three juveniles out of the house at gunpoint. State v.
Johnston, 38 Wash. App. 793, 690 P.2d 591 (1984). Other Wash-
ington cases involving Terry stops include: State v. Walker, 24
Wash. App. 823, 828, 604 P.2d 514, 517 (1979) (detention in
police car for eight minutes so victim could arrive and identify
suspect was proper); State v. Davis, 12 Wash. App. 32, 35, 527
P.2d 1131, 1133 (1974) (officer who reasonably suspected that an
automobile was stolen could request identification from each
occupant); State v. Sinclair, 11 Wash. App. 523, 530-31, 523
P.2d 1209, 1214-15 (1974) (officers with well-founded suspicion
that defendant had an outstanding traffic warrant were justified
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in detaining defendant pending radio check); State v. Smith, 9
Wash. App. 279, 281, 511 P.2d 1032, 1034 (1973) (investigatory
stop justified by officer's knowledge that defendants and defen-
dants' car matched description from robbery witness and by
proximity of stop, in time and location, to robbery); see also
State v. Moreno, 21 Wash. App. 430, 434, 585 P.2d 481, 483
(1978) (officer may not proceed with specific questions designed
to elicit incriminating information during investigatory stop
without making formal arrest and giving Miranda warnings).
4.7(b) Detention of Persons in Proximity to Suspect
The Washington Supreme Court has held that under the
fourth amendment the mere fact of an individual's proximity to
one independently suspected of criminal activity is insufficient
to justify a stop. State v. Thompson, 93 Wash. 2d 838, 841, 613
P.2d 525, 527 (1980); see State v. Larson, 93 Wash. 2d 638, 642,
611 P.2d 771, 774 (1980) (stop based on parking violation by
driver does not reasonably provide grounds to require identifica-
tion of passengers in absence of independent cause to question
passengers). See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 9.2(b),
at 22-24. See also id. § 9.3(c), at 77; cf. State v. Serrano, 14
Wash. App. 462, 466-68, 544 P.2d 101, 104-05 (1975).
4.8 Constitutional Limitations on Compelled Responses to
Investigatory Questions
The fourth amendment guarantees prohibit an officer from
forcibly stopping an individual in the absence of at least a rea-
sonable suspicion of criminal activity. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S.
47, 52, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362-63, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641 (1979).
Even when a police officer possesses a reasonable suspicion, how-
ever, and forcibly detains and questions the suspect, the officer
may not compel the suspect to answer. Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721, 727 n.6, 22 L. Ed. 2d 676, 681 n.6, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 1397
n.6 (1969); State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 105-06, 640 P.2d
1061, 1069 (1982) (citation omitted). Furthermore, a suspect's
refusal to answer the investigating officer's questions cannot pro-
vide the basis for an arrest. 97 Wash. 2d at 105-06, 640 P.2d at
1069.
A number of states, including Washington, have enacted
stop-and-identify statutes or other legislation designed in part to
facilitate police investigation of ongoing or imminent crimes.
[Vol. 9:1
Search and Seizure Survey
See, e.g., State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982);
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903, 103 S. Ct.
1855 (1983). Some of these statutes have been struck down as
unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Kolender, supra. The stat-
utes can be challenged on a number of grounds: for implicating
the first amendment free speech right, the fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination, and the fourteenth amendment
due process right, in addition to the fourth amendment right.
White, 97 Wash. 2d at 97 nn. 1 & 2, 640 P.2d at 1064 nn. 1 & 2.
See generally id.; 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 9.2(f), at 35-
45. Thus, a Terry stop that survives a fourth amendment chal-
lenge may collapse under a challenge brought under another
amendment.
4.9 Grounds for Initiating a Frisk
An officer conducting a Terry stop may conduct a limited
search for weapons in order to protect himself or herself or per-
sons nearby from physical harm. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30,
20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968). Even such a
limited intrusion, however, is a "search" within the fourth
amendment. Id. at 29, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 910, 88 S. Ct. at 1884.
A prerequisite to a pat-down for weapons is that the officer
legitimately be in the presence of the party to be frisked and
have grounds for a forcible stop. Id. at 32-33, 20 L. Ed. 2d at
912-13, 88 S. Ct. at 1885-86 (Harlan, J., concurring). A frisk then
may be undertaken if the officer reasonably believes that the
suspect "may be armed and presently dangerous" to the officer
or others and if nothing in the course of an initial investigation
dispels that fear. Terry at 30, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 911, 88 S. Ct. at
1884. A frisk may not be used as a pretext for a search for
incriminating evidence when the officer has no reasonable
grounds to believe that the suspect is armed. Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 64, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 935, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1903
(1968).
Lower federal courts have read Terry to mean that for cer-
tain crimes in which the offender is likely to be armed, the right
to conduct a protective search is "automatic"; for other crimes,
such as possession of marijuana, additional circumstances must
be present. See 3 LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.4(a), at 109-
18.
Washington requires that the officer have reason to believe
that the suspect is presently dangerous. State v. Hobart, 94
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Wash. 2d 437, 446, 617 P.2d 429, 433 (1980); see State v.
Harper, 33 Wash. App. 507, 511, 655 P.2d 1199, 1201 (1982)
(officer must have "sufficient basis" to believe that an individual
is armed in order to conduct a self-protective search). Thus,
police may not take intrusive protective measures when they
cannot articulate a reason for believing that a suspect is danger-
ous other than that the suspect was seen leaving in his car from
the scene of a possible burglary. State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d
733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984). Frisks have been permitted in State
v. Galloway, 14 Wash. App. 200, 202, 540 P.2d 444, 446 (1975)
(defendant entered apartment during execution of search war-
rant and suspiciously kept hand in overcoat pocket during police
questioning); see also State v. Howard, 7 Wash. App. 668, 674,
502 P.2d 1043, 1046-47 (1972) (defendant parked car near resi-
dence being searched, and officer had prior knowledge that
defendant carried concealed knife); State v. Brooks, 3 Wash.
App. 769, 775, 479 P.2d 544, 548 (1970) (defendant matched
description of suspect who had fired shots at other officers
moments before stop).
4.9(a) Scope of a Permissible Frisk
A frisk must be justified not only in its inception but also in
its scope. The scope of a valid frisk is strictly limited to what is
necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to
harm the officer or others nearby. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29,
20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968). Cf. infra § 5.1
(search incident to arrest). A frisk need not, however, conform to
the conventional pat-down. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 147, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 617-18, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923-24 (1972)
(when officer received information that narcotics suspect was
seated in nearby car and carried gun in his waistband, and when
the suspect refused to comply with officer's request to step out
of the car, officer was justified in reaching through window and
removing revolver from suspect's waistband). See 3 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.4(b), at 125.
A Washington court has upheld an officer's grab at a sus-
pect's hand when the suspect had furtively withdrawn his hand
from his pocket and thrust it behind his back. State v. Serrano,
14 Wash. App. 462, 469, 544 P.2d 101, 106 (1975). Although the
court reasoned that the officer's reflexive action was not actually
a search, the Terry principle that officers may act to protect
themselves justified the interference. Id. at 469, 544 P.2d at 106.
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When in the course of a frisk an officer feels what may be a
weapon, the officer may take only such action as is necessary to
examine the object. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 20 L. Ed.
2d 889, 911, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85 (1968) (officer merely
reached into coat and removed gun). Once the police ascertain
that no weapon is involved, their authority to conduct even a
limited search ends. State v. Keyser, 29 Wash. App. 120, 124,
627 P.2d 978, 980 (1981) (when officer removes bag from under
car seat and determines from touching it that bag contains no
weapons, officer not justified in further examining contents of
bag); see also State v. Hobart, 94 Wash. 2d 437, 446, 617 P.2d
429, 433 (1980); State v. Allen, 93 Wash. 2d 170, 173, 606 P.2d
1235, 1236 (1980). See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 9.4(c), at 128-31.
4.9(b) Frisks of Persons in Proximity to Suspect
Police may not frisk persons present on the premises of a
place lawfully being searched, absent a reasonable suspicion that
such persons are armed. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 87,
62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979); supra § 3.8(a). Similarly,
police may not take protective measures such as searching the
purse of a passenger in a vehicle when the driver is stopped on
the basis of a traffic violation, absent a reasonable suspicion that
the passenger is involved in criminal conduct. See State v. Lar-
son, 98 Wash. 2d 638, 642, 611 P.2d 771, 774 (1980). When the
driver is lawfully stopped for reasons pertaining to handgun pos-
session and threats of violence, however, a protective frisk of a
passenger is permitted. State v. Coahran, 27 Wash. App. 664,
620 P.2d 116 (1980). One commentator suggests that the appro-
priate inquiry is whether the officer is under a reasonable appre-
hension of danger, a determination that would depend on the
nature of the crime, the time and place of the arrest, the number
of officers and suspects, and whether the companion has made
any threatening movements. 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §
9.4(a), at 120.
4.9(c) Other Protective Measures Besides Frisks
An officer may take measures for self-protection other than
a frisk. A police officer may order a driver who has been validly
stopped to get out of his or her car, regardless of whether the
driver is suspected of being armed or dangerous or whether the
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offense under investigation is a serious one. Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 337, 98 S. Ct. 330,
333 (1977) (intrusion de minimus, and risks confronting officer
substantial); see also State v. Kennedy, 38 Wash. App. 41, 684
P.2d 1326 (1984), rev. granted, 102 Wash. 2d 1015 (1984). Lower
courts have not agreed on whether Mimms extends to passen-
gers. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.2, at 105 (Supp.
1985).
4.9(d) Search of Area Within Suspect's Control
Officers may extend a Terry search for weapons to the pas-
senger compartment of a detained person's vehicle when the
police have a reasonable belief that the suspect both is danger-
ous and can gain access to a weapon in the vehicle. Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
The related issue of whether an officer may search items carried
by a suspect is analyzed in 3 LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §
9.4(e), at 133-37.
CHAPTER 5: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-THE
EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
5.0 Introduction
"[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
. . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delin-
eated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 19
L. Ed. 2d 576, 585, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967) (footnotes omitted);
see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564,
91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971); State v. Loewen, 97 Wash. 2d 562, 565,
647 P.2d 489, 492 (1982); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170,
188, 622 P.2d 1199, 1210 (1980); State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d
143, 149, 622 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1980).
The following sections examine the various "jealously and
carefully drawn" exceptions to the warrant requirement. See
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759-60, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235,
241-42, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 2590-91 (1979). Note that even when a
search or seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the war-
rant requirement, it may be invalid if other rights are infringed.
See, e.g., United States v. Sherwin, 572 F.2d 196, 200 (9th Cir.
1977) (plain view seizure of photographs of sexual activity inva-
lid; officers' determination that photographs obscene violated
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first amendment).
5.1 Search Incident to Arrest
Police may conduct a warrantless search and seizure inci-
dent to an arrest.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might
well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addi-
tion, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search
for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule
. . . . There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the
arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate con-
trol"-construing that phrase to mean the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence.
There is no comparable justification, however, for rou-
tinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest
occurs-or, for that matter, for searching through all the deskdrawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.
Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions,
may be made only under the authority of a search warrant.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685,
693-94, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2039-40 (1969).
The "search incident to arrest" exception to the warrant
requirement applies only when: (1) the arrest was valid, and (2)
the search incident to the arrest was "restricted in time and
place in relation to the arrestee and the arrest" as opposed to"wide-ranging, exploratory, rummaging, [and] ransacking. .. "
State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 127, 135, 559 P.2d 970, 974, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977).
As the following section will demonstrate, the search inci-
dent to arrest exception to the warrant requirement has been
analyzed differently under the Washington Constitution com-
pared with under the fourth amendment.
5.1(a) Lawful Arrest
The criteria for a lawful arrest are discussed in Chapter 4. If
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the arrest is invalid, then the search incident to the arrest is
invalid. State v. Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d 45, 50, 578 P.2d 527, 529
(1978). Even when an arrest is valid, however, a search is not
properly "incident" to the-arrest if the arrest was merely a pre-
text for conducting the search for evidence of another offense.
State v. Johnson, 71 Wash. 2d 239, 242-43, 427 P.2d 705, 707
(1967). Cf. State v. Carner, 28 Wash. App. 439, 445, 624 P.2d
204, 208 (1981) (second body-search made after decision to
release defendant and in retaliation for his remarks held invalid,
even when arrest and initial search were valid).
The search incident to arrest exception requires a custodial
arrest. See Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d at 50, 578 P.2d at 529. Wash-
ington prohibits custodial arrests for minor traffic violations
when the arrestee signs a promise to appear in court; thus, a
search incident to a custodial arrest for a minor traffic violation
would be unlawful. Id. at 47, 578 P.2d 528; see also Watts v.
United States, 328 A.2d 770 (D.C. App. 1972). Cf. United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427, 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973).
One judge has suggested that when police safety is a con-
cern, police could protect themselves by closing and locking car
doors and windows while processing the arrest or citation rather
than by searching the car. See United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d
666, 673 (5th Cir. 1973) (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); cf. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 54
L. Ed. 2d 331, 98 S. Ct. 330 (1977) (police may direct driver out
of car while issuing citation for motor vehicle violation). For a
suggestion that in the noncustodial arrest situation a search
should be limited to the scope of a Terry frisk unless there is an
evidentiary basis for a full search, see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 5.2(h), at 291-96.
5.1(b) "Immediate Control"
In determining whether, under the fourth amendment, the
area searched or the object seized was within the "immediate
control" of the defendant, courts have recognized that "there
can be no hard and fast rule . . . ." People v. Williams, 57 Ill.
2d 239, 246, 311 N.E.2d 681, 685 (1974). Factors that have been
considered include: (a) whether the arrestee was physically
restrained; (b) the position of the officer in relation to the defen-
dant and the place searched; (c) the difficulty of gaining access
into the container or enclosure searched; and (d) the number of
officers present as compared with the number of arrestees or
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other persons. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.3(c), at
413-19; 7.1(b), at 499-506.
Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution prohibits
an arresting officer from searching beyond the area of an arres-
tee's actual immediate control. Thus, for example, once a defen-
dant is arrested and placed in a patrol car, the justification for a
warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle disappears. State
v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 699, 674 P.2d 1240, 1248 (1983).
The search must be strictly tied to its purpose: to remove weap-
ons that an arrestee might use to resist arrest or effect an
escape, or to prevent the destruction of evidence. Id. In contrast,
under the fourth amendment, the passenger compartment of an
automobile and containers found therein are within the scope of
a search incident to arrest even when the suspect has been
removed from the vehicle and taken into police custody. New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 101 S. Ct. 2860
(1981) (police may search jacket found on back seat of automo-
bile after driver and passengers have left vehicle). See infra §
5.2(b).
Under the fourth amendment, some courts have permitted
police in certain limited situations to extend a search incident to
an arrest into an area that is beyond the arrestee's immediate
control. If the police permit an arrestee to move into other
rooms to gather clothing, for example, the police may accom-
pany the arrestee and search the rooms and any areas, such as
closets or bureau drawers, where the arrestee has been. See 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.4, at 420-24. Courts also have
permitted police to search premises to determine whether
accomplices who could aid the arrestee are present, id. at 424-27,
and to conduct a protective sweep of premises when the officers
fear that third parties may offer resistance, id. at 427-43.
The Washington Constitution places greater restraints on
the police than the fourth amendment does when the arrestee is
in his or her home; entry into other rooms requires a reasonable
fear for police safety or a belief that the arrestee is likely to
escape or destroy evidence. See State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash.
2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984); supra § 4.1; cf. Washington v. Chr-
isman, 455 U.S. 1, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778, 102 S. Ct. 812 (1982).
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5.2 "Immediate Control" or Permissible Scope: Particular
Applications
5.2(a) The Defendant
Under the fourth amendment, an officer may search an
arrestee who has been taken into custody even when the officer
does not believe that the arrestee is armed or in possession of
evidence of the crime for which he or she was arrested. United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427, 440-41,
94 S. Ct. 467, 477 (1973). It is the lawful arrest that establishes
the authority to search the arrestee; the arresting officer may
have no subjective fear that an arrestee is armed or that evi-
dence will be destroyed. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 263-
64, 38 L. Ed. 2d 456, 460, 94 S. Ct. 488, 491 (1973). Thus, the
rule applies even when the custodial arrest is for a minor traffic
violation unless, as in Washington, such an arrest would be ille-
gal. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 440-41, 94 S. Ct.
at 477; see State v. Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d 45, 578 P.2d 527
(1978).
An intrusion into a suspect's body, such as drawing blood
samples, is not justifiable under the search-incident-to-arrest
exception to the warrant requirement. Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1835 (1966). Such
intrusions may be justified, however, by the exigent circum-
stances exception. 384 U.S. at 770-71, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 919-20, 86
S. Ct. at 1835-36. See generally infra § 5.18(a); supra § 3.13(b);
2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.3(c), at 321-30.
The Schmerber rules do not apply, however, to less intru-
sive physical intrusions such as a chokehold intended to prevent
a suspect from swallowing apparent contraband. See State v.
Taplin, 36 Wash. App. 664, 676 P.2d 504 (1984); State v. Wil-
liams, 16 Wash. App. 868, 560 P.2d 1160 (1977). Officers
attempting to prevent a suspect from swallowing evidence may
not prevent the suspect from breathing or obstruct the suspect's
blood supply to the head, although they may pinch his or her
nose shut. Williams, 16 Wash. App. at 872, 560 P.2d at 1163.
More aggresive conduct, such as jumping on the suspect, is likely
to violate due process rights. Id. at 870, 560 P.2d at 1162; see
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 96 L. Ed. 183, 72 S. Ct. 205,
25 A.L.R.2d 1396 (1952). See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 5.2(i), at 296.
For a brief discussion of post-detention body searches, see
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infra § 6.2.
5.2(b) Vehicles and Containers
Under the fourth amendment, police may search the pas-
senger compartment of a vehicle as a search incident to the
arrest of the driver. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed.
2d 768, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981). The compartment is considered
within the arrestee's immediate control even after the arrestee
has been placed in police custody. Id. at 459, 69 L. Ed. 2d at
774, 101 S. Ct. at 2864.
Under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution,
"immediate control" is construed more literally. Once the driver
has been removed from the vehicle and no longer can obtain
access to it, the passenger compartment falls outside the area of
immediate control, and the search incident to arrest exception
will not apply. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240
(1983). But cf. State v. Donohoe, 39 Wash. App. 779, 783, 695
P.2d 150, 153 (1985).
When police have probable cause to believe an automobile
contains contraband or evidence, whether or not they have prob-
able cause to arrest the vehicle's occupants they may have
authority to search the vehicle without a warrant pursuant to
other exceptions to the warrant requirement. See generally infra
§§ 5.21-5.23. Traditionally, sealed containers taken from an
arrestee and in the exclusive control of the police could not be
searched without a warrant as incident to the arrest. Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235, 243-44, 99 S. Ct.
2586, 2592 (1979). Under the fourth amendment, the traditional
rule has been modified, and law enforcement officers now may
search pursuant to a lawful arrest "any containers found within
the passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment iswithin reach of the arrestee, so also will the containers in it be
within his reach." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 69 L.
Ed. 2d 768, 775, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864 (1981) (permitting search
of jacket found on back seat of automobile when driver and pas-
sengers not in vehicle); see United States v. Venizelos, 495 F.
Supp. 1277, 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (search of arrestee's purse law-
ful when purse within immediate control of arrestee); see also
State v. Garcia, 605 F.2d 349, 354 (7th Cir. 1979) (search of
hand-carried suitcases lawful because arrestee could have
quickly opened suitcases and gained access to weapons or evi-
dence). But see Oklahoma v. Castleberry, - U.S. ., 83 L.
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Ed. 2d 315, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985) (4-4 decision) (affirming state
court decision holding unconstitutional warrantless search of
suitcase in car trunk when police had probable cause to arrest
driver but not to believe suitcase contained drugs); State v.
Cole, 31 Wash. App. 501, 510, 643 P.2d 675, 680 (1982) (zone of
control under Belton does not include luggage contained in
hatchback area of car); 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.5(a),
at 349-50.
5.3 Pre-Arrest Search
If a warrantless search is closely related in time and place to
a lawful arrest, the search may be considered incidental to the
arrest and therefore valid, even if it occurs before the arrest.
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633, 645-
46, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2564 (1980); State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d
127, 138, 559 P.2d 970, 975 (1977); State v. Donohoe, 39 Wash.
App. 778, 695 P.2d 150, 153 (1985), rev. denied, 103 Wash. 2d
1032 (1985); State v. Ward, 24 Wash. App. 761, 765, 603 P.2d
857, 860 (1979), rev. denied, 93 Wash. 2d 1019 (1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 964 (1980). See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE §§ 5.4, at 336-38; 6.3, at 406-08.
Under limited circumstances, pre-arrest searches are per-
mitted even when the arrest does not follow closely. Police may
conduct a search incident to the arrest of a suspect when they
have probable cause, when they believe the suspect is in the pro-
cess of destroying highly evanescent evidence, and when they
can preserve the evidence by a limited search. Cupp v. Murphy,
412 U.S. 291, 296, 36 L. Ed. 2d 900, 906, 93 S. Ct. 2000, 2004
(1973). See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.4(b), at 338-45;
State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 127, 137-38, 559 P.2d 970, 975
(1977) (upholding officer's seizure of evidence prior to arrest
because of exigent circumstance of its possible destruction).
5.4 Post-Detention Searches: Search Incident to Arrest and
Inventory Search
5.4(a) Post-Detention Search Incident to Arrest
The search incident to arrest exception can apply both to a
search at the place of detention as well as to a search at the
place of arrest. See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §
5.3 (a), at 303-11.
Any post-arrest search is unlawful, however, if probable
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cause to arrest dissipates by the time the suspect is taken into
custody. A more difficult question arises when a suspect is
detained only because the police have failed to comply with laws
allowing release. See generally LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §
5.3(d), at 330-35.
Even when an arrestee is searched upon booking, officers
later may conduct a warrantless "second look" into the arres-
tee's belongings. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 805,
39 L. Ed. 2d 771, 777, 94 S. Ct. 1234, 1238 (1974) (search of
defendant's personal belongings long after defendant had been
searched and placed in jail cell was permissible search incident
to arrest; police did no more than they were entitled to do inci-
dent to an arrest). See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.3(b),
at 311-21 (Edwards requires that (1) the object come into plain
view at the time of arrival at the place of detention, (2) later
investigation establishes that the object has evidentiary value,
and (3) the object remains in custody as part of arrestee's inven-
toried property). Compare United States v. Venizelos, 495 F.
Supp. 1277, 1280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (arrestee's purse may be
searched either at place of arrest or anytime during detention)
with State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 194, 622 P.2d 1199,
1214 (1980) (Utter, J., concurring) (probable cause required for
detailed, post-booking search through arrestee's personal belong-
ings stored in police property box).
A search conducted after police have decided to release a
suspect is improper when there is no probability that the sus-
pect possesses relevant evidence or weapons. State v. Carner, 28
Wash. App. 439, 445, 624 P.2d 204, 207-08 (1981).
5.4(b) Post-Detention Inventory Search
Police officers may search containers or packages as part of
an inventory of the arrestee's possessions prior to storage for
safekeeping. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643, 77 L. Ed. 2d
65, 69-70, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2608 (1983); South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1005, 96 S. Ct. 3092,
3097 (1976). The police need not have probable cause to believe
that the containers conceal evidence of crime, nor must they fear
concealed weapons. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10
n.5, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 547 n.5, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2482-83 n.5 (1977).
The police have some obligation, however, to safeguard the
container and its contents when they seize it. Id. at 19, 53 L. Ed.
2d at 553, 97 S. Ct. at 2487. Whether the defendant is arrested
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in a private or a public place thus can be significant. Id. (when a
person is arrested in a public place, it is reasonable for police to
take custody of the arrestee's property rather than to leave the
property in the public place while a warrant is obtained). See
generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.5(b), at 356-58.
Lower courts have reached differing results as to whether
police may conduct an item-by-item inventory of contents. See 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.5(b), at 359-61.
5.5 Searches Conducted in Good Faith and Without Purpose of
Finding Evidence
If officers undertake a search in good faith for a reason
other than investigating crime-for example, to aid someone
who has been injured-any evidence they discover may be
admissible. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 5.4(c), at 345-47;
5.5(d), at 370-71. Thus, even when police lack probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed, they may conduct a war-
rantless search of premises when the premises contain persons in
imminent danger of death or harm, objects likely to burn,
explode or otherwise cause harm, or information that will dis-
close the location of a threatened victim or the existence of a
threat. 2 LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.5, at 456-57.
For an officer's actions to come within the medical emer-
gency exception to the warrant requirement, the officer must
honestly and reasonably believe that aid or assistance is neces-
sary. State v. McAlpin, 36 Wash. App. 707, 677 P.2d 185 (1984);
see State v. Loewen, 97 Wash. 2d 562, 568, 647 P.2d 489, 493
(1982) (search of defendant's tote bag for identification
improper when defendant regained consciousness prior to
search); see also Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. -, 83 L.
Ed. 2d 246, 105 S. Ct. 409 (1984); see also State v. Sanders, 8
Wash. App. 306, 308, 506 P.2d 892, 895-96 (1973) (entry proper
when police informed by telephone operator of problem at resi-
dence, when no one answered officer's knock at door, and when
police observed through a window a person swaying back and
forth, in apparent need of assistance).
When the medical emergency is a homicide, the officer may
not only enter to aid the victim, but also may make a quick
check of the area to see if the perpetrator or other victims are
present. See Thompson, 469 U.S. at -, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 251,
105 S. Ct. at 412. Such a search must be brief; a general explora-
tory search lasting several hours is not permissible. Id. Cf. supra
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§ 5.1(b).
In the course of rendering aid, police may conduct warrant-
less searches of a victim's personal effects. See, e.g., Chavis v.
Wainwright, 488 F.2d 1077, 1078 (5th Cir. 1973) (police justified
in making inventory search of defendant's clothing and effects
when clothing and effects were removed in hospital during
defendant's treatment for possibly fatal stab wounds, and when
police were required to keep clothing and effects as evidence of
possible homicide); United States v. Dunavan, 485 F.2d 201, 203
(6th Cir. 1973) (when taking person to hospital, police may
search his or her briefcase for purpose of establishing identity).
Similarly, police may make a warrantless entry to protect
property. State v. Campbell, 15 Wash. App. 98, 100, 547 P.2d
295, 297 (1976) (police entry to investigate alleged burglary per-
missible). Firefighters may enter a house to extinguish a fire and
immediately thereafter conduct a limited warrantless investiga-
tion to determine the fire's cause. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
499, 510, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486, 498, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1950 (1978). But
once a fire has been extinguished, a warrant is required for arson
investigators to search the premises to discover a possible crimi-
nal cause of the fire. Id. at 511, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 500, 98 S. Ct. at
1951; Michigan v. Clifford, - U.S. -, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477,
486, 104 S. Ct. 641, 649 (1984).
5.6 The Plain View Doctrine: Distinction Between "Plain View"
and "Open View"
This section discusses the warrantless seizure of objects
based on the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.
Courts have used the term "plain view" to describe three types
of searches: (1) when an officer observes an item that is exposed
to public view in a public place or in a location which is not
constitutionally protected; (2) when an officer intrudes into a
constitutionally protected area-either lawfully or unlaw-
fully-and there observes a clearly exposed object; and (3) when
an officer, standing in a non-protected area, observes an object
that is located inside a constitutionally protected area. See gen-
erally State v. O'Herron, 153 N.J. Super. 570, 574, 380 A.2d 728,
729-30 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1032, 58 L. Ed. 2d 695, 99S. Ct. 637 (1978); 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(a), at 240-
45.
These three situations are distinguished by the nature of
the defendant's expectation of privacy in the object. In the first
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situation-the discovery of an object in a public place or in a
location which is not constitutionally protected-there is no true
search, for the defendant has no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in an object that is exposed to public view. O'Herron, 153
N.J. Super. at 574, 380 A.2d at 730. Generally, "[wihat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of fourth amendment protection." Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 582, 88 S. Ct.
507, 511 (1967); see generally supra §§ 1.1-1.3. Thus, the first
situation is more accurately referred to as "open view" and not"plain view." State v. Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 632 P.2d 44
(1981).
For the same reason, the mere observation of an object
located in a protected area from a vantage point in a non-pro-
tected area does not constitute a search. Privacy rights are
implicated, however, when police enter the constitutionally pro-
tected area to seize the object. "[S]eeing something in open view
does not. . . dispose, ipso facto, of the problem of crossing con-
stitutionally protected thresholds . . . . Light waves cross
thresholds with a constitutional impunity not permitted arms
and legs. Wherever the eye may go, the body of the policeman
may not necessarily follow." Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine:
Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Incident" Geography
Battle, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1047, 1096 (1975). Thus, although the
open view doctrine may justify observing an object located in a
constitutionally protected area, it will not justify seizing the
object; the search is in the entry, not the inspection.
The plain view doctrine has been used to justify the seizure
of objects without a warrant. The following sections will discuss
the criteria for falling within the exception to the warrant
requirement in the second and third situations: the discovery
and seizure of an object after entry into a constitutionally pro-
tected area and the entry into a protected area and the seizure
of an object that was viewed from an unprotected area.
5.7 Criteria for Falling Within the "Plain View" Exception
5.7(a) Discovery of Object in Plain View Following Entry Into
Constitutionally Protected Area
The most common plain view situation occurs when the
officer lawfully enters a constitutionally protected area and
unexpectedly discovers incriminating evidence. See, e.g., State v.
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Johnson, 17 Wash. App. 153, 154-55, 561 P.2d 701, 703 (1977).
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that thepolice officer in each of them had a prior justification for anintrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across apiece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrineserves to supplement the prior justification-whether it be awarrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to law-ful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being presentunconnected with a search directed against the accused-andpermits the warrantless seizure . . . [But] the extension of theoriginal jurisdiction is legitimate only where it is immediatelyapparent to the police that they have evidence before them;the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a generalexploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564,
583, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2038 (1971).
For a warrantless seizure to fall within the plain view excep-
tion, three requirements must be met: (1) the police must have aprior justification for the intrusion into the constitutionally pro-
tected area; (2) the discovery of the incriminating evidence must
be inadvertent; and (3) the police must immediately realize thatthe object they observe is evidence-that is, the incriminating
character of the evidence must be immediately apparent. State
v. Daugherty, 94 Wash. 2d 263, 267, 616 P.2d 649, 651 (1980);
see State v. Lesnick, 84 Wash. 2d 940, 942, 530 P.2d 243, 245(1975); State v. Murray, 84 Wash. 2d 527, 534, 527 P.2d 1303,
1307 (1974); State v. Kennedy, 38 Wash. App. 41, 684 P.2d 1326
(1984), rev. granted, 102 Wash. 2d 1015 (1984).
(1) Prior Justification for Intrusion
The plain view doctrine applies only when the police arejustified in occupying the position from which they observe theillegal object or activity. Thus, when the initial stop of a vehicle
is unlawful, and as a consequence the police have no right to bein a position to observe the vehicle's interior, the observation of
contraband within the vehicle constitutes an unlawful search.
State v. Lesnick, 84 Wash. 2d 940, 942-43, 530 P.2d 243, 245(1975); see also Washington v. Chrisman, 45 U.S. 1, 9, 70 L. Ed.2d 778, 786-87, 102 S. Ct. 812, 818 (1982); State v. Daugherty,
94 Wash. 2d 263, 269, 616 P.2d, 649, 652 (1980); State v.
McCrea, 22 Wash. App. 526, 529, 590 P.2d 367, 369 (1979).Because the plain view exception to the warrant requirement
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rests on the lawfulness of the officer's presence, plain view cases
will have different outcomes under the federal and state consti-
tutions when the two constitutions differ as to that lawfulness.
For example, when an officer has accompanied an arrestee to the
arrestee's dormitory room and follows the arrestee into the
room, the inspection of objects within the room may be lawful
under the fourth amendment and unlawful under article I, sec-
tion 7. Washington v. Chrisman, 45 U.S. 1, 9, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778,
786-87, 102 S. Ct. 812, 818 (1982) (fourth amendment permits
officer to accompany arrestee wherever arrestee goes), on
remand, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 822, 676 P.2d 419, 424 (1984) (article
I, section 7 prohibits officer from entering misdemeanor arres-
tee's home unless officer can demonstrate threat to officer's
safety, possibility of destruction of evidence of misdemeanor
charged, or strong likelihood of escape).
(2) Inadvertent Discovery
The plain view exception does not apply when an officer
expects to find the incriminating object; the officer must dis-
cover the object inadvertently. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 471, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 586, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2040-41
(1971).
Thus courts generally have held that when police have suffi-
cient grounds to name an item in a warrant, they may not seize
it on the basis of plain view. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 4.11(d), at 178-83. The limitation may apply only to items that
are "not contraband nor stolen nor dangerous in themselves."
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 471, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 586, 91 S. Ct. at 2041.
One Washington court, however, has upheld the seizure of
objects not mentioned in a search warrant because they could
have been seized under the plain view exception during a prior
lawful intrusion. State v. McAlpin, 36 Wash. App. 707, 714-15,
677 P.2d 185, 190 (1984) (police observed contraband in plain
view during lawful intrusion based on medical emergency in
defendant's home; officer's subsequent failure to list contraband
in affidavit in support of search warrant did not invalidate
seizure of contraband during execution of warrant because evi-
dence previously had been in plain view). When the discovery of
an object in the course of a search for another object is in fact
inadvertent, its seizure may fall within the exception. State v.
Lair, 95 Wash. 2d 706, 717, 630 P.2d 427, 433-34 (1981) (discov-
ery of drug other than marijuana during "wide open" search for
marijuana was, for plain view purposes, inadvertent); State v.
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Johnson, 17 Wash. App. 153, 561 P.2d 701 (1977) (stolen prop-erty from prior burglary may be seized under plain view doctrineduring execution of search warrant based on subsequent bur-glary, provided police did not have probable cause to believe
that the property from prior burglary was present on the prem-ises at time they applied for warrant); but see Lair, 95 Wash. 2d
at 721, 630 P.2d at 436 (Dolliver, J., dissenting) ("wide opensearch for all controlled substances" renders impossible anyinadvertent discovery of drugs). Cf. State v. Callahan, 31 Wash.
App. 710, 712-13, 644 P.2d 735, 736 (1982).
Some courts have bolstered the inadvertent discovery ruleby requiring that a search warrant be executed in good faith.
See, e.g., United States v. Tranquillo, 330 F. Supp. 871, 876(M.D. Fla. 1971) (bringing along vice squad officers to look fornarcotics while other officers executed search warrant for stolen
clothing deemed "bad faith"); see generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 4.11(e), at 183-84.
One Washington court has held the discovery of an objectinadvertent when the officer looked in a location where heexpected to find evidence; the officer, however, had not taken"unreasonable steps" to be in a position to observe the object.
State v. Kennedy, 38 Wash. App. 41, 49, 684 P.2d 1326, 1331(1984) (officer lawfully stopping vehicle observed driver reaching
under seat of car; officer justified in removing partially visibleplastic bag from under seat as plain view seizure), rev. granted,
102 Wash. 2d 1015 (1984).
(3) Immediate Knowledge: Incriminating Character
Immediately Apparent
The plain view exception applies only when the policeimmediately recognize the incriminating nature of the object.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564,583, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2038 (1971). For example, the discovery of acontraband television set inside the defendant's apartment didnot come within the plain view doctrine, despite the validity ofthe entry into the apartment, because the officers did not realizethat the television was contraband until they had copied downthe serial number and checked with police headquarters. State
v. Murray, 84 Wash. 2d 527, 534, 527 P.2d 1303, 1307 (1974); butsee 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.11(c), at 175-76.
The United States Supreme Court has not indicated what ismeant by "immediately apparent" and to what extent officersmay examine an object to determine whether it is incriminating.
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2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 4.11(b), (c), at 167-78 (sug-
gesting that in order for officers to inspect items, they must be
aware of facts that justify a reasonable suspicion that the items
are incriminating; for officers to seize the items, they must have
probable cause).
A useful synthesis of Washington cases and doctrine per-
taining to the issue of when an object's incriminating nature is
immediately apparent is found in State v. Legas, 20 Wash. App.
535, 581 P.2d 172 (1978) (officers may inspect for serial numbers
on radio equipment when they have well-founded suspicion that
equipment is stolen based upon knowledge of other stolen prop-
erty on premises, past criminal activities of person having access
to premises, and peculiarly large quantity of equipment); see
also State v. McCrea, 22 Wash. App. 526, 590 P.2d 367 (1979)
(when federal officers executing warrant for machine gun came
upon items they thought might be controlled substances and
called local officers to identify items, seizure was unlawful
because incriminating nature was not immediately apparent to
federal officers, and local officers had no prior justification for
intrusion); State v. Keefe, 13 Wash. App. 829, 537 P.2d 795
(1975) (typewriter sample could not be seized under "plain
view" doctrine while police executed search warrant for stolen
gun).
For the objects seized to be incriminating, they must be
fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime. Evidence of crime
includes objects having a "sufficient nexus" with the crime
under investigation. State v. Reid, 38 Wash. App. 203, 213, 687
P.2d 861, 868 (1984); State v. Turner, 18 Wash. App. 727, 729,
571 P.2d 955, 957 (1977). Evidence also may be seized if it will
aid in the apprehension of a suspect. Turner, 18 Wash. App. at
729, 571 P.2d at 957.
The officer's knowledge is relevant to a determination of the
legality of items. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 483, 49 L.
Ed. 2d 627, 644, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 2749 (1976). Thus, an officer's
experience and knowledge that plastic baggies are common
receptacles for marijuana will enable the officer immediately to
recognize the incriminating nature of a baggie even when its
contents are not observed. State v. Kennedy, 38 Wash. App. 41,
48-49, 684 P.2d 1326, 1331 (1984), rev. granted, 102 Wash. 2d
1015 (1984).
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5.7(b) Seizure of Object from Protected Area After Observing
Object from Non-Protected Area
In those cases in which the police officer is in a public ornon-protected area at the time he or she observes contraband
within a constitutionally protected area, the officer's mere visual
observation-without physical intrusion-does not constitute a"search". See State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 23, 691 P.2d929, 942 (1984) (when an officer peered into defendant's car on
public street and saw blood on door handle and jewelry similar
to that observed at homicide scene, his observation fell within
the open view doctrine of Seagull); see also 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 2.2(a), at 242-43; State v. O'Herron, 153 N.J.
Super. 570, 575, 380 A.2d 728, 730 (1977).
When an officer enters a constitutionally protected area to
seize an object observed from outside the area, the plain view
doctrine will not justify the absence of a warrant.
[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless
seizure of evidence. This is simply a corollary of the familiarprinciple . . . that no amount of probable cause can justify awarrantless search or seizure absent "exigent circumstances."Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an incriminating
object is on premises belonging to a criminal suspect mayestablish the fullest possible measure of probable cause. Buteven where the object is contraband, this court has repeatedlystated and enforced the basic rule that the police may not
enter and make a warrantless seizure.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564,
584, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2039 (1971). See also Taylor v. United
States, 286 U.S. 1, 5-6, 76 L. Ed. 2d 951, 953, 52 S. Ct. 466, 467(1932) (although police were standing where they had a right to
be when they looked through a small opening in a garage andsaw contraband, their warrantless entry to seize the contraband
was unconstitutional).
Thus, a police officer who lawfully observes contrabandwithin a constitutionally protected area may enter the area with-
out a warrant only if the officer can justify the entry by one ofthe other exceptions to the warrant requirement. 1 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(a), at 243-45; see State v. Drumhiller,
36 Wash. App. 592, 675 P.2d 631 (1984); see generally State v.
O'Herron, 153 N.J. Super. 570, 576-81, 380 A.2d 728, 730-34
(1977). For example, the warrantless entry into the defendant's
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vegetable garden to seize lawfully observed marijuana plants was
unconstitutional because the officer could not show exigent cir-
cumstances or any other warrant requirement exception.
O'Herron at 582, 380 A.2d at 733-34.
5.8 Plain View: Aiding the Senses with Enhancement Devices
The Washington Court of Appeals and lower courts in other
jurisdictions have applied the plain view doctrine when police
officers used flashlights to aid their observations, provided that
the observations could have taken place in daylight without
flashlights. State v. Young, 28 Wash. App. 412, 417, 624 P.2d
725, 729 (1981) (tools suspected of being used in robbery were
properly seized when officer observed tools after shining flash-
light on front seat of car with door left open), rev. denied, 95
Wash. 2d 1024 (1981). See 1 LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §
2.2(b), at 248-56; see also United States v. Booker, 461 F.2d 990,
992 (6th Cir. 1972); Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185
(5th Cir. 1970); People v. Whalen, 390 Mich. 672, 678-79, 213
N.W.2d 116, 120 (1973) (proper to use flashlight to observe inte-
rior of car and occupants).
The decisions permitting the use of enhancement devices
are based on the theory that the object has been "knowingly
exposed to public view" even though "artificial illumination,
specifically directed, might be required to render the property
visible." State v. Stone, 294 A.2d 683, 688-89 (Me. 1972). Con-
sistent with traditional plain view requirements, the flashlight-
enhanced observation must be from a location where the officer
has a right to be. See, e.g., Tyler v. United States, 302 A.2d 748,
751 (D.C. 1973) (search invalid when officer improperly opened
car door before using flashlight to observe gun in interior of
vehicle; officer did not have "a right to be in the position to have
that view").
The rule governing magnification is similar to the one gov-
erning the use of flashlights. Police officers may use binoculars
and telescopes to observe that which is in the open and subject
to some scrutiny by the naked eye from the same location, or to
observe that which they lawfully could have observed from a
closer location. 1 LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(c), at 256-
62; see, e.g., United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37, 38 (4th Cir.
1973); United States v. Loundmannz, 472 F.2d 1376, 1379 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). The binocular/telescope rule does not permit
enhanced observations that enable the officer to observe objects
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or activities that could not be observed by the naked eye; in
these circumstances, the defendant may have a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in the objects or activities. See, e.g., United
States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (D. Haw. 1976) (plain
view exception does not apply to FBI agents' use of 800 millime-
ter telescope to observe activities in defendant's apartment from
building one-fourth of one mile away, when no observation pos-
sible from closer locations); State v. Kender, 60 Hawaii 301, 305-
06, 588 P.2d 447, 450-51 (1979) (plain view exception inapplica-
ble when officer climbed up fence on neighboring property andused a telescope to observe marijuana plants in defendant's
backyard that otherwise would have been concealed by a fence
and heavy foliage). But see Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa.
Super. 177, 181-82, 263 A.2d 904, 906 (1970) (applying plainview exception to binocular observation, from atop a four-foot
ladder, of activity that could not have been seen with the naked
eye). Cf. supra § 1.3(c) (reasonable expectation of privacy in"open fields"); see generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §
2.2(c), at 259-61.
5.9 Extensions of the Plain View Doctrine
5.9(a) Plain Hearing
Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized a "plain hear-ing" analogue to the plain view doctrine. For example, officers
did not need a warrant in order to obtain a motel room next tothe suspects' room and to listen at the connecting door. United
States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 921 (1973). See also United States v. Pagan, 395 F.Supp. 1052, 1060-61 (D.P.R. 1975) (eavesdropping on hotel room
conversation permitted), aff'd., 537 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1976);
State v. Day, 50 Ohio App. 2d 315, 322, 362 N.E.2d 1253, 1257-
58 (1976).
In Washington, eavesdropping by means of an electronic
device or the interception of private telephone, telegraph, radio,
or other electronic communications is governed by the Washing-
ton Violating Right of Privacy Act, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.73(1983). Even tape recordings made by federal agents pursuant to
the federal wiretap statute are inadmissible in state courts when
the recordings are made in violation of the Washington statute.
State v. Williams, 94 Wash. 2d 531, 541, 617 P.2d 1012, 1018
(1980). Police testimony about such recorded conversations is
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also inadmissible. Id. at 543, 617 P.2d at 1019. Cf. infra § 7.3(c)
(use of illegally obtained evidence at probable cause hearings).
5.9(b) Plain Smell
Courts have differed on whether the plain view doctrine
applies to odors and permits the warrantless seizure of an object
based on its smell. See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 707 F.2d
1093 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, - U.S. -, 83
L. Ed. 2d 890, 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985); United States v. Haley, 669
F.2d 201, 203-04 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1117
(1982). See generally 1 LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(a), at
247-48.
Washington has permitted the warrantless seizure of an
object based on its odor when the odor establishes probable
cause. See State v. Huckaby, 15 Wash. App. 280, 291, 549 P.2d
35, 42 (1976), review denied, 87 Wash. 2d 1006 (1976); see also
State v. Hammond, 24 Wash. App. 596, 600, 603 P.2d 377, 379
(1979) (marijuana odor emanating from vehicle); State v.
Compton, 13 Wash. App. 863, 864-65, 538 P.2d 861, 861-62
(1975).
5.10 Consent Searches: Introduction
A warrantless search is constitutional when valid consent is
granted. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9-10, 70 L. Ed. 2d
778, 787, 102 S. Ct. 812, 818 (1982). A valid consent search
requires that: (1) the consent be "voluntary"; (2) the consent be
granted by a party having the authority to consent; State v.
Shoemaker, 85 Wash. 2d 207, 210-12, 533 P.2d 123, 125 (1975),
and (3) the search be limited to the scope of the consent
granted. State v. Johnson, 71 Wash. 2d 239, 243-44, 427 P.2d
705, 708 (1967). See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §
8.1, at 610-35.
5.11 Voluntariness of Consent: Burden of Proof
The State has the burden of proving that consent to a
search was voluntarily given. Shoemaker, 85 Wash. 2d at 210,
533 P.2d at 125. The level of proof required is "clear and posi-
tive evidence." State v. Rodriguez, 20 Wash. App. 876, 878, 582
P.2d 904, 906 (1978). See also State v. Johnson, 16 Wash. App.
899, 903, 559 P.2d 1380, 1383 (1977), rev. denied, 89 Wash. 2d
1002 (1977).
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For discussion of the distinctions between voluntariness of
consent and waiver of constitutional rights, see 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.1, at 612-20.
5.12 Factors Considered in Determining Voluntariness
The validity or voluntariness of a consent to search is ana-
lyzed in a similar manner as the voluntariness of a confession.
Thus, the issue of whether "consent to a search was in fact 'vol-
untary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express orimplied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality
of all the circumstances." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.218, 229, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 862-63, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047-48(1973); see State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wash. 2d at 211-12, 533 P.2d
at 125. Unlike the confession situation, however, an individual's
knowledge of the right to refuse consent is only one factor bear-
ing on voluntariness; such knowledge is not essential to an effec-
tive consent. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 862-
63, 93 S. Ct. at 2047-48. But when examining the totality of the
circumstances, "account must be taken of subtly coercive policequestions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state ofthe person who consents." 412 U.S. at 229, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 864,93 S. Ct. at 2049. Factors generally considered as bearing on the
voluntariness of consent include: (1) whether Miranda warnings
were given prior to obtaining the consent; (2) the degree of edu-
cation and intelligence of the consenting party; and (3) whether
the consenting party had been advised of the right not to con-
sent. Shoemaker, 85 Wash. 2d at 212, 533 P.2d at 125; see State
v. Johnson, 17 Wash. App. 153, 561 P.2d 701 (1977). These and
other factors are discussed in the following sections.
5.12(a) Police Claim of Authority to Search
An express or implied claim by the police that they will pro-ceed immediately to conduct the search even without the indi-
vidual's consent is likely to indicate that the subsequent consent
was involuntary. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543,
550, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797, 803, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1792 (1968). See gen-
erally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.2(a), at 638-42.
A threat to seek a search warrant if the person refuses toallow a search, however, does not invalidate a consent. See State
v. Murray, 84 Wash. 2d 527, 534, 527 P.2d 1303, 1307 (1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004, 44 L. Ed. 2d 673, 95 S. Ct. 2407
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(1975); State v. Bellows, 72 Wash. 2d 264, 268, 432 P.2d 654, 656
(1967) (defendant not coerced into signing statement giving con-
sent to search hotel room when officer had stated he could
obtain search warrant by waking judge in early morning hours
but had not stated that to do so would prejudice defendant); see
generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.2(c), at 645-49.
5.12(b) Coercive Surroundings
If the police make a show of force at the time the consent is
sought, or if the surroundings are coercive in other respects, the
consent probably will not be considered voluntary. See McNear
v. Rhay, 65 Wash. 2d 530, 537, 398 P.2d 732, 737 (1965); State v.
Werth, 18 Wash. App. 530, 535, 571 P.2d 941, 943 (1977) (when
defendant placed under physical restraint and not informed of
right to refuse consent to search, and when police had searched
her home illegally without consent two days previous, defendant
did not voluntarily consent to search of her home even if she
verbalized consent), rev. denied, 90 Wash. 2d 1010 (1977); see
also State v. Dresker, 39 Wash. App. 136, 692 P.2d 846 (1984);
cf. INS v. Delgado, - U.S. -, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247, 105 S. Ct.
1758 (1985) (INS agents moving systematically through factory
asking workers about their citizenship while other INS agents
were stationed at the factory exits did not render workers'
responses nonconsensual); supra § 1.4(a); see generally 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.2(b), at 642-43.
On the other hand, the fact that a defendant is in custody
when he or she consents to a search does not by itself establish
coercion or involuntariness of consent. United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 424, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598, 609, 96 S. Ct. 820, 828
(1976); McNear v. Rhay, 65 Wash. 2d 530, 538, 398 P.2d 732,
737-38 (1977). Custodial restraint is, however, a significant fac-
tor in assessing voluntariness. See State v. Werth, 18 Wash.
App. 530, 535, 571 P.2d 941, 943-44 (1977); State v. Rodriguez,
20 Wash. App. 876, 881, 582 P.2d 904, 907 (1978).
5.12(c) Awareness of the Constitutional Right to Withhold
Consent
Although an individual's knowledge of the right to refuse a
search is taken into account in determining whether consent to a
search was voluntary, the state may prove that consent was vol-
untary without establishing such knowledge. Schneckloth v.
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Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 863, 93 S. Ct.
2041, 2048 (1973). See Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. -, 83 L.
Ed. 2d 165, 105 S. Ct. 308 (1984); see also State v. Shoemaker,
85 Wash. 2d 207, 212, 533 P.2d 123, 125 (1975); State v. Werth,
18 Wash. App. 530, 535-36, 571 P.2d 941, 944 (1977); cf. State v.
Rodriguez, 20 Wash. App. 876, 880-81, 582 P.2d 904, 907 (1978)
(consent voluntary despite defendant's assertion he was not told
and did not know of right to refuse consent). See generally 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.2(i), at 666-71.
Washington and the majority of jurisdictions hold that the
failure to give Miranda warnings to a defendant in custody does
not automatically invalidate a consent to search. State v. Lyons,
76 Wash. 2d 343, 458 P.2d 30 (1969); State v. Rodriguez, 20
Wash. App. 876, 880, 582 P.2d 904, 907 (1978).
5.12(d) Prior Illegal Police Action
A prior illegal act by the police may suggest that the defen-
dant's consent was involuntary. See, e.g., State v. Werth, 18
Wash. App. 530, 535, 571 P.2d 941, 943-44 (1977) ("In view of
the additional circumstance that 2 days before, Werth's home
had been searched illegally without her consent, it is apparent
that overall, the situation was rife with coercion."); see generally
2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.2(d), at 649-55. Thus, a prior
illegal search or arrest may taint the subsequent consent and
thereby render the consent invalid. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 8.2(a), at 649-55; see generally infra Ch. 7.
5.12(e) Maturity, Sophistication, Mental or Emotional State
The sophistication and emotional state of the defendant are
always considered in assessing the voluntariness of the consent.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854,
875, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2058 (1973) ("The traditional definition ofvoluntariness we accept today has always taken into account evi-
dence of minimal schooling, [and] low intelligence. . . ."); State
v. Shoemaker, 85 Wash. 2d 207, 212, 533 P.2d 123, 125 (1975)(determination of voluntariness should include consideration of
"the degree of education and intelligence of the consenting per-
son"); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 64 L.
Ed. 2d 497, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980). See generally 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.2(c), at 655-58.
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5.12(f) Prior Cooperatiorn or Refusal to Cooperate
A prior voluntary confession or other type of cooperation
with the police will weigh in favor of a finding that the consent
to search was voluntary. See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 8.2, at 659-67. A prior refusal to consent to a search
will suggest that a subsequent consent was not voluntary. See
generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.2(g), at 658-59.
A suspect's behavior may indicate consent even when verbal
consent is withheld. See State v. Sabbot, 16 Wash. App. 929,
938, 561 P.2d 212, 218-19 (1977) (although undercover investiga-
tor followed defendant into defendant's home after defendant
had told him to wait outside, investigator's presence in house
was with defendant's tacit acquiescence).
5.12(g) Police Deception as to Identity or Purpose
The use of deception by a police officer does not necessarily
affect the voluntariness of a consent to search. See State v.
Myers, 102 Wash. 2d 548, 689 P.2d 38 (1984) (police use of ficti-
tious arrest warrant to gain entry into defendant's house in
order to execute valid search warrant did not invalidate defen-
dant's consent to entry or defendant's subsequent cooperation in
search); State v. Huckaby, 15 Wash. App. 280, 285-88, 549 P.2d
35, 38-41 (1976), rev. denied, 87 Wash. 2d 1006 (1976); 2 LAFAvE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § § 8.2(m), (n), at 677-90.
5.13 Scope of Consent
A consensual search must be limited to the area covered by
the defendant's consent; consequently, any search exceeding the
scope of consent is invalid. See, e.g., State v. Murray, 84 Wash.
2d 527, 534, 527 P.2d 1303, 1307 (1974) (when defendant con-
sented to search by officers who said they were looking only for
office and video equipment, search could not include inspecting
television serial numbers not in plain view); State v. Johnson, 71
Wash. 2d 239, 243, 427 P.2d 705, 708 (1967) (consent limited to
search of contents of trunk; thus, search of other areas of vehicle
invalid); McNear v. Rhay, 65 Wash. 2d 530, 538, 398 P.2d 732,
738 (1965) (when police request for consent to search was "pred-
icated solely upon a belief that stolen property, in the nature of'shoplifted' articles, would be found," and when defendant
"signed the consent with that understanding[,]" the scope of the
consent to search was so limited); State v. Cuzick, 21 Wash.
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App. 501, 505, 585 P.2d 485, 488 (1978) (defendant's consent to
officer looking in his car did not authorize officer rummaging
through suitcase discovered in back seat and containing defen-dant's personal belongings). See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 8.1(c), at 624-35.
5.14 Consent by a Third Party
Under appropriate circumstances, warrantless searches may
be based upon the consent of third parties, and evidence discov-
ered during such searches may be used against a nonconsenting
defendant. State v. Vidor, 75 Wash. 2d 607, 452 P.2d 961 (1969).
See, e.g., State v. Porter, 5 Wash. App. 460, 463, 488 P.2d 773,
775 (1971).
The validity of a third-party consent is affected both by the
relationship between the defendant and the third party and by
some general considerations. The general considerations include:
(1) Antagonism between the defendant and the third party,
see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.3(b), at 698-701;
(2) Specific instructions that the defendant may have given
to the third party, see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.3(c), at
701-03;
(3) Objection by the defendant, when he or she was present
at the time the third party authorized the search, see 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.3, at 704-09. Note that in some cases
the contemporaneous objections by the defendant do not invali-
date the consent given by a third party. E.g., People v. Cosme,
48 N.Y.2d 286, 397 N.E.2d 1319, 422 N.Y.S. 2d 652 (1979).
For a discussion of the significance of a police officer's rea-
sonable mistake that the third party had authority over the
place searched, see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.3, at 716-
25.
The following sections discuss the relationships between a
defendant and a third party that may give rise to third-party
consent.
5.14(a) Defendant's Spouse
The defendant's spouse having equal use of the object or
equal right to occupation of the premises may consent to a
search of the object or premises. See, e.g., State v. Gillespie, 18
Wash. App. 313, 316, 569 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1977), rev. denied, 89
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Wash. 2d 1019 (1978); State v. Hartnell, 15 Wash. App. 410,
417, 550 P.2d 63, 68 (1976) (wife's invitation to police officer to
enter defendant's house in response to officer's request was con-
sensual entry requiring no notice of authority or purpose as ordi-
narily required under knock and announce statute or applicable
constitutional provisions), rev. denied, 87 Wash. 2d 1010 (1976);
see generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.4(a), at 726-31.
5.14(b) Defendant's Parents
A parent may consent to a search, whether or not the child
is a minor, when the child is living with the parent. See, e.g.,
State v. Thompson, 17 Wash. App. 639, 644, 564 P.2d 820, 823
(1977) (when defendant's mother consented to search of home in
which she and defendant were living knowing that defendant
was to be placed under arrest, and when there was no evidence
of coercion, consent was valid), rev. denied, 89 Wash. 2d 1018
(1978).
5.14(c) Defendant's Child
The defendant's child, in appropriate circumstances, may
consent to a search of the parent's home. See, e.g., State v.
Jones, 22 Wash. App. 447, 451-52, 591 P.2d 796, 799 (1979)
(thirteen-year-old child's invitation to enter apartment in which
child resided was legally sufficient consent, absent any evidence
that opening of door and invitation were unusual, unexpected, or
unauthorized acts, or that child was too young or immature to
consent). For a general discussion of the scope and limitations of
a child's consent to a search of the parent's house, see 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.4(c), at 736-38.
5.14(d) Co-Tenant or Joint Occupant
A co-tenant or other joint occupant of the defendant's
dwelling who "possesse[s] common authority over or other suffi-
cient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be
inspected" may give valid consent to a search of those premises
or effects. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 39 L. Ed.
2d 242, 250, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993 (1974); see also United States v.
Green, 523 F.2d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 1975). Washington has
adopted the "common authority" standard of Matlock for deter-
mining the validity of third party consent under article I, section
7 of the state constitution. State v. Mathe, 102 Wash. 2d 537,
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543, 688 P.2d 859, 863 (1984). The common authority rule
requires first, that the consenting party possess the authority to
permit the search in his or her own right, and second, that it is
reasonable to infer that the defendant assumed the risk that the
co-occupant might permit a search. Id. at 543-44, 688 P.2d at
863.
The common authority rule applies to apartments and to
more limited rental arrangements such as those found in motels,
boarding houses, and room rentals. Mathe at 544, 688 P.2d at
863. See also State v. Bellows, 72 Wash. 2d 264, 268, 432 P.2d
654, 657 (1967) (when co-occupants of motel room have equal
right to use and occupancy of premises, either may grant con-
sent to search); State v. Porter, 5 Wash. App. 460, 463, 488 P.2d
773, 775 (1971) (tenant who believes that her roommate is traf-
ficking in drugs may let police into the apartment during drug
transaction). See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §
8.5(c), at 748-53.
5.14(e) Landlord, Lessor, or Manager
A lessor or manager of an apartment building may consent
to a search of an area that is not within the exclusive possession
of the lessee. See, e.g., State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112, 123, 542
P.2d 782, 789 (1975) (search of rented half of garage upheld
when police, with permission of rental manager, searched
unrented half, pried off partition separating two halves, and
observed rented portion); State v. Talley, 14 Wash. App. 484,
487, 543 P.2d 348, 351 (1975) (grounds outside apartment build-
ing were common areas not under exclusive control of defendant
and thus police lawfully could search grounds with consent of
building managing agent).
A landlord, however, generally may not authorize a search
of premises that are within the lessee's exclusive possession.
Mathe, 102 Wash. 2d at 544, 688 P.2d at 863. See Annot., 2
A.L.R.4th 1173, 1208 (1980).
For an example of a tenant abandoning his interest in a
property and showing no actual expectation of privacy, see State
v. Christian, 95 Wash. 2d 655, 659, 628 P.2d 806, 808 (1981); see
generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.5(a), at 738-47. For
discussion of consent by a lessee, see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 8.5(b), at 747-48.
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5.14(f) Bailee
A bailee may consent to a search of the bailor's belongings
when the bailee has a sufficient relationship to or degree of con-
trol over the chattel. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.6(a),
at 760-65; see also State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 127, 139-40, 559
P.2d 970, 976 (1977) (when hospital had joint control over
patient-defendant's clothing, hospital ward clerk could consent
to police seizure of the clothing), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876, 54
L. Ed. 2d 155, 98 S. Ct. 226 (1977). For a discussion of consent
by a bailor, see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.6, at 765-66.
5.14(g) Employee and Employer
Under some circumstances, an employee may give consent
to a search of the employer's premises, and an employer may
consent to a search of the place of employment even when the
belongings of an employee would be affected. For a discussion of
the rules governing consent within the employer-employee rela-
tionship, see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 8.6(c)-8.6(d), at
767-74. For a discussion of consent by an educational institution
(or officer thereof) to a search affecting a student's belongings,
see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.6(e), at 774-78.
5.14(h) Hotel Employee
A hotel employee may not grant valid consent to a search of
a guest's room. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490, 11 L. Ed.
2d 856, 861, 84 S. Ct. 889, 893 (1964).
5.14(i) Host and Guest
For a discussion of consent by a host, see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 8.5(d), at 753-57, and for a discussion of consent
by a guest, see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.5(e), at 757-59.
5.15 Statutory Implied Consent
A statute may establish that particular conduct constitutes
implied consent to a search. Thus, for example, a person driving
a motor vehicle in Washington gives implied consent to a blood
test if he or she is arrested for vehicular homicide. State v.
Judge, 100 Wash. 2d 706, 675 P.2d 219 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 46.20.308(1); cf. State v. Rogers, 37 Wash. App. 728, 683 P.2d
608 (1984).
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5.16 Exigent Circumstances: Introduction
The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant require-
ment applies when police have established probable cause but
do not obtain a warrant because of the need for an immediate
search or seizure. The reasoning underlying the exception is that
the delay involved in obtaining a warrant could result in the loss
of evidence, the escape of the suspect, or harm to the public or
the police. See 2 LAFAVE SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.1. See also
State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 701, 674 P.2d 1240, 1248
(1983). Exigent circumstances, however, are not created when-
ever a serious offense has been committed. Thompson v. Louisi-
ana, 469 U.S. , 83 L. Ed. 2d 246, 105 S. Ct. 409 (1984);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290, 98 S. Ct. 2408
(1978); State v. Counts, 99 Wash. 2d 54, 58, 659 P.2d 1087, 1089
(1983).
The exigent circumstances exception has been narrowly
construed when the search requires intrusion into the human
body, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 16 L. Ed. 2d
908, 919, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1835 (1960), or entry onto private prem-
ises, Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34, 26 L. Ed. 2d 409, 413, 90
S. Ct. 1969, 1972 (1970). At the same time, under the fourth
amendment, the exception broadly encompasses searches of
vehicles; thus, police may make a warrantless search of a vehicle
even though the vehicle and its owner are in police custody.
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 428-29,
90 S. Ct. 1975, 1981 (1970); see infra § 5.22.
The Washington Constitution does not recognize a general"automobile exception" to the warrant requirement; rather, it
requires that the search of a vehicle be justified by an actual
exigency. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 868, 700-03, 674 P.2d
1240, 1248-49 (1983). Consequently, in determining whether exi-
gent circumstances exist, Washington courts examine facts such
as the amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant by tradi-
tional means and the availability of a telephone warrant. Id. at
701, 674 P.2d at 1249.
5.17 Exigent Circumstances Justifying Warrantless Entry into
the Home
5.17(a) Hot Pursuit
An arrest on the street does not create an exigent circum-
stance justifying a warrantless search of the arrestee's house.
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Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 26 L. Ed. 2d 409, 90 S. Ct. 1969
(1970). But police may make a warrantless entry into a home
when they attempt to arrest the suspect in a public place, the
suspect retreats into the home, and the police reasonably fear
that delay will result in the suspect escaping, injury to the
officers or the public, or the destruction of evidence. See
Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(escape); United States v. Weaklem, 517 F.2d 70, 72 (9th Cir.
1975) (injury); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4,
8-9 (9th Cir. 1973) (destruction of evidence); see also United
States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300, 306, 96 S.
Ct. 2406, 2409 (1976); Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. 294, 298, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1645-46
(1967); State v. Gallo, 20 Wash. App. 717, 722, 582 P.2d 558, 562
(1978). While the police are on the premises, the scope of the
intrusion is limited to its purpose; if the purpose is to prevent
escape or harm, for example, the search is limited to finding the
suspect or weapons which could be used against the police. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. at 299, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 787-88, 87 S. Ct. at 1646.
For purposes of determining whether an arrest takes place
in a home, the location of the arrestee and not the officer is the
critical factor. State v. Holeman, 103 Wash. 2d 426, 429, 693
P.2d 89, 91 (1985). Thus, absent exigent circumstances, an
officer may not arrest a suspect without a warrant when the sus-
pect is standing in the doorway to his or her home, even when
the officer is outside the home. Id. at 429, 693 P.2d at 91.
In determining whether the warrantless entry into a home
was justified by the hot pursuit exigent circumstance, courts
examine not only the purpose of the entry but also whether:
(1) the offense was serious or one of violence. Dorman
v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732, 745, 104 S. Ct. 2091,
2099 (1984) (warrantless arrest in defendant's bedroom for non-
criminal traffic offense not justified as necessary to preserve evi-
dence of individual's blood-alcohol level, even assuming that
underlying facts would have supported finding of that exigent
circumstance, because state had chosen to classify offense as
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment
possible). But see Welsh at -, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 752, 104 S. Ct.
at 2105 (White, J., dissenting) (because suspect could cast sub-
stantial doubt on validity of blood or breath test by consuming
additional alcohol after arriving home, and in light of prompt-
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ness with which officers reached suspect's home, need to prevent
imminent and ongoing destruction of evidence of serious viola-
tion of Wisconsin's traffic laws provided exigent circumstance
justifying warrantless in-home arrest) (emphasis added);
(2) the suspect was armed. Dorman, 435 F.2d at 393;
(3) there was a clear and strong showing of probable
cause to believe the suspect committed the crime. Id. at 393;
(4) there were reasonable grounds to believe that the
suspect was on the premises. Id. at 393;
(5) the police identified themselves and provided an
opportunity for surrender prior to their entry. Id.;
(6) the arrest decision was made in the course of an
ongoing investigation or in the field, and the exigency of entry
into the house was not foreseen at the time of the decision. See
United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1102-03 (9th Cir.
1976) (entry into defendant's home without warrant not justified
because entry was foreseeable consequence of planned investiga-
tion and prior police activities; see also Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 763, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 694 (1969);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464, 91 S. Ct. 2022,
2037, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 581 (1970);
(7) pursuit was substantially continuous and
afforded police no reasonable opportunity to obtain a warrant.
People v. Escudero, 23 Cal. 3d 800, 847, 592 P.2d 312, 318, 153
Cal. Rptr. 825 (1979); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 732, 745, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2099 (1984) (warrantless arrest
in home not justified by hot pursuit when police did not engage
in immediate or continuous pursuit of defendant from scene of
crime); State v. Counts, 99 Wash. 2d 54, 59, 659 P.2d 1087, 1089
(1983) (no hot pursuit when police stood outside defendant's
home for one hour after defendant retreated therein).
The hot pursuit exception requires a greater level of proof
for each of the elements of the exception the more intrusive the
search. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d at 393 n.19.
Washington cases involving hot pursuit include State v.
Hendricks, 25 Wash. App. 775, 780, 610 P.2d 940, 943 (1980)
(escape); State v. Gallo, 20 Wash. App. 717, 582 P.2d 588 (1978)
(injury); State v. Stringer, 4 Wash. App. 484, 481 P.2d 910
(1971).
5.17(b) Imminent Arrest
Even when a suspect has not been arrested, police may
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make a warrantless entry into a home when they reasonably
believe that the suspect has been alerted to his or her imminent
arrest and is likely to destroy evidence or escape. See United
States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1356 (9th Cir. 1978). The
exception also applies when the police reasonably believe that
the suspect is armed or the crime for which he or she is to be
arrested is one of violence. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782, 787, 87 S. Ct.
1642, 1647 (1967); Flickinger, 573 F.2d at 1355-56.
In addition, police may make a warrantless entry when they
believe an accomplice has been alerted to the arrest of another
accomplice and the crime was one of violence. State v. Reid, 38
Wash. 2d 203, 209-10, 687 P.2d 861, 866 (1984).
Police may not, however, make a warrantless entry when the
likelihood of escape is slight, the offense is minor, and the police
do not believe the suspect is armed. State v. Dresker, 39 Wash.
App. 136, 692 P.2d 846 (1984). But when the police actually
observe the destruction of evidence, a warrantless entry is justi-
fied. State v. Drumhiller, 36 Wash. App. 592, 597, 675 P.2d 631,
633 (1984) (police observed occupants in process of inhaling
what police reasonably believed to be cocaine).
Probable cause to believe a home contains contraband does
not constitute an exigent circumstance justifying the absence of
a warrant; police must have reason to believe the contraband
will be destroyed before a warrant could be obtained. See
United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1973); cf. State v.
Jeter, 30 Wash. App. 360, 362, 634 P.2d 312, 314 (1981) (pres-
ence of easily disposable contraband does not of itself constitute
exigent circumstance justifying noncomplaince with "knock and
announce" statute).
5.18 Exigent Circumstances Justifying Warrantless Search and
Seizure of the Person
Warrantless searches and seizures of persons may be justi-
fied by the exigent circumstances exception when police reasona-
bly fear injury to themselves or others, flight, or the destruction
of evidence. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 62 L. Ed.
2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 770-71, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 919-20, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1835-36
(1966); State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 127, 138-39, 559 P.2d 970,
975-76 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876, 54 L. Ed. 2d 155, 98 S.
Ct. 226 (1977). The issue generally does not arise with respect to
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an arrestee because the warrantless search of an arrestee may bejustified as incident to the arrest. See supra § 5.1. Exigent cir-cumstances are used to justify two other kinds of warrantless
searches of persons: searches that penetrate the body, such asblood tests and other invasive medical procedures, and searches
of persons located on premises being searched.
5.18(a) Warrantless Searches Involving Intrusion Into the
Body
For a medical procedure to be performed without a warrantand justified by exigent circumstances, the test selected toobtain the evidence and the medical procedures employed mustbe reasonable. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 16 L. Ed.2d 908, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966); see supra § 3.13(b). In addition,there must be a clear indication that the desired evidence will befound; that is, the state must show more than probable causebecause of the severity of the search. Id. at 771-72, 16 L. Ed. 2dat 920, 86 S. Ct. at 1836. But see State v. Wetherell, 82 Wash.2d 865, 870-71, 514 P.2d 1069, 1073 (1973) (warrantless blood
test not permitted absent consent). Compare State v. Young, 15Wash. App. 581, 585, 550 P.2d 689, 691 (1976) (police may usereasonable force to constrict throat to prevent swallowing), rev.denied, 87 Wash. 2d 1012 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 931, 53L. Ed. 2d 246, 75 S. Ct. 2635 (1977), with Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 172, 96 L. Ed. 183, 190, 72 S. Ct. 205, 209-10 (1952)
(capsules may not be forcefully extracted from suspect's mouth).The fact that evidence is likely to be destroyed will notautomatically justify an intrusive medical procedure even whena warrant is obtained; the evidence may have to be essential to aconviction. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. -, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662,
105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985).
5.18(b) Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Persons Located
on Premises Being Searched
When a search warrant for premises is being executed,
police may conduct a warrantless search of a person located onthe premises when they have "reasonable cause" to believe thatthe person is concealing evidence sought and immediate seizureis necessary to prevent its destruction. State v. Halverson, 21Wash. App. 35, 584 P.2d 408 (1978); cf. State v. Worth, 37Wash. App. 889, 683 P.2d 662 (1984) (warrant authorizing search
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of home and its owner did not permit officers to search person
found in home at time of search when magistrate had made no
prior determination of probable cause to search that person and
person did not act suspiciously). For a more complete discussion
of when occupants may be searched during the execution of a
search warrant for premises, see supra § 3.8(a).
5.19 Exigent Circumstances Justifying Entry into the Home or
Search of the Person: Absence of Less Intrusive Alternatives
A number of courts have held warrantless entries of homes
illegal when police could have kept the residence under surveil-
lance until a warrant was obtained. State v. Werth, 18 Wash.
App. 530, 537, 571 P.2d 941, 944-45 (1977), rev. denied, 90
Wash. 2d 1010 (1978); see United States v. Pacheco-Ruiz, 549
F.2d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1976); see also United States v. Flick-
inger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1978) (dictum). Cf. State v.
McKenzie, 12 Wash. App. 88, 528 P.2d 269 (1974) (when police
officers watched defendant's house while other officers applied
for search warrant, and when defendant drove car out of garage,
was approached by police, and then sounded his horn, the
officers were permitted immediately to enter house in order to
detain occupants, provided the officers refrained from searching
the house until the search warrant was issued); State v. Peele,
10 Wash. App. 58, 516 P.2d 788 (1973) (when the suspect was
not fleeing but might be expected to hide out on premises until
morning, search warrant necessary); People v. Vogel, 58 Ill. App.
3d 910, 374 N.E.2d 1152 (1978) (when threat of destruction of
evidence in locker minimal or nonexistent and could be
thwarted by stationing officer at locker while warrant obtained,
warrantless search not justified); State v. Allen, 12 Ore. App.
603, 508 P.2d 472 (1973) (when no one who could dispose of con-
traband remains on premises, police should secure premises by
stationing guard while search warrant is obtained). See gener-
ally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.5, at 454-55 (cordoning-
off should be required when it constitutes lesser intrusion than a
warrantless search and does not jeopardize life).
Similarly, the police may be required to keep occupants
under surveillance or give them the option of leaving the prem-
ises-instead of searching them-until a warrant is procured.
See, e.g., United States v. Grummel, 542 F.2d 789 (9th Cir.
1976); United States v. Roselli, 506 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1974)
(when police could have stationed officer with informant to pre-
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vent informant from calling defendant to warn of imminent
search, police failure to apply for warrant unlawful); State v.
Lewis, 19 Wash. App. 35, 573 P.2d 1347 (1978). A suspect
attempting to swallow evidence may create an exigent circum-
stance justifying efforts to prevent the swallowing even when the
evidence could be expected to pass through the digestive system
and be recovered. State v. Taplin, 36 Wash. App. 664, 676 P.2d
504 (1984).
5.20 Exigent Circumstances Justifying Warrantless Search and
Seizure of Containers
Generally, a container may be seized without a warrant
when there is probable cause to believe it is evidence of a crime;
the container's mobility is the exigent circumstance permitting
the warrantless seizure. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977). A warrantless
search of its contents, however, is permissible only if delay
would diminish the evidentiary value of the contents or prevent
the apprehension of suspects. Id.; State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d
127, 559 P.2d 970 (1977); State v. Randall, 116 Ariz. 371, 569
P.2d 313 (1977); State v. Dunlap, 395 A.2d 821 (Me. 1978);
State v. Wolfe, 5 Wash. App. 153, 486 P.2d 1143 (1971). Once
the container is within the exclusive control of the police, there
is no danger of removal justifying a warrantless search of the
contents. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 25 L.
Ed. 2d 282, 90 S. Ct. 1029 (1970); State v. Shoemaker, 28 Wash.
App. 787, 626 P.2d 538 (1981).
Under the fourth amendment, at least, the rule requiring a
warrant for the search of a container's contents does not apply
when the container is located inside an automobile and probable
cause exists for the vehicle as a whole or for more than just the
container. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. -, 83 L. Ed. 2d
890, 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
72 L. Ed. 2d 572, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); see generally 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 5.5, at 347-71; infra § 5.22.
Note that a warrantless inspection or testing of a container's
contents is not always considered a "search." When the only fact
that can be gleaned from an inspection or test is whether the
contents are contraband, the fourth amendment is not impli-
cated. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85,
100, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1662 (1984) ("chemical test that merely dis-
closes whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not
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compromise any legitimate interest in privacy"); United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 121, 103 S. Ct.
2637, 2644-49 (1983) (trained narcotics dog sniffing exterior of
luggage does not constitute a search); see generally supra § 1.6.
But cf. State v. Morgan, 32 Wash. App. 764, 650 P.2d 228 (1982)
(fourth amendment proscribes reopening and chemical testing of
contents of package in absence of exigent circumstances and
without warrant).
5.21 Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Motor Vehicles
Automobiles and other motor vehicles are treated as a spe-
cial category in search and seizure law for two reasons: first, the
reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle is less than that in
a home or person; and second, the mobility of a vehicle may
nake obtaining a warrant prior to a search or seizure impracti-
cable. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. -, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406,
414, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2070 (1985) (privacy expectation in vehicles
is less than in homes because of pervasive government regulation
of driving and roads); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 49, 26
L. Ed. 2d 419, 427, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1980 (1970). For purposes of
the fourth amendment, at least, a motor home is treated like a
vehicle when it is mobile and "so situated that an objective
observer would conclude that it was being used not as a resi-
dence, but as a vehicle." Carney, 471 U.S. at -, 85 L. Ed. 2d
at 414, 105 S. Ct. at 2070. The reasonable expectation of privacy
in motor vehicles is discussed supra § 1.3(e).
The search of a motor vehicle and its contents is treated
very differently under the fourth amendment than under article
I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. See State v. Ringer,
100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983). This section first will
set forth federal law governing the search and seizure of
automobiles and their contents and then will discuss state law.
The section will conclude with the general principles governing
impoundment and inventory searches. The section focuses on
the warrantless search or seizure of a vehicle and its contents
when police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains
evidence of crime. Vehicles also may be searched without a war-
rant when the circumstances of the search are consistent with
the other exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as the
search incident to arrest or Terry stop and frisk exceptions. See
supra §§ 5.2(b) and 4.8, respectively.
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5.22 Searches and Seizures of Vehicles Under the Fourth
Amendment
5.22(a) Probable Cause to Search a Vehicle: The Carroll Rule
Under the fourth amendment, police may conduct a war-rantless search of an automobile when there is probable cause tobelieve the vehicle contains contraband or evidence. Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154, 69 L. Ed. 543, 551-52, 45 S. Ct.280, 285 (1925); see also United States v. Johns, 471 U.S. __
83 L. Ed. 2d 890, 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985); Colorado v. Bannister,
449 U.S. 1, 3, 66 L. Ed. 2d 1, 3-4, 101 S. Ct. 42, 43 (1980); Cham-
bers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 428, 90 S. Ct.1975, 1981 (1970); State v. Glasper, 84 Wash. 2d 17, 21, 523 P.2d
937, 941-42 (1974); State v. Parker, 79 Wash. 2d 326, 328-29, 485P.2d 60, 61-62 (1971). A warrantless search is permissible
because an automobile's mobility creates an exigency: the con-
traband or evidence could be transported out of the jurisdictionwhile officers are applying for a warrant. Carroll, 267 U.S. at
153, 69 L. Ed. at 551, 45 S. Ct. at 285.
The special treatment of automobiles has been extended to
permit the warrantless search of a vehicle's trunk when police
reasonably believe that the trunk contains weapons and the
vehicle is vulnerable to vandalism. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433, 448, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706, 718, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2531 (1973).Similarly, police may make a warrantless search of a trunk when
they reasonably believe a suspect may be hiding in it. State v.
Silvernail, 25 Wash. App. 185, 191, 605 P.2d 1279, 1283 (1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843, 66 L. Ed. 2d 51, 101 S. Ct. 124 (1980),
reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1026, 66 L. Ed. 2d 488, 101 S. Ct. 596
(1980).
5.22(b) Application of Carroll When Actual Exigency Removed
The Carroll rule permits a warrantless search even after avehicle has been taken into police custody and is in no danger of
removal or of disturbance of its contents. Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. at 51-52, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 428-29, 90 S. Ct. at 1981; Flor-
ida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. , 80 L. Ed. 2d 381, 104 S. Ct. 1852
(1984) (per curiam) (actual exigent circumstances not necessary
to justify warrantless probable cause search). The rationale is
that the initial justification for the warrantless search does notdisappear after impoundment. United States v. Johns, 471 U.S.
at -, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 897, 105 S. Ct. at 885. The vehicle, how-
1985]
University of Puget Sound Law Review
ever, has to have been initially mobile or readily mobile for Car-
roll to apply. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460-62,
29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 579-81, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2034-36 (1971) (when
defendant already had been arrested, his car was located in his
driveway, no other individual was available to move the car, and
police already had established probable cause to search the car,
warrant was required); see California v. Carney, 471 U.S.
85 L. Ed. 2d 406, 412-13, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2068-69 (1985).
The constitutional limits on the number of warrantless
searches and the length of time that may elapse before police are
required to obtain a warrant has not been clarified. See United
States v. Johns, 471 U.S. at -, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 897-99, 105 S.
Ct. at 886-87. The Court has upheld the warrantless search of
containers in a vehicle under the Carroll rule when the contain-
ers were stored in a government warehouse for three days prior
to the search. Id. at -, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 899, 105 S. Ct. at 887.
See generally Note, The Automobile Exception to the Warrant
Requirement: Speeding Away from the Fourth Amendment, 82
W. VA. L. REV. 637 (1979-1980).
5.22(c) Permissible Scope of Search or Seizure Under Carrol"
The Vehicle Itself and Containers Within the Vehicle
When police have probable cause to believe that a vehicle
contains contraband, they may conduct a warrantless search "of
the same scope as could be authorized by a magistrate." United
States v. Johns, 471 U.S. at -, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 896, 105 S. Ct.
at 885 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823, 72 L.
Ed. 2d 572, 593, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1982)). Generally, "[a]
warrant to search a vehicle would support a search of every part
of the vehicle that might contain the object of the search."
Johns, 471 U.S. at -, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 896, 105 S. Ct. at 885
(quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 821, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 591, 102 S. Ct. at
2170).
Thus, when the exact location of the contraband within the
vehicle is not known, police may conduct a warrantless search
not only of the vehicle itself but also of any of its contents,
including containers. Ross, 456 U.S. at 825, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 594,
102 S. Ct. at 2173. When, however, police have probable cause to
believe that the contraband is hidden within a particular
container, and the container is placed inside a vehicle, probable
cause does not automatically extend to the entire vehicle. See
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 97 S.
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Ct. 2476 (1977); see also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765,61 L. Ed. 2d 235, 246, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (1979). Moreover,
when a warrant would traditionally be required for a search of acontainer as, for example, when the container consists of per-
sonal luggage, the placement of the container inside the vehicle
does not trigger the Carroll rule; although no warrant may berequired for the seizure of the container, a warrant is required
for a search of its contents. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12, 53 L. Ed.
2d at 549, 97 S. Ct. at 2484 (the expectation of privacy in con-
tainers is not undermined simply by placing the containers in a
vehicle).
5.23 Searches and Seizures of Vehicles Under Article I, Section
7
The Washington Constitution does not permit a blanket
exception to the warrant requirement for automobiles; warrant-less vehicle searches must be justified by actual exigent circum-
stances, including the impracticability of obtaining a warrant by
telephone. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 703, 674 P.2d1240, 1248 (1983) (seizure of drugs from van following driver's
arrest was unlawful when driver was in custody and police didnot fear destruction of evidence, escape, or harm to themselves
or others); see State v. Reid, 38 Wash. App. 203, 687 P.2d 861(1984). Thus, the lawfulness of a warrantless search and seizure
under the Washington Constitution is determined by reference
to the actual mobility of the vehicle, to whether the vehicle hin-
ders traffic or endangers other travellers, and to the availability
of a telephone warrant. See id. at 703, 674 P.2d at 1248-49.
The warrantless search and seizure of containers foundwithin an automobile also must be justified by actual exigent cir-
cumstances. See Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 688, 702-03, 674 P.2d
at 1248.
5.24 Warrantless Vehicle Searches Based on Generalized Sus-
picion: Spot Checks of Motorists
In the absence of a valid spot check program, police officersmay stop a motor vehicle to check for valid registration or possi-
ble automobile violations only when they have a reasonable sus-picion of unlawful activity. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 59
L. Ed. 2d 660, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979); State v. Marchand, 104Wash. 2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (1985) (decided under the fourth
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amendment). For police to institute general spot check proce-
dures, the procedures must constitute "a sufficiently productive
mechanism to justify the intrusion." Id. at 437-38, 706 P.2d at
226-27. In addition, the spot check procedures must be such that
"the exercise of discretion by law enforcement officials [is] suffi-
ciently constrained." Id. at 438, 706 P.2d at 227. See generally
infra § 6.4(c).
For a brief discussion of border vehicle stops to check for
illegal aliens and contraband, see infra §§ 6.3(a)-(c).
5.25 Warrantless Searches of Suspected Stolen Vehicles
Police may search a vehicle without a warrant in any place
where registration papers might be kept if the driver has fled the
vehicle and police reasonably believe that the vehicle might be
stolen. State v. Orcutt, 22 Wash. App. 730, 734-35, 591 P.2d 872,
875 (1979). Cf. State v. Taras, 19 Ariz. App. 7, 11, 504 P.2d 548,
552 (1972) (warrantless search for registration papers may be
made when occupant is arrested and refuses to identify owner-
ship of the vehicle).
5.26 Forfeiture or Levy
Courts differ as to whether a vehicle that was used to trans-
port contraband may be seized without a warrant. 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 7.3, at 550; see G.M. Leasing Corp. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 50 L. Ed. 2d 530, 543, 97 S. Ct.
619, 628 (1977) (IRS may impound car parked on public street
for levy or forfeiture purposes without obtaining warrant when
no legitimate privacy interest is invaded; when car is on private
property, a warrant may be required).
5.27 Impoundment
A vehicle may be impounded without a warrant in several
circumstances:
(1) as evidence of a crime, if the officer has probable cause
to believe that it was stolen or used in the commission of a
felony; (2) as part of the police 'community caretaking func-
tion,' if the removal of the vehicle is necessary ... and (3) as
part of the police function of enforcing traffic regulations, if
the driver has committed one of the traffic offenses for which
the legislature has specifically authorized impoundment.
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State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 742-43, 689 P.2d 1065,
1070-71 (1984) (quoting State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 189,
622 P.2d 1199, - (1980)); State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d 143,
149, 622 P.2d 1218, 1223 (1980); see State v. Sweet, 36 Wash.
App. 377, 675 P.2d 1236 (1984).
The "community caretaking function" permits impound-
ment when the vehicle has been abandoned, impedes traffic,
poses a threat to public safety and convenience, or itself is
threatened by vandalism or theft of its contents. South Dakota
v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1005, 96
S. Ct. 3092, 3097 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441,
37 L. Ed. 2d 706, 715, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2528 (1973). In such cases,
the police may have no reason to believe that the vehicle is con-
nected with criminal activity.
When, however, police conduct warrantless impoundments
and subsequent inventory searches, see infra § 5.28, the searches
may not be a pretext for a search that the police otherwise could
not have made. See State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 188-89,
622 P.2d 1199, 1212 (1980); State v. Gluck, 83 Wash. 2d 424,428-29, 518 P.2d 703, 706-07 (1974). One of the justifications for
warrantless inventory searches is that the searches are under-
taken without an intent to find evidence. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 7.4, at 563-89.
When impoundment would be permitted as part of the
police community caretaking function, police first must make aninquiry as to the availability of the owner or the owner's spouse
or friends to move the vehicle. State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d
at 743, 689 P.2d at 1071. See State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d 143,
153, 622 P.2d 1218, 1224-25 (1980); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash.
2d 170, 189, 622 P.2d 1199, 1211 (1980); State v. Bales, 15 Wash.
App. 834, 836-37, 552 P.2d 688, 690 (1976); State v. Singleton, 9
Wash. App. 327, 333, 511 P.2d 1396, 1400 (1973). See also State
v. Alexander, 33 Wash. App. 271, 274-75, 653 P.2d 1367, 1369
(1982) (basis for "community caretaking function" is need to
protect owner's property while it remains in police custody, to
protect police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen prop-
erty, and to protect police from potential danger). Police also
must consider the alternative of parking and locking the car.
Williams, 102 Wash. 2d at 743, 689 P.2d at 1071.
A vehicle may be impounded as part of the police function
of enforcing traffic regulations when the driver has committed
one of the traffic offenses for which the legislature has specifi-
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cally authorized impounding. See State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d
170, 189, 622 P.2d 1199, 1211 (1980); State v. Singleton, 9 Wash.
App. 327, 332-33, 511 P.2d 1396, 1400 (1973). A vehicle lawfully
parked at one's home or even on a public street, however, may
not be impounded simply because its owner has been arrested.
United States v. Squires, 456 F.2d 967, 970 (2d Cir. 1972). Simi-
larly, impounding is improper when the arrestee will be released
imminently and the vehicle does not pose a safety hazard. State
v. Bales, 15 Wash. App. 834, 836, 552 P.2d 668, 690 (1976); State
v. Bertram, 18 Ariz. App. 579, 582, 504 P.2d 520, 522 (1972).
5.28 Inventory Searches of Impounded Vehicles
Courts generally uphold inventory searches when the initial
impounding of the vehicle was lawful and the search was pursu-
ant to a promulgated set of procedures or guidelines. See, e.g.,
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 371-72, 49 L. Ed. 2d
1000, 1006-07, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3098-99 (1976); Cooper v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. 58, 61, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730, 733-34, 87 S. Ct. 788, 790-
91 (1967) (permitting warrantless search of car seized pursuant
to state statute authorizing retention of car used to transport
narcotics; search reasonable even though statute authorized only
seizure because search closely related to reason defendant
arrested, reason for impounding car, and reason car retained); cf.
Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221, 20 L. Ed.
2d 538, 543, 88 S. Ct. 1472, 1475 (1968) (car search illegal when
police had not intended to impound car but had parked it near
courthouse for convenience of owner).
In Washington, police lawfully impounding a vehicle pursu-
ant to the community caretaking function may conduct an
inventory search only after they obtain the owner's consent.
State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984) (dic-
tum). Compare State v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d 633, 635 (La. 1976)
(search unlawful when police removed sleeping defendant from
car and subsequently searched car for incriminating evidence),
and State v. Mangold, 82 N.J. 575, 577, 414 A.2d 1312, 1317-18
(1980) (although impoundment lawful, inventory search of vehi-
cle's contents unlawful when vehicle occupants were denied
opportunity first to safeguard their property), with People v.
Clark, 65 Ill. 2d 169, 174, 357 N.E.2d 798, 800 (1976) (inventory
search was lawful when arrest was for unlawfully transporting
alcohol, car was stalled and blocking traffic, and inventory
searches were customary when vehicles had to be towed).
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The scope of an inventory search is limited. For example,police may not open and examine a locked trunk "absent a man-ifest necessity for conducting such a search." State v. Houser, 95Wash. 2d at 156, 622 P.2d at 1226 (1980). Moreover, police may
not open luggage located in an impounded vehicle absent con-sent or exigent circumstances. Id. at 158, 622 P.2d at 1227-28;see also United States v. Bloomfield, 594 F.2d 1200, 1203 (8thCir. 1979) (barring search of knapsack within car).
5.29 Warrantless Vehicle Searches: Medical Emergencies
Police may enter a vehicle to aid a person in distress or to
seek information about a person in distress. United States v.Haley, 581 F.2d 723, 726 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.1005, 58 L. Ed. 2d 681, 99 S. Ct. 618 (1978). Cf. supra § 5.5.
5.30 Warrantless Searches in Special Environments
Warrantless searches have been permitted in special envi-ronments when the danger to the public is severe and the degree
of intrusion small. Thus, warrantless magnetometer, or metaldetector, searches are permitted at airports to prevent hijackingsand bombings. United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5thCir. 1973). Similarly, brief stops and visual searches of packages,purses, and briefcases are permitted at courthouses to prevent
bombings. Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972).
At the same time, the Washington Supreme Court hasrejected as unconstitutional the warrantless pat-down of patrons
at rock concerts. Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 98 Wash. 2d 668,673-74, 658 P.2d 653, 656 (1983). The searches at concerts aredistinguishable from the airport and courthouse searchesbecause the dangers posed by the violence at rock concerts aresubstantially less than those posed by bombings and hijackings,
and because pat-down searches constitute a higher degree ofintrusion than magnetometer and typical courthouse searches.
Id.
For a discussion of warrantless searches in other special
environments, see infra § 6.1 (schools); § 6.2 (prisons and jails);
§ 6.3 (borders).
5.31 Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Objects in the Pub-
lic and Private Mails
First-class mail and packages transported by private carrier
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may be seized without a warrant when law enforcement officers
have probable cause to believe that the mail or packages contain
contraband. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251,
25 L. Ed. 2d 282, 90 S. Ct. 1029 (1970); see also United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 99, 104 S. Ct. 1652,
1661 (1984). The contents of such mail or packages may not be
examined without a warrant, however, unless the reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents no longer exists or the
examination consists of a test that will disclose only the pres-
ence of contraband. Jacobsen at -, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 99, 104 S.
Ct. at 1660-61; see State v. Morgan, 32 Wash. App. 764. 650
P.2d 228 (1982); State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash. App. 813, 598 P.2d
421 (1979), rev. denied, 93 Wash. 2d 1008 (1980).
CHAPTER 6: SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS
6.0 Special Environments and Purposes: Searches and Seizures
at Schools, Prisons, and Borders; Administrative Searches and
Seizures
This chapter discusses differences in reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy, in burdens of proof, and in warrant require-
ments at three special environments: public schools, detention
and correction facilities, and the international border. The sec-
tion also discusses special considerations in administrative
searches.
For a brief discussion of warrantless searches in airports,
courthouses, and public concerts, see supra § 5.30.
6.1 Schools
Schools are considered a special environment in search and
seizure law, with the result that the usual burdens of proof and
warrant requirements are relaxed.
The reasonable suspicion standard and the balancing
approach in Terry have been used to justify the warrantless
search of a student's purse by a school official. New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. -, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
The special problem of school discipline and the special environ-
ment of the school permit a standard of proof of less than prob-
able cause. This is true even when the intrusion is more substan-
tial than a frisk and the object of the intrusion is the discovery
of evidence of violation of a school rule and not the prevention
of physical harm. Id. at -, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 734, 105 S. Ct. at
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743.
Washington has recognized the school as a special environ-ment and consequently permits a search of a student's person
based on less than probable cause. State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash.2d 75, 81, 558 P.2d 781, 784 (1977). Using the Terry reasonable
suspicion standard and the balancing test articulated in Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 87 S. Ct.1727 (1967), the McKinnon court set forth several factors for
determining the reasonableness of a search: "the child's age, his-tory, and school record, the prevalence and seriousness of theproblem in the school to which the search was directed, the exi-
gency to make the search without delay, and the probative valueand reliability of the information used as a justification for thesearch." McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d at 81, 558 P.2d at 784 (cita-
tions omitted).
Although the reduced standard of proof of reasonable suspi-cion will justify the search of a student or his or her belongings,the school still must possess particularized suspicion withrespect to each individual searched. Kuehn v. Renton School
District, 103 Wash. 2d 594, 599, 694 P.2d 1078, 1081 (1985). But
cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at - n.8, 83 L. Ed. 2d at735 n.8, 105 S. Ct. at 744 n.8 (dicta) (individualized suspicion
may not be required). See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 10.11 (b), at 456.
6.2 Prisons, Custodial Detention, and Post-Conviction Alterna-
tives to Prison
Incarceration affects all aspects of an individual's searchand seizure protections: the reasonable expectation of privacy,the levels of proof required for intrusions, and the warrantrequirements. This section will provide a sampling of some ofthe ways incarceration or even conviction alone alters search and
seizure protections.
6.2(a) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
A prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his orher prison cell. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. -, 82 L. Ed. 2d
393, 400-01, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3200-01 (1984).
Pre-trial detainees, on the other hand, appear to have a rea-sonable expectation of privacy in their cells, for the government
must show legitimate reasons for instituting searches of their
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cells. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. -, 82 L. Ed. 2d 438,
449-50, 104 S. Ct. 3227, 3234 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 555-57, 60 L. Ed 2d 447, 479-80, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1882-84
(1979).
6.2(b) Levels of Proof
Neither probable cause nor individualized suspicion is
required for searches of prisoners, pre-trial detainees, or prison
cells. See State v. Baker, 28 Wash. App. 423, 424-25, 623 P.2d
1172, 1173 (1981) (prisoners); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 555-
60, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 479-82, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1882-85 (1979) (pre-
trial detainees).
A parolee does not have the same search and seizure protec-
tions as an ordinary citizen, and thus police may search a
parolee's vehicle based on only a "well founded" suspicion of
criminal activity. State v. Coahran, 27 Wash. App. 664, 666, 620
P.2d 116, 118 (1980).
6.2(c) Warrantless Searches and Seizures
Warrants are not required for searches of prisoners or pre-
trial detainees. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. -, 82 L. Ed.
2d 438, 104 S. Ct. 3227 (1984); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. _ ,
82 L. Ed. 2d 393, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
Warrants also are not required for searches of parolees, pro-
bationers, or work-release inmates or their homes and effects.
See State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 22-23, 691 P.2d 929,
941-42 (1984); see also State v. Coahran, 27 Wash. App. 664, 620
P.2d 116 (1980); State v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75, 516 P.2d
1088 (1973).
6.2(d) Strip and Body Cavity Searches Following Custodial
Arrests for Minor Offenses
Recent litigation has focused on routine strip and body cav-
ity searches of persons arrested for minor offenses who are
detained pending posting bond. See, e.g., Giles v. Ackerman, 746
F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1984); cf. Durfin v. Spreen, 712 F.2d 1084 (6th
Cir. 1983) (felony offense).
In Washington, routine strip searches are governed in part
by statute and administrative regulation. See WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 10.79.060-.110 (1985); WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 289-02-020; 289-
16-100; 289-16-200 (1983). Probable cause and a warrant are
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required for strip and body cavity searches conducted prior to adetainee's first court appearance unless: (1) the detainee ischarged with a violent offense; (2) the detainee is charged withan offense involving escape, burglary, use of a deadly weapon, orcontraband; or (3) police possess a reasonable suspicion that thedetainee is concealing on his or her person contraband, weapons,or fruits or instrumentalities of crime. WASH. ADMIN. CODE R.289-16-100, -200. Cf. State v. Brown, 33 Wash. App. 843, 848,658 P.2d 44, 47-48 (1983) (strip search of prisoner permittedafter prisoner had contact with visitor); State v. Hartzog, 26Wash. App. 576, 583-84, 615 P.2d 480, 484-85, (1980) (visual andbody cavity searches of prisoners leaving penal institution forcourt appearance are permissible, but second search at court-house impermissible unless hearing conducted to determine if
second search necessary).
6.3 Borders
Searches and seizures of travelers at or near the interna-tional border fall within the scope of the fourth amendment, butsuch intrusions generally do not have to meet the strict levels ofproof and warrant requirements of ordinary searches andseizures. This section will describe briefly some of the situationsin which traditional proof and warrant requirements have been
relaxed.
6.3(a) Permanent Checkpoints: Illegal Aliens
Law enforcement officers may conduct routine brief ques-tioning of travellers at permanent checkpoints to identify illegalaliens, provided the intrusion does not exceed the scope of aTerry stop. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,566-67, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 1133, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3087 (1976). Nowarrant is required for such stops. See id.
6.3(b) Roving Patrols: Illegal Aliens
Officers conducting roving patrols near borders must have areasonable suspicion, based on "specific articulable facts," that avehicle contains illegal aliens in order to stop the vehicle. UnitedStates v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607,
618, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2582 (1975).
For a roving patrol to search a vehicle, reasonable suspicionthat the vehicle contains illegal aliens is insufficient; the officers
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must have probable cause. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266, 269-70, 37 L. Ed. 2d 596, 600-01, 93 S. Ct. 2535,
2537-38 (1973).
6.3(c) Smuggling
The scope of a Terry stop at the border may be relatively
intrusive when smuggling of narcotics is suspected. See United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. -, 87 L. Ed. 2d
381, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985) (individual fitting courier profile of
alimentary canal smuggler may be detained for 16 hours pending
bowel movement); cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 75 L. Ed.
2d 229, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326-27 (1983) (officers having only rea-
sonable suspicion that airport traveler was smuggling narcotics
could not detain traveller in special room and seize his tickets
and luggage); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10, 77 L.
Ed. 2d 110, 122, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2645 (1983) (ninety minute
detention of luggage at international airport unreasonable when
law enforcement officers only had reasonable suspicion of smug-
gling); but cf. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. -, 84 L. Ed.
2d 605, 615-17, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1574-75 (1985) (twenty minute
detention of suspect based only on reasonable suspicion is per-
missible; Terry stop is unconstitutional in duration only when
police do not act with due diligence, not at expiration of any
particular time period).
6.4 Administrative Searches
Searches conducted for administrative purposes, whether or
not criminal prosecution is anticipated, are governed by the
fourth amendment. See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287,
78 L. Ed. 2d 479, 483-84, 104 S. Ct. 641, 646-47 (1984) (fourth
amendment applies to inspection of home that was partially
damaged by fire, even when purpose of inspection is to deter-
mine fire's origin, and no criminal conduct is suspected).
6.4(a) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The fact that a search is part of an administrative or regula-
tory program or has a purpose other than criminal prosecution
does not affect an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy
in the premises being searched. See Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967) (search of
home for housing code violations); See v. City of Seattle, 387
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U.S. 541, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943, 87 S. Ct. 1737 (1967) (search of com-mercial premises for fire code violations). Although a few perva-sively regulated industries are permitted no reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy, the general rule is that the fourth amendmentprotections apply to civil as well as criminal searches and tocommercial as well as residential premises. Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305, 311-12, 98 S. Ct.1816, 1820-21 (1978) (except for particular industries such asthose involving liquor and firearms, when no reasonable expecta-tion of privacy exists, fourth amendment protects against unrea-sonable administrative searches of commercial premises); seealso Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. at -, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 483-84 104 S. Ct. at 646-47; Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 56 L.
Ed. 2d 486, 98 S. Ct. 1942 (1978).
6.4(b) Warrant Requirements
Warrants generally are required for administrative searches
of both private and commercial premises. Camara v. MunicipalCourt, 387 U.S. at 532-33, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 937-38, 87 S. Ct. at1732-33; See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 545-46, 18 L. Ed. 2dat 947-48, 87 S. Ct. at 1740-41. When the traditional exceptionsto the warrant requirement apply, however, a warrant is unnec-essary. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. at -, 78 L. Ed. 2d at483-84, 104 S. Ct. at 646-47 (warrant not required for entry ontopremises when consent given or exigent circumstances present:"evidence of criminal activity . . . discovered during the courseof a valid administrative search . . . may be seized under the'plain view' doctrine") (citation omitted).
Warrants are not required in certain limited situations whensearches are made pursuant to comprehensive and predictablelegislative schemes. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 69 L. Ed.2d 262, 101 S. Ct. 2534 (1981). Such situations are characterized
by a substantial federal interest in inspection, as in the case ofhazardous industries, and by the necessity of a warrantlessinspection to enforce the legislative purpose. Id. at 598-99, 69 L.Ed. 2d at 269, 101 S. Ct. at 2537-38 (congressional schemeauthorizing warrantless inspections of mines found constitu-tional). In addition, the scheme must prove to be an adequatesubstitute for a warrant by imposing certainty and regularity inthe inspections and by accommodating special privacy concerns.
Id. at 600-01, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 270, 101 S. Ct. at 2539.Warrants also may not be required for license, registration,
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and equipment spot checks of vehicles. See Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979). Cf. State v.
Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (1985). Although
vehicle spot checks have not been approved except when con-
ducted near international borders, see supra § 6.3, the minimum
requirements of such checks have been discussed in dicta by
both the United States and Washington Supreme Courts and
are set out infra § 6.4(c).
6.4(c) Level of Proof Requirements
To obtain an administrative warrant to search commercial
or residential premises, law enforcement officers either must
offer specific proof of a violation or show that "reasonable legis-
lative or administrative standards for conducting an. . . inspec-
tion are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment]."
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305,
316, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1824 (1978) (brackets in original) (citation
omitted).
When officers seek a warrant based on a general adminstra-
tive program, they must set forth sufficient details of the pro-
gram to enable a magistrate to determine whether the program
is reasonable. Seattle v. Leach, 29 Wash. App. 81, 85, 627 P.2d
159, 162 (1981). Conclusory statements are inadequate. Id.
When an administrative warrant is sought to determine the
cause of a recent fire, "fire officials need show only that a fire of
undetermined origin has occurred on the premises, that the
scope of the proposed search is reasonable and will not intrude
unnecessarily on the fire victim's privacy, and that the search
will be executed at a reasonable and convenient time." Michigan
v. Clifford, 464 U.S. -, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477, 484, 104 S. Ct. 641,
647 (1984).
The constitutionality of vehicle spot checks depends in part
upon two factors: whether the purpose is satisfied by the proce-
dure-that is, whether spot checks are "a sufficiently productive
mechanism to justify the intrusion"-and whether the checks
"do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion" by
officers conducting the stops. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
659, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 671, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1399 (1979); see State
v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 437, 706 P.2d 225, 226 (1985).
As with the "area" warrants that authorize housing and fire
code inspections, see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967); See v. City of Seattle,
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387 U.S. 541, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943, 87 S. Ct. 1737 (1967), individual-
ized suspicion is not necessarily required for spot checks. See
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 673-74, 99 S. Ct. at 1401
(dicta). It is unclear, however, whether any spot check procedure
would be constitutional under article I, section 7 of the Wash-
ington Constitution. See State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d at
441, 706 P.2d at 228; cf. supra § 6.3 (border checkpoints).
CHAPTER 7: ADMINISTRATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
7.0 Introduction
The exclusionary rule traditionally has provided that if a
search or seizure violates a person's fourth amendment rights,
any evidence that derives from the search or seizure must besuppressed in the criminal trial of that defendant. When physi-
cal evidence must be suppressed, testimony regarding that phys-ical evidence also must be suppressed if such testimony is thefruit of the unlawful search or seizure. 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 11.6, at 699-718. Note that to invoke the exclusionary
rule, a defendant must make a timely objection and have stand-
ing to object. State v. Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989
(1962). The rule applies both to federal and state violations of
the fourth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L. Ed. 2d
1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961).
Historically, the exclusionary rule has had several purposes:(1) to deter unreasonable searches and seizures, id. at 656, 6 L.
Ed. 2d at 1090-91, 81 S. Ct. at 1692; (2) to preserve judicial
integrity-that is, to prevent courts from becoming accomplices
to willful disobedience of the constitution, id. at 659, 6 L. Ed. 2d
at 1092, 81 S. Ct. at 1694; and (3) to sustain the public's belief
that government will not profit from lawless behavior, United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 576-77,
94 S. Ct. 613, 624 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In a 1984
case, the United States Supreme Court identified deterrence of
police misconduct as the principal justification for the rule; the
Court declined to employ the rule to deter magistrates fromimproper probable cause determinations or as a method of dem-
onstrating judicial integrity. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
_ , 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
Although most of the discussion in this section centers uponthe exclusion of evidence compelled by the federal constitution,
state law can compel. the exclusion of evidence from state courts
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that federal law would hold admissible in federal courts. E.g.,
State v. Williams, 94 Wash. 2d 531, 541, 617 P.2d 1012, 1018
(1980) (recordings made in violation of Washington privacy stat-
ute, although permitted under federal wiretap statute, inadmis-
sible in state court proceedings); infra § 7.4(f) (state may compel
exclusion of illegally seized evidence from civil proceedings even
when federal constitution does not require such exclusion).
The difference in wording and intent between article I, sec-
tion 7 of the Washington Constitution and the fourth amend-
ment has led to a difference in exclusionary rules. See, e.g.,
State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 110-12, 640 P.2d 1061, 1071-72
(1982) (Washington provision places emphasis on protecting
individual rights, not on curbing governmental action). For
example, the Washington Supreme Court has recognized deter-
rence of legislative misconduct as a legitimate purpose for
excluding illegally obtained evidence. Id. at 112, 640 P.2d at
1072; cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at -, 82 L. Ed. 2d at
694, 104 S. Ct. at 3418 (deterring police misconduct sole purpose
of exclusionary rule). Under the fourth amendment the applica-
tion of the rule will depend largely on whether the exclusion of
evidence will deter future police misconduct; under article I, sec-
tion 7, however, the application of the rule may be automatic.
See White, 97 Wash. 2d at 109-12, 640 P.2d at 1071-72.
7.1 Criticisms of the Rule
A number of judges and legal scholars have opposed a
broad-reaching exclusionary rule. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 484 n.21, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 1082 n.21, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3047-
48 n.21 (1976); LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § _; (bibliogra-
phy). The reasons include the following:
(1) The rule handcuffs the police, handicapping the
detection and prosecution of crime. Counterargument: The
fourth amendment itself, not the rule, has that effect. When the
amendment was adopted, that very argument was rejected. See 1
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 1.2, at 22-23. For citations to
studies on the effects of the exclusionary rule on felony prosecu-
tions, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. -, 82 L. Ed. 2d
677, 688 n.6, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3413 n.6 (1984).
(2) The rule aids only the guilty. Counterargument:
Because of the rule's deterrent effect, innocent persons are
spared unreasonable searches and seizures.
(3) The rule does not deter. Counterargument: After
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creation of the rule, there was a dramatic increase in the numberof warrant applications and in the number of police academyclasses offering instruction on obtaining evidence in a mannerthat does not violate the fourth amendment. Stone v. Powell,428 U.S. at 492, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1086-87, 96 S. Ct. at 3051.
Suggested alternatives to the exclusionary rule include pro-viding civil damages as the sole remedy, limiting the rule toknowing or substantial violations, or limiting the rule to minor
crimes. 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.2, at 20-39. See gen-erally Gottlieb, Feedback from the Fourth Amendment: Is the
Exclusionary Rule an Albatross Around the Judicial Neck?, 67Ky. L.J. 1007 (1979) (suggesting remedy solely in tort, with dam-
ages paid either through insurance or governmental
reimbursement).
7.2 Limitations in the Application of the Rule
7.2(a) Unlawful Searches and Seizures Conducted in Good
Faith
This section discusses two general categories of exceptions
to the exclusionary rule: exceptions based on the good faith ofthe police and exceptions based on nonsubstantive use of theillegally obtained evidence. Subsequent sections will discuss
additional limitations on the application of the rule. The limita-tions pertain to: (1) the type of judicial proceeding, see infra §§
7.3, 7.4; (2) the public or private status of the party conductingthe unlawful search or seizure, see infra §§ 7.5, 7.6; (3) the nexusbetween the unlawful search or seizure and the evidence soughtto be suppressed, see infra §§ 7.7, 7.8; and (4) procedural
requirements, see infra §§ 7.9, 7.10.
The exclusionary rule does not apply, in federal courts atleast, when evidence is seized in reasonable, good-faith relianceon a search warrant that is later found to be unsupported byprobable cause. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. -, 82 L. Ed.2d 677, 698, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3421 (1984). "[T]he marginal bene-fits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectivelyreasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search war-rant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion." Id. at
_ , 82 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 3421.Similarly, evidence seized under the authority of a techni-cally invalid warrant may be admitted when the police reasona-bly believed that the search they conducted was authorized by avalid warrant. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. -, 82 L.
1985]
University of Puget Sound Law Review
Ed. 2d 737, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984). "Suppressing evidence
because the judge failed to make all the necessary clerical cor-
rections despite his assurances that such changes would be made
will not serve the deterrent function that the exclusionary rule
was designed to achieve." Id. at -, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 745, 104 S.
Ct. at 3429-30.
Federal courts also may admit evidence obtained during a
search incident to an unlawful arrest when the arrest is made in
good faith reliance on an ordinance subsequently declared
unconstitutional. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 40, 61 L.
Ed. 2d 343, 351, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2633 (1979). This good faith
exception has its own exception: the evidence is inadmissible
when the ordinance at issue is so similar to an ordinance or stat-
ute that previously was declared unconstitutional and as a con-
sequence is "so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any
person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws."
Id. at 38, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 350, 99 S. Ct. at 2632.
When an unlawful arrest was based partly on a provision of
a statute that had not yet been construed and as a result was
presumptively valid at the time of the arrest evidence deriving
from the arrest nevertheless is inadmissible if the valid section
of the statute could not be enforced without incorporating the"grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional" section. State v.
White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 104, 640 P.2d 1061, 1067-68, (1982).
The DeFillippo good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule is inapplicable to claims brought under article I, section 7 of
the Washington Constitution. White, 97 Wash. 2d at 109-12, 640
P.2d at 1070-72. Thus, when an arrest is made pursuant to an
unlawful statute, the good faith of the police and the presump-
tive validity of the statute at the time of arrest do not render
the fruits of the arrest admissible. Id. (automatic application of
exclusionary rule "will add stability to the rights of individual
citizens, discourage the Legislature from passing provisions akin
to [the unlawful statute], and will make law enforcement more
predictable").
7.2(b) Non-Substantive Use of Illegally Seized Evidence
Illegally obtained evidence may be used to impeach a defen-
dant's direct testimony at trial even when the evidence is inad-
missible in the government's case-in-chief. Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62, 98 L.Ed.503, 74 S. Ct. 354 (1954). A defen-
dant's statements made in response to proper cross-examination
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also are subject to impeachment by illegally obtained evidence
that is inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt. United
States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 64 L. Ed. 2d 559, 100 S. Ct. 1912
(1980); see also State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 179-80, 622
P.2d 1199, 1206 (1980).
7.3 Applications of the Rule in Criminal Proceedings Other
than Trial
7.3(a) Grand Jury Testimony
A person testifying before a grand jury may not refuse to
answer questions on the ground that the questions are based on
evidence derived from an illegal search. United States v. Calan-
dra, 414 U.S. 338, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 94 S. Ct. 613 (1974). The
exclusionary rule is not applied to grand jury proceedings
because its application would have only a marginal deterrent
effect. In determining whether to employ the rule, the court
weighs the deterrent value of applying the rule against the costs
of excluding the type of evidence in question. Id. at 351, 38 L.
Ed. 2d at 573, 94 S. Ct. at 621.
7.3(b) Indictment
The rule does not apply to indictments based on illegally
obtained evidence. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 2 L.
Ed. 2d 321, 78 S. Ct. 311 (1958). Again, the rationale is that
excluding the evidence, even if it means dismissing an indict-
ment, would have only marginal deterrent value.
7.3(c) Probable Cause Hearing
Illegally seized evidence may be considered in determining
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused com-
mitted the crime charged. Giordinello v. United States, 357 U.S.
480, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1503, 78 S. Ct. 1245 (1958); State v. O'Neill, 103Wash. 2d 853, 867-72, 700 P.2d 711, 719-21 (1985) (recordings by
federal agents made in a manner inconsistent with state law andthus inadmissible at trial nevertheless may be used to furnish
probable cause for court-ordered search).
7.3(d) Bail Hearing
Several cases in other jurisdictions suggest that illegally
seized evidence may be suppressed at bail hearings. See Steigler
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v. Superior Court, 252 A.2d 300 (Del. 1969); State v. Tucker,
101 N.J. Super. 380, 244 A.2d 353 (1968).
7.3(e) Sentencing
The exclusionary rule has been applied in sentencing hear-
ings only when the illegal search was conducted "for the express
purpose of improperly influencing the sentencing judge." United
States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1970); Verdugo v.
United States, 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968).
7.3(f) Revocation of Conditional Release
There is a split of authority as to whether the rule extends
to hearings to revoke parole or probation. Compare United
States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1975) (exclusion-
ary rule does not apply to probation revocation proceedings
when officers conducting search did not know and had no reason
to believe suspect was probationer) and State v. Kuhn, 81 Wash.
2d 648, 503 P.2d 1061 (1971) (rule does not apply to revocation
proceedings), with United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205
(4th Cir. 1978) (rule applies to probation revocation) and
Michaud v. State, 505 P.2d 1399 (Okla. Crim. 1973) (rule applies
to suspended sentence revocations).
Some courts have suggested that the exclusionary rule
should apply when the arresting officer knows that the victim is
on conditional release; otherwise a zealous officer would have
less of an incentive to obey the Constitution, knowing that ille-
gally seizing the evidence could send the parolee back to prison.
See generally United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205 (4th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir.
1975).
7.3(g) Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings
The exclusionary rule does not require habeas corpus relief
when the state granted the defendant a full and fair opportunity
to litigate all fourth amendment claims. Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
7.3(h) Perjury
Illegally seized evidence may be used to support a perjury
conviction. See United State v. Raftery, 534 F.2d 854 (9th Cir.
[Vol. 9:1
Search and Seizure Survey
1976); United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1976) (cau-
tioning against per se admissibility, suggesting that exclusion
may sometimes have deterrent effect), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
823, 50 L. Ed. 2d 84, 97 S. Ct. 74 (1976).
7.4 Application of the Rule in Quasi-Criminal, Civil, and
Administrative Proceedings
The exclusionary rule has been applied in forfeiture pro-
ceedings, requiring the suppression of any illegally seized evi-
dence used to prove the criminal violation justifying the forfei-
ture. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693,
14 L. Ed. 2d 170, 85 S. Ct. 1246 (1965); accord, People v. Zim-
merman, 44 Ill. App. 3d 601, 358 N.E.2d 715 (1976).
7.4(a) Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings
Generally, the exclusionary rule has been applied in juvenile
delinquency proceedings. See, e.g., Hyde v. Robert T., 8 Cal.
App. 3d 990, 993, 88 Cal. Rptr. 37, 38 (1970); In re Marsh, 40 Ill.
2d 53, 55, 237 N.E. 2d 529, 531 (1968); see also In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 30-31, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 548, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1445 (1967).
7.4(b) Narcotics Addict Commitment Proceedings
The exclusionary rule is applied in narcotics addict commit-
ment proceedings. See People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 682, 446
P.2d 800, 805, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800, 805 (1968).
7.4(c) Civil Tax Proceedings
The exclusionary rule is not applied in civil tax proceedings
when state officials turn over illegally seized tax records to the
IRS. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458, 49 L. Ed. 2d
1046, 1063, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3034 (1976). But see Pizarello v.
United States, 408 F.2d 579, 586 (2d Cir. 1969) (tax assessment
invalid if based substantially on illegally obtained evidence); 1
LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.5, at 83-109 (extent of deter-
rence afforded by applying rule outweighs cost of excluding
evidence).
7.4(d) Administrative Hearings
Most courts apply the rule in administrative hearings when
the disposition is relatively significant and when the application
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of the rule is likely to deter unlawful searches and seizures. See,
e.g., Governing Board of Mountain View School District v. Met-
calf, 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 549-51, 111 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727-28
(1974) (recognizing rule may be applied in administrative hear-
ings, but holding that rule is not applicable in teacher dismissal
proceeding based on immoral conduct because primary purpose
of proceedings is to protect school children); New Brunswick v.
Speights, 157 N.J. Super. 9, 20-21, 384 A.2d 225, 231 (1978)
(policy of deterring unlawful governmental conduct may be sig-
nificant when subsequent disciplinary hearing, directed at police
officer charged with criminal violations, was foreseeable at time
of search or seizure); cf. Thanhauser v. Milprint, Inc., 9 A.D.2d
833, 833, 192 N.Y.S.2d 911, 912 (1959) (claimant's statement,
taken while claimant under sedation and in severe pain, admissi-
ble in workman's compensation hearing).
7.4(e) Legislative Hearings
Whether the rule applies in a legislative hearing depends on
whether the evidence was seized with the intent to use it at the
hearing; if it was, then application of the rule will have some
significant deterrent value. United States v. McSurely, 473 F.2d
1178, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (when defendant prosecuted for con-
tempt of Congress, court must exclude evidence derived from
unlawful search and seizure by congressional committee investi-
gator); see also Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 205, 1
L. Ed. 2d 1273, 1294, 77 S. Ct. 1173, 1188 (1957) (protective
freedoms should not be placed in danger in absence of clear
determination by House or Senate that particular inquiry is jus-
tified by specific legislative need).
7.4(f) Private Litigation
The exclusionary rule is not applied in private litigation.
Honeycutt v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 F.2d 340, 348 (7th Cir. 1975)
(fourth and fourteenth amendments do not require exclusion of
evidence obtained illegally by state police when private parties
seek to introduce evidence in civil proceeding); Sackler v.
Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 44, 203 N.E.2d 481, 483, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83,
84 (1964) (evidence of wife's adultery obtained by illegal entry
into wife's home by husband and private investigators admissi-
ble in divorce action). Evidence illegally seized by the govern-
ment may be introduced into a private proceeding because the
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rule would have little deterrent value: the state, not being a
party to the proceeding, would have nothing to gain from a
fourth amendment violation. Honeycutt, 510 F.2d at 348.
States, however, may rely on their own laws to bar the use
of illegally seized evidence in private litigation and thereby pro-
mote the following policies: (1) depriving transgressors of the
fruits of their wrongs; (2) deterring lawless behavior; and (3) dis-
couraging violence. See Kassner v. Frement Mutual Ins. Co., 47
Mich. App. 264, 266, 209 N.W.2d 490, 492 (1973) (unlawful
search of premises destroyed by fire represents significant inva-
sion of privacy; thus, evidence seized as result of search not
admissible in civil case); Badde, Illegally Obtained Evidence in
Criminal and Civil Cases: A Comparative Study of a Classic
Mismatch, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1325, 1353 (1973).
7.5 Application of the Rule to Searches by Private Individuals:
General Principle
Because the fourth amendment is a limitation on the gov-
ernment only, federal courts do not exclude the fruits of a pri-
vate search. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475, 65 L. Ed.
1048, 1051, 41 S. Ct. 574, 576 (1921) (papers obtained through
theft by private individual and delivered to federal prosecutors
admissible against defendant); see United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 96, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1658 (1984)
(private freight carrier notified government agents that damaged
package contained white powdery substance; information held
admissible, for "when an individual reveals private information
to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal
that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the fourth
amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that
information.").
At least one state, however, has applied the exclusionary
rule to searches by private parties in the same manner as the
rule is applied to searches by governmental officials. State v.
Hyem, 630 P.2d 202, 206 (Mont. 1981). The court concluded
that the increasing presence of private police, coupled with a cit-
izen's authority to arrest, militate in favor of subjecting private
parties to the same standard of conduct as public officials. Id. at
206; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564,
91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971); United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788
(9th Cir. 1981); cf. Kuehn v. Renton School District, 103 Wash.
2d 594, 694 P.2d 1078 (1985) (when private person acts under
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authority of state, fourth amendment applies; thus, lawfulness of
school search of students' luggage is not dependent upon
whether person conducting search is band director, principal, or
parent).
7.6 Searches by Private Individuals: Particular Applications
A private search becomes a state search if the private party
acts as an agent for the government or the two are engaged in a
joint endeavor. A private search also may be considered a state
search when the party conducting the search acts on behalf of
the public or with the purpose to aid the government. See, e.g.,
Hyde v. Robert T., 8 Cal. App. 3d 990, 88 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1970)
(entry by deceit considered government action when landlord
introduced plainclothes officer as companion in order to gain
access to apartment to search for stolen goods).
A minority of jurisdictions hold that any illegally obtained
evidence is inadmissible, regardless of who performed the unlaw-
ful act. See Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 45-48, 203 N.E.2d
481, 484-86, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 86-89 (1964) (Van Voorhis and
Bergan, J.J., dissenting). For a discussion of the admissibility of
evidence obtained illegally by a private person, see Annot., 36
A.L.R.3d 553, 575-84 (1971).
7.6(a) Agency Theory
Under an agency theory, a search is not private if ordered or
requested by a government officer. Thus, evidence is admissible
when obtained as a consequence of postal authorities opening a
package to see if the proper postage rate was paid, but is inad-
missible when the postal authorities open the package upon the
request of a police officer seeking evidence. United States v.
Valen, 479 F.2d 467 (3rd Cir. 1973); Thacker v. Commonwealth,
310 Ky. 702, 221 S.W.2d 682 (1949); State v. Blackshear, 140 Or.
App. 247, 511 P.2d 1272 (1973); Commonwealth v. Dembo, 451
Pa. 1, 301 A.2d 689 (1973); see United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984) (DEA agent's
removal of plastic bags from rubber tubing inside damaged
package and agent's visual inspection of contents enabled him to
learn nothing more than had been learned from private search
conducted earlier by private courier employees who called DEA
after observing white powdery substance). See generally New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. -, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 105 S. Ct. 733
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(1985) (school officials act as representatives of the state, not as
surrogates for parents, and they cannot claim the parents'
immunity from fourth amendment strictures).
7.6(b) Joint Endeavor Theory
Under a joint endeavor theory, when the police accompany
a citizen on a search, it becomes a government search. State v.
Scrotsky, 39 N.J. 410, 415, 189 A.2d 23, 25-26 (1963). It is imma-
terial whether the official originates the idea or simply joins the
search while it is in progress. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S.
74, 79, 93 L. Ed. 1819, 1823, 69 S. Ct. 1372, 1374 (1949). Tacit
governmental approval of a private entry also may convert a pri-
vate search into state action. State v. Becich, 13 Or. App. 415,
419-20, 509 P.2d 1232, 1234 (1973).
A search is private, however, if it is undertaken in direct
contravention of police instructions. United States v. Maxwell,
484 F.2d 1350, 1352 (5th Cir. 1973). And a search may be a pri-
vate search if a private purpose is being served even when the
police are summoned before the search begins and are present as
it occurs. United States v. Lamar, 545 F.2d 488, 490 (5th Cir.
1977) (heroin discovered by airline agent who opened unclaimed
bag to determine its owner is admissible even when officer was
present during search); see also United States v. Sherwin, 539
F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976) (allegedly obscene books discovered by
shipping manager and delivered to FBI admissible); Berger v.
State, 150 Ga. App. 166, 169, 257 S.E.2d 8, 10 (1979) (contra-
band discovered in briefcase by hotel manager and security per-
sonnel admissible because purpose of search was to determine
owner of lost or misplaced property); cf. Corngold v. United
States, 367 F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1966) (contraband discovered by
airline agent admissible when government agents participate,
regardless of whether search conducted at request of agents or
solely for airline's own purposes).
7.6(c) Public Function Theory
Evidence obtained by store detectives, security officers, and
insurance investigators generally is admissible. See United
States v. Lima, 424 A.2d 113, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Annot., 36
A.L.R.3d 553, 567-71 (1971). Searches by off-duty police officers
are considered private if the officers acted as private citizens and
if the search or seizure was unconnected with their duties as
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police officers. People v. Wachter, 58 Cal. App. 3d 911, 920-21,
130 Cal. Rptr. 279, 285 (1976) (deputy sheriff acted as private
citizen when he notified law enforcement officials of defendant's
marijuana plants).
But when a private party acts as a police officer, has a
strong interest in obtaining convictions, and is familiar with
search and seizure law, the purposes of the exclusionary rule are
served by suppression, and the rule will apply. See Stapleton v.
Superior Court, 70 Cal.2d 97, 100, 447 P.2d 967, 970, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 575, 578 (1969) (police participation in planning car search
that was conducted by credit card agent tainted subsequent
actions of agent with imprimatur of state action); Common-
wealth v. Eschelman, 477 Pa. 93, 100-01, 383 A.2d 838, 842
(1978) (off-duty police officer considered acting as government
agent when he trespassed, seized suspicious looking package
from car, and handed package over to police).
For examples of private action constituting state action in
contexts other than search and seizure cases, see Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 42 L. Ed. 2d 477, 95 S.
Ct. 449 (1974); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 90 L. Ed. 265,
66 S. Ct. 276 (1946).
7.6(d) Ratified Intent and Judicial Action Theory
A majority of jurisdictions have decided that when evidence
is seized to aid the government and when the government had
prior knowledge that the seizure would occur, the taint of the
illegal action is transferred to the government. See United
States v. McKjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1327-28 (5th Cir. 1975) (cop-
ies of fraudulent claims allowed into evidence because defendant
failed to prove that federal investigators knew nurse had ille-
gally copied records for government use).
7.7 Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: General Rule
The extent to which evidence related to an illegal search or
seizure may be suppressed depends on the extent to which the
evidence derives from exploitation of the illegality. Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 455, 83 S. Ct.
407, 417 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 64 L. Ed. 319, 40 S. Ct. 182 (1920) (when police unlaw-
fully seized documents, made copies of the documents, and
returned the originals, copies inadmissible); State v. Byers, 88
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Wash. 2d 1, 10, 559 P.2d 1334, 1338 (1977). The following sec-
tions discuss three tests that have been used to determine
whether a given piece of evidence constitutes "fruit of the poi-
sonous tree" and therefore should be suppressed. See generally
Comment, Custodial "Seizures" and the Poison Tree Doctrine:
Dunaway v. New York and Its Aftermath, 13 J. MAR. L. REV.
733 (1980).
7.7(a) Attenuation Test
The attenuation test suggests that at some point the taint of
the evidence becomes so dissipated as to preclude suppression.
That point arises when the detrimental consequences of the ille-
gal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost. Brown v. Illi-
nois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-09, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 430-31, 95 S. Ct.
2254, 2264-65 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); State v. Reid, 38
Wash. App. 203, 213, 687 P.2d 861, 868 (1984). For example, in
Reid, police arrested the defendant after he left his apartment
building and stepped into his car. When the defendant refused
to identify which apartment unit he had exited, police seized the
defendant's keys from the car, entered the building, and used
the keys to unlock the door to one of the apartments. The police
then entered the apartment, observed evidence in plain view,
and later returned and seized the evidence pursuant to a war-
rant. The court reasoned that even if the initial seizure of the
keys were unlawful, the evidence taken from the apartment
would be admissible; the seizure of the evidence "was so attenu-
ated that the taint of the seizure of the keys had dissipated." 38
Wash. App. at 205-09, 687 P.2d at 864-66 (moreover, "bystand-
ers had identified the door through which the defendant had
often entered and existed. [Thus,] [t]he keys were not utilitized
in the manner of a divining rod to locate [the defendant's]
apartment but rather to facilitate access to [the] residence and
to confirm from which door the defendant had exited.")
One commentator has suggested the following criteria for
establishing that the fruit of the unlawful search or seizure is too
attenuated to be suppressible:
(1) When "the chain between the challenged evidence
and the primary illegality is long or the linkage can be shown
only by 'sophisticated argument'. . . .In such a case it is highly
unlikely that the police officers foresaw the challenged evidence
as a probable product of their illegality; thus [the discovery of
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the evidence would] not have been a motivating force behind
[the search]." Consequently, the threat of exclusion would not
operate as a deterrent.
(2) When the evidence "is used for some relatively
insignificant or highly unusual purpose. Under these circum-
stances it is unlikely that, at the time the primary illegality was
contemplated, the police foresaw or were motivated by the
potential use of the evidence and the threat of exclusion would,
therefore, effect no deterrence."
(3) When the unlawful police conduct is minimally
offensive. Because "the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter undesirable police conduct, where that conduct is particu-
larly offensive the deterrence ought to be greater and .. .the
scope of exclusion broader." Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous
Tree-A Plea For Relevant Criteria, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1136,
1148-51 (1967).
7.7(b) Independent Source Test
When evidence has been obtained lawfully, the fact that
police additionally came by the evidence unlawfully does not
make it suppressible. Nix v. Williams, __ U.S. -, 81 L. Ed.
2d 377, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2509 (1984) ; State v. O'Bremski, 70
Wash. 2d 425, 429-30, 423 P.2d 530, 533 (1967) (when missing
child found during unlawful search of apartment, child's testi-
mony admissible because she was not discovered solely as result
of unlawful search; witness had informed police he knew where
child was).
The case for admitting the evidence is stronger when the
independent source is known prior to the police illegality.
United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir. 1966) (testi-
mony of witness found on premises of gambling casino during
illegal search admissible when witness' identity as casino patron
was learned previously from observation by federal agents); see
also United States v. Giglio, 263 F.2d 410, 413 (2d Cir. 1959).
Finally, when the unlawful search or seizure results only in
the police "focusing" their investigation on a particular individ-
ual, subsequently obtained evidence is not suppressible even if
police would not have been able to focus the investigation but
for the illegality. United States v. Friedland, 441 F.2d 855, 859
(2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Bacall, 443 F.2d 1050, 1056-57
(9th Cir. 1971) (even when evidence can be traced to leads
resulting from illegal search, evidence admissible if government
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in fact learned of evidence from independent source).
7.7(c) Inevitable Discovery Test
Evidence obtained as a result of unlawful police action nev-
ertheless is admissible when the police inevitably would have
obtained the evidence lawfully. Nix v. Williams, - U.S. f,
81 L. Ed. 2d 377, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2509 (1984); see also State v.
Reid, 38 Wash. App. 203, 209 n.6, 687 P.2d 861, 866 n.6 (1984);
Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790, 792 (2d Cir. 1943);
Clough v. State, 92 Nev. 603, 555 P.2d 840 (1976); State v. Cros-
sin, 21 Or. App. 835, 536 P.2d 1263 (1975).
The burden of proof is on the state on the issue of the inevi-
tability of a lawful discovery. Nix v. Williams, - U.S. at -,
81 L. Ed. 2d at 387, 104 S. Ct. at 2509. The state must prove the
inevitability by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
The inevitable discovery test applies even when the state
cannot show the police acted in good faith in accelerating the
discovery of the evidence. Williams at -, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 388,104 S. Ct. at 2510 (under inevitable or ultimate discovery excep-
tion to exclusionary rule, prosecution not required to prove
absence of bad faith). But see generally Maguire, How to
Unpoison the Fruit-The Fourth Amendment and the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 55 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 307, 315 (1964).
7.8 Particular Applications of the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
Doctrine
7.8(a) Confession as Fruit of Illegal Arrest
Generally, a court may admit a defendant's confession into
evidence consistent with the fifth amendment when the defen-dant confessed voluntarily. When a confession is the fruit of an
illegal search or seizure, however, the court also must ensure
that the distinct policies of the fourth amendment are satisfied.
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600-03, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 425-27,
95 S. Ct. 2254, 2260-61 (1975). A confession made immediately
upon an illegal entry and arrest is excludable, but when a sus-
pect is released after an illegal arrest and later returns to the
police station to make a confession, the confession is admissible
because its taint has dissipated. Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963).
The factors dissipating the taint of a confession are the
following:
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(1) the giving of Miranda warnings, although the warn-
ings taken alone do not constitute a per se break in causality
between the illegality and the confession;
(2) the temporal proximity of the arrest and the
confession;
(3) the presence of intervening circumstances; and
(4) the purpose and egregiousness of the official
misconduct.
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 603-05, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 428, 95 S.
Ct. at 2262; accord State v. Byers, 88 Wash. 2d 1, 8, 559 P.2d
1334, 1338 (1977); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,
110, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633, 645, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2564 (1980); State v.
Johnston, 38 Wash. App. 793, 690 P.2d 591 (1984).
When a person is detained but not formally arrested and
the detention is unlawful because probable cause is lacking, his
or her confession, if causally connected to the detention, is not
admissible, even though the person was first given Miranda
warnings. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218, 60 L. Ed. 2d
824, 839-40, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2259 (1979).
7.8(b) Confession as Fruit of Illegal Search
Dissipation of the taint and the Brown factors do not apply
to a confession following an unlawful search as opposed to one
following an unlawful arrest because a suspect is more likely to
confess as a result of a search. People v. Robbins, 54 Ill. App. 3d
298, 305, 369 N.E.2d 577, 581 (1977). Thus, a confession is sup-
pressible if it would not have been made but for the illegal
search. See State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 102-04, 640 P.2d
1061, 1067-68 (1982). But cf. United States v. Green, 523 F.2d
968, 972 (9th Cir. 1975) (defendant's admission allowed into evi-
dence when admission followed government agents' confronting
defendant with both legally and illegally seized products of
search); United States v. Trevino, 62 F.R.D. 74, 77 (S.D. Tex.
1974) (defendant's admissions allowed into evidence even
though they were result of an illegal search; defendant testified
at pre-trial hearing that he "probably would have" made admis-
sions even in absence of search).
7.8(c) Search as Fruit of Illegal Arrest or Detention
When a search is incident to an illegal arrest, the fruits of
the search are suppressible absent intervening factors such as a
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valid arrest occurring between the illegal arrest and the search.
United States v. Walker, 535 F.2d 896, 898 (5th Cir. 1976).
A search following an illegal arrest may be purged of the
taint by voluntary consent to the search; the voluntariness of the
consent may be determined by reference to the Brown factors. 3
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.4, at 644; see State v. Fortier,
113 Ariz. 332, 335, 553 P.2d 1206, 1209 (1976); see also State v.
Shoemaker, 85 Wash. 2d 207, 212, 533 P.2d 123, 125 (1975); cf.
supra § 5.12.
Some courts have held that when the execution of a search
warrant has been preceded by an illegal arrest of the person who
lives at the place searched, the evidence derived from the illegal
arrest is automatically excluded. See, e.g., People v. Shuey, 13
Cal. 3d 835, 850, 533 P.2d 211, 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 94 (1975).
But see State v. Fenin, 154 N.J. Super. 282, 381 A.2d 364 (1977)
(evidence of possession and of possession with intent to dis-
tribute controlled substance is admissible although preceded by
illegal search because evidence was obtained pursuant to valid
warrant and not as result of illegal search).
7.8(d)Search as Fruit of Illegal Search
When the issuance of a search warrant is based upon
untainted evidence, the fact that an illegal search took place
prior to securing the warrant will not invalidate the execution of
the warrant, and evidence seized during the execution will be
admissible. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. , 82 L. Ed. 2d
599, 614-15, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 3391 (1984) (second search of home
not tainted by prior illegal entry).
Generally, warrants are considered valid if they could have
been issued based upon the untainted information in the affida-
vit. See United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 1001-02, (2d
Cir. 1977) (when lawfully obtained evidence sufficient to justify
issuance of warrant, fact that officer might not have sought war-
rant but for receipt of illegally obtained evidence does not
require suppression of fruits of search made pursuant to war-
rant), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015, 54 L. Ed. 2d 760, 98 S. Ct. 732
(1978); United States v. Dimuro, 540 F.2d 503, 515 (1st Cir.
1976); United States v. Nelson, 459 F.2d 884, 889 (6th Cir.
1972).
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7.8(e) Arrest as Fruit of Illegal Search
If an arrest is based solely on information derived from an
illegal search, that arrest is tainted and void. United States v.
Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 1002 (2d Cir. 1977); see Sheff v. State,
329 So. 2d 270, 272 (Fla. 1976).
7.8(f) Identification of Suspect as Fruit of Illegal Arrest
Courts differ as to whether to exclude suspect identifica-
tions made as a result of an illegal arrest.
(1) Line-up identification.-Courts have reached con-
flicting conclusions on the suppression of line-up identifications
resulting from illegal arrests. Compare Commonwealth v. Gar-
vin, 448 Pa. 258, 265-66, 293 A.2d 33, 37-38 (1972) (permissible
to introduce line-up evidence obtained as result of illegal arrest),
with Garner v. State, 314 A.2d 908, 912 (Del. Super Ct. 1973)
(line-up evidence derived from illegal arrest suppressible).
Some courts have used the Brown factors in determining
whether such identifications are admissible. See Johnson v. Lou-
isiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365, 32 L. Ed. 2d 152, 161, 92 S. Ct. 1620,
1626 (1972) (defendant may consent to line-up and, hence, break
taint); State v. McMahon, 116 Ariz. 129, 133, 568 P.2d 1027,
1031 (1977) (post-arrest discovery of information connecting
defendant with another crime dissipates taint of illegal line-up if
new information comes to light before line-up occurs and illegal
arrest is not made with intent to obtain line-up evidence).
Courts also have examined the purpose and flagrancy of the offi-
cial misconduct. See 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.4, at
612-80.
(2) At-trial identification.-When both the police
officer's knowledge of the accused's identity and the victim's
independent recollection of the accused antedate the unlawful
arrest, an in-court identification of the accused by the victim is
untainted by either the arrest or the pre-trial identification aris-
ing therefrom. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 63 L.
Ed. 2d 537, 547-48, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 1251 (1980); State v. Mathe,
102 Wash. 2d 537, 688 P.2d 859 (1984). Other factors to be con-
sidered in determining whether the at-trial identification is
admissible include:
(a) the witness' prior opportunity to observe the
alleged criminal act;
(b) the existence of any discrepancy between any
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pre-line-up description and the defendant's actual description;
(c) any identification of another person as the per-
petrator prior to the line-up;
(d) the identification of the defendant by picture
prior to the line-up;
(e) the failure to identify the defendant on a prior
occasion; and
(f) the length of time between the alleged act and
the line-up identification.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149,
1166, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1940 (1967). Compare Payne v. United
States, 294 F.2d 723, 725 (D.C. Cir.) (no taint), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 883, 7 L. Ed. 2d 83, 82 S. Ct. 131 (1961), with Garner v.
State, 314 A.2d 908, 912 (Del. 1973) (in-court identification
inadmissible when based solely upon line-up identification that
was result of illegal arrest), and In re Woods, 20 Ill. App. 3d 641,
649, 314 N.E.2d 606, 611 (1974) (in-court identification tainted
by identification made pursuant to illegal arrest despite lapse of
six months).
When police have made flagrantly illegal arrests for the pur-
pose of securing identifications that otherwise could not have
been obtained, the identifications are inadmissible. United
States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 584-85 (2d Cir. 1970).
(3) Photo identification.-A photo identification pro-
duced by an unlawful arrest is not admissible. United States v.
Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537, 547-48, 100 S. Ct.
1244, 1251 (1980). But see Johnson v. State, 496 S.W.2d 72, 74
(Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (photo identification not fruit of illegal
arrest when discovery of outstanding warrant was intervening
circumstance).
Courts have allowed photos taken during illegal arrests tobe used on subsequent occasions to connect suspects with addi-
tional, unrelated crimes when the suspects were not arrested
originally for the sole purpose of acquiring the photo. See Peo-
ple v. McInnis, 6 Cal. 3d 821, 826, 494 P.2d 690, 693, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 618, 621, (1972) (use of photo identification permitted
when illegal arrest by law enforcement agency was not related to
crime with which defendant ultimately was charged by another
agency), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 106, 34 L. Ed. 2d 513, 93 S. Ct.
562 (1972); cf. People v. Pettis, 12 Ill. App. 3d 123, 127-28, 298
N.E.2d 372, 376 (1973) (testimony identifying defendant as per-
petrator of offense admissible when testimony resulted from
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photo taken after illegal arrest for different offense).
(4) Fingerprints.-Fingerprints may be suppressed
when the unlawful arrest was for the purpose of obtaining and
using the fingerprints for prosecuting the suspect for the crime
for which he or she was arrested. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S.
721, 727, 22 L. Ed. 2d 676, 681, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 1397-98 (1969);
see Paulson v. State, 257 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972) (because police did not arrest defendant for sole purpose
of obtaining fingerprints, fingerprints obtained from arrest for
public drunkenness not suppressible at trial for grand larceny).
7.8(g) Identification of Property as Fruit of Illegal Search
Testimony concerning an object seized during an illegal
search is inadmissible when the identification of the object has
no basis independent of the illegal search. People v. Dowdy, 50
Cal. App. 3d 180, 123 Cal. Rptr. 155, 159 (1975).
7.8(h) Testimony of Witness as Fruit of Illegal Search
Testimony and physical evidence are treated differently for
purposes of the exclusionary rule. United States v. Ceccolini,
435 U.S. 268, 280, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268, 279, 98 S. Ct. 1054, 1062
(1978). Verbal testimony carries with it an exercise of free will,
and the costs of excluding the evidence are great. Consequently,
the suppressibility of derivative witness testimony depends on
several of the following factors:
(1) Whether the witness testified freely.-See United
States v. Karathanos, 531 F.2d 26, 35 (2d Cir. 1976) (testimony
by illegal aliens obtained as result of illegal search inadmissible
because testimony was prompted by government statements
concerning future prosecution);
(2) Whether the physical fruits of the illegal search
were used in questioning the witness.-See State v. Rogers, 27
Ohio Op.2d 105, 114, 198 N.E.2d 796, 806 (1963) (testimony
about gun suppressed because witness would not have been
questioned about gun but for unlawful search);
(3) Whether the search and testimony were close in
time;
(4) Whether the witness' identity and location were
known before the search.-See State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wash. 2d
425, 429-30, 423 P.2d 530, 533 (1967) (when parents had sought
help from police, police questioned boy, and boy stated girl was
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in apartment, girl's testimony admissible although girl found in
apartment during illegal search);
(5) Whether the search was made with the intent to
find witnesses.-See Karathanos, 531 F.2d at 35; see also Peo-
ple v. Martin, 382 Ill. 192, 202-03, 46 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1942)
(testimony of witnesses suppressed when witness' names
obtained from papers found during illegal search of defendant's
premises). See generally Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 273-79, 55 L. Ed.
2d at 275-79, 98 S. Ct. at 1059-062.
7.8(i) Crime Committed in Response to Illegal Arrest or Search
Generally, evidence that the defendant attacked orattempted to bribe an officer is admissible even if the arrest was
illegal. United States v. Perdiz, 256 F. Supp. 805 806, (S.D. N.Y.
1966); State v. Aydelotte, 35 Wash. App. 125, 132, 665 P.2d 443
447 (1983); see People v. Puglisi, 380 N.Y.S.2d 221, 51 A.D.2d
695 (1976). Evidence of a suspect speeding away from an unlaw-
ful traffic stop has been considered sufficiently distinguishable
from the intrusion to be admissible at trial. State v. Owens, 39
Wash. App. 130, 692 P.2d 850 (1984).
The rationale for admitting the evidence is that acts of free
will purge the taint; application of the exclusionary rule would
only marginally further deterrence. In addition, exclusion would
permit persons unlawfully arrested to assault officers withoutrisk of criminal liability. Aydelotte, 35 Wash. App. at 132-33,
665 P.2d at 447-48. The evidence would be inadmissible, how-
ever, if it were the product of police exploitation. See People v.
Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 324 N.E.2d 872, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1975)
(when, without identifying themselves, officers encircled defen-
dant, evidence of defendant pulling gun inadmissible).
7.9 Waiver or Forfeiture of Objection
A defendant may waive or forfeit his or her constitutional
objection and thus render the objectionable evidence admissible.
A waiver can be made in several ways, including by failure to
make a timely objection, by the defendant testifying at trial
about the evidence, and by the entry of a guilty plea.
7.9(a) Failure to Make Timely Objection
Jurisdictions have their own rules for what constitutes atimely objection. Washington court rules provide that a defen-
19851
University of Puget Sound Law Review
dant's failure to object at the omnibus hearing may constitute a
waiver of the error if the party had knowledge of the illegality of
the search or seizure prior to the hearing. WASH. CT. Civ. R. 4.5.
The defendant's failure to object at trial will constitute a waiver
unless the illegality is of such a flagrant or prejudicial nature
that curative measures would have been futile. State v. Van
Auken, 77 Wash. 2d 136, 143, 460 P.2d 277, 282 (1969); State v.
Alman, 19 Wash. App. 169, 172, 573 P.2d 1329, 1331 (1977).
7.9(b) Testimony by Defendant Concerning Suppressed Evi-
dence
A defendant may not raise a fourth amendment claim on
appeal challenging the admission of evidence, notwithstanding a
timely objection, if the defendant gave testimony at trial admit-
ting the possession of that evidence. State v. Peele, 10 Wash.
App. 58, 67, 516 P.2d 788, 793 (1973); Jones v. State, 484
S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Crim. 1970). A claim may be raised, however,
if the defendant's testimony was induced by the erroneous
admission of the evidence. See Harrison v. United States, 392
U.S. 219, 225, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1047, 1053, 88 S. Ct. 2008, 2011
(1968); Peele, 10 Wash. App. at 67-68, 516 P.2d at 794. The
rationale for the general rule is that the testimony makes the
admission of the illegal evidence harmless error. See Peele, 10
Wash. App. at 66, 516 P.2d at 793; Cadle v. State, 136 Ga. App.
232, 221 S.E.2d 59 (1975); infra § 7.10.
7.9(c) Guilty Plea
A defendant who has knowingly and voluntarily entered a
guilty plea may not therefter obtain post-conviction relief on
fourth amendment grounds even though he or she made a timely
motion to suppress in advance of the plea. Sanders v. Craven,
488 F.2d 478, 479 (9th Cir. 1973); see Tolett v. Henderson, 411
U.S. 258, 267, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235, 243, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608 (1973).
Because the conviction is based on the plea, the defendant can-
not directly challenge the evidence. Sanders, 488 F.2d at 479.
But if the plea itself can be characterized as the fruit of illegally
obtained evidence and consequently should have been sup-
pressed upon the defendant's timely motion, then the plea was
not entered voluntarily or knowingly. The defendant in such a
case is permitted to go to trial and, if convicted, to appeal the
admission of the evidence. See Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 724, 732-35
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(1968).
7.10 Harmless Error
Even when illegally seized evidence has been improperly
admitted at trial, a conviction will not be reversed if the defen-
dant would have been convicted without its admission. See
State v. Smith, 93 Wash. 2d 329, 352-53, 610 P.2d 869, 883
(1980); State v. Fricks, 91 Wash. 2d 391, 396, 588 P.2d 1328,
1332 (1979).
CONCLUSION
Search and seizure law is continually undergoing both minormodifications and major revisions. This is particularly true inlight of the Washington Supreme Court's recent reliance on arti-
cle I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. The reader thus
should be aware that this Survey is not comprehensive and will
require continuous updating.
Although the particulars of search and seizure law may
change, the types of issues raised and considered are likely toremain much the same. This survey should be a useful tool for
lawyers and judges who must assess the scope of protection
Washington affords against unlawful searches and seizures.
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State v. Williams, 94 Wash. 2d 531, 617 P.2d 1012 (1980) §§ 1.6,
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denied, 93 Wash. 2d 1008 (1980) §§ 1.1, 2.4(b), 5.31
State v. Woodall, 32 Wash. App. 407, 647 P.2d 1051 (1982) rev'd
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5.8
FRISK
SEE: Stop and Frisk





Search and Seizure Survey
Arrest as fruit of illegal
search, 7.8(d)
Attenuation test, 7.7(a)
Confession as fruit of
illegal arrest, 7.8(a)




arrest, as fruit, 7.8(i)




as fruit of illegal
arrest, 7.8(f)
Identification of






Search as fruit of illegal
arrest or detention,
7.8(c)
Search as fruit of prior
illegal search, 7.8(e)
Testimony as a fruit,
7.8(h)
Use of illegally seized

















































University of Puget Sound Law Review
TEST





























































































SEE: Affidavit for Search
Warrant
OBSCENE MATERIALS































































University of Puget Sound Law Review
Observation by officer of
object in a protected
area, 5.7(b)
























SEE: Prisoners or Pre-Trial
Detainees
PREMISES
SEE ALSO: Business and
Commercial Premises,
Inspection of Fire Scenes
Adjoining lands,
































Level of proof necessary
for search of, 6.2(b)





SEE: Expectation of Privacy
PRIVATE PAPERS









































































































SEE: Stop and Frisk
REASONABLE EXPECTA-
TION OF PRIVACY























As a result of lawful
arrest, 5.2(a)
Use of force, 5.2(a)





SEE ALSO: Affidavit for
Search Warrant; Execution





































SEE: Fruit of the Poisonous
Tree
SEIZURE
SEE ALSO: Protected Areas
and Interests; Warrantless
Searches



























































































As aid to observation,
5.8
TERRY STOP






























Seizure of person, 1.4(b)


























Search and Seizure Survey
Veracity, 2.6(b)
VIEW












Searches; Stop and Frisk
Administrative searches,
6.4










Prior to arrest, 5.3
Requirements
generally, 5.0
Schools, 6.1
Special situations, 5.5,
5.30
WARRANTS
SEE: Arrest
Search Warrants
Warrants;
WITNESS-VICTIM
INFORMATION
SEE: Victim-Witness
Information
1985]
